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This study answers the research question: what factors determine the onset and duration 
of civil wars involving natural resources? This case study analysis uses determinants 
extracted from several quantitative studies to examine the role of natural resources in 
civil war. This study compares resource politics in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
and the Republic of Botswana from independence to the early 2000s.  
 
The Congo officially became embroiled in a civil war in 1996 and then in 1998. During 
this same period another resource-rich country, Botswana was able to parlay resource 
abundance into positive development indicators. However, Botswana‘s political and 
economic weaknesses help exclude some of the factors commonly associated with the 
role of resources in civil war. For example, Botswana depended heavily upon resource 
exports. It also failed to develop sectors outside of the mining sector. In addition, it was a 
de facto single-party country. Still, Botswana remained peaceful.  
 
Scholars believe that at the end of the Cold War rebels had to seek their own funding 
sources since superpower assistance was no longer available. This discourse suggests that 
we can understand more about rebel mobilization since the story is no longer clouded by 
Cold War politics.  
 
The findings in this study suggest that the discourse has not moved as rapidly as 
previously thought. The discourse is now in its second generation. The first generation 
was characterized by economic explanations (as a departure from a history of political 
explanations). The second generation has come full circle, back to political explanations. 
Despite these developments, a number of operationalization problems inhibit a clear 
understanding of causality.  
 
This study recommends new approaches to understanding the role of resources in 
conflicts. Currently, scholars over-determine the role of natural resources in civil war. 
For example, a set of unique historical circumstances merged to create the conditions for 
civil wars in the Congo in 1996 and 1998. The distinctions bêtween resource conflicts 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
 
―The meek shall inherit the earth, but not the mineral rights.‖ -J. Paul Getty  
 
Scholars have identified several determinants of intra-state, violent natural resource 
conflict. In this study I answer the following research question: What factors appear to be 
associated with the onset and duration of natural resource conflict in developing 
countries? This study compares the diamond resource politics in Botswana with those in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). While a number of quantitative and 
qualitative studies address natural resource conflict in various ways, few offer case 
analyses of a range of determinants. This void suggests that more comprehensive case 
studies are needed to identify the determinants of the onset and duration of natural 
resource conflict in countries of the same region.  
The Chapters 
Chapter 1 of this study introduces the topic. Chapter 2 contains a literature 
review. From this literature review, I identify the determinants of the onset and duration 
of natural resource conflict. Chapter 3 explains the research methods I employ in this 
study. This chapter also provides a justification for case selection. In addition, it lists the 
sources that I consult for this study. Those sources include state archive documents, 
humanitarian reports, cease-fire agreements, development indices, state constitutions, 
corporate reports, personal communications, interviews, and reputable media reports. 
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Chapter 4 contains a case study of DRC, based on the determinants identified in Chapter 
2. Chapter 4 contains analysis as well as findings. Chapter 5 contains a case study of 
Botswana, based on the determinants identified in Chapter 2. Chapter 5 also contains 
findings and analyses. Chapter 6 provides comparative analyses of the findings from both 
cases. In these comparative analyses, I examine the extent to which my findings can be 




Chapter II: The Determinants of Natural Resource Conflict 
 
In this chapter I lay out what we know about violent conflict involving natural 
resources in developing countries. Here I define such conflict as “violent conflict 
between the armed forces of two or more parties, striving to gain economic 
advantage and control the extraction, the distribution, and the production of high-
value goods” (Angstrom, 2001:109). Historically, scholars have been concerned 
about such intra-state conflicts largely because of their potential to destabilize the 
regions in which they occur. Since September 11, 2001 another concern has 
emerged--unstable regions in the world incubate terrorists (Rabasa, et. al, 2007). 
These regions provide bases of operations for terrorists and resources to finance 
their activities. Most importantly, natural resource conflicts place millions of 
innocent people in harm’s way.  
Natural resource conflict is present to some degree or another in all regions of the 
world. Natural resource competition can occur wherever people demand natural 
resources, regardless of the available supply (Harding, 1968). The resources referenced in 
this study are oil, gemstones, minerals and timber. The following literature review 
explains why, according to scholars, violent conflicts erupt or heighten as a result of 
competition over resources.  
This chapter unfolds as follows. First, I will discuss the historical circumstances 
that have pushed the natural resource conflict discourse forward. Next, I will identify the 
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major theories that have emerged to explain natural resource conflict. Different theories 
explain natural resource conflict differently. For example, some scholars contend that 
resource abundance alone causes and prolongs conflict. In contrast, others contend that 
state weaknesses explain the likelihood and intensity of conflict. Still others explain the 
onset and duration of conflict as a product of behavior by Western states and 
corporations. They explain conflict as the result of a ―political economy of conflict.‖ Still 
others use rebel motivations and behavior, elite contestation, and the nature of the 
resources themselves to explain the onset and duration of conflict. The key findings from 
this literature review will serve as guides in my subsequent analysis of natural resource 
conflict.  
The Determinants of Natural Resource Conflict 
Since the 1990s, the study of intra-state (violent) natural resource conflict in developing 
countries has exploded across a variety of disciplines including economics, political 
science, sociology, geography and environmental politics (Ron, 2005 and Isham, et al., 
2002). Findings from these studies have not contradicted each other so much as 
emphasized different factors (Ross, 2004). One key association that has been identified is 
that between resource dependence and civil war (Dunning, 2005; Collier and Hoeffler, 
1998). In their ground-breaking study, Collier and Hoeffler operationalized resource 
dependence as the ratio of a country‘s primary commodity exports to its GDP.  Using a 
threshold of 1,000 battled-related deaths to indicate that a conflict has occurred, Collier 
and Hoeffler concluded that up to 32 percent of primary commodity exports to GDP an 
increase in the percent of primary commodity exports increased the likelihood of a 
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conflict within the next five years. This study seemed to fulfill a World Bank economic 
policy agenda by using economic determinants to explain natural resource conflict. 
Subsequently, these findings have been challenged (Fearon, 2005) with the same or 
similar data, different data, and different foci altogether.  
  Another key association has been established between natural resource conflict 
and the economic interests of rebels. Collier and Hoeffler (2001) concluded that groups 
organize against the dominant power primarily to control resource revenue. Collier and 
Hoeffler (2001) contrast this explanation with an explanation that rebel groups organize 
against the dominant power primarily to correct some political injustice. The finding that 
rebels are primarily motivated by resource revenue has been disputed even by scholars 
using the same or similar data (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2002; 
Hegre, 2002). This finding has catalyzed an entire discourse.  
Despite recent developments in this discourse, violent conflicts with natural 
resources themes are by no means new. Strategic natural resource acquisition figured 
prominently, for example, in the European conquests of Africa, Southeast Asia, and 
South America. In addition, self-determination struggles fought throughout colonial 
history were struggles over ownership of human and natural resources (Ayittey, 2005; 
Ron, 2005; Malone and Nitzschke, 2005). In the absence of a colonial backdrop, natural 
resource conflict is now portrayed as ―organized banditry‖ among African warlords 
(Thom, 1999: html format - under ―Proxy Border Wars and Economic Insurgency‖).  
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The Role of Resource Abundance 
Some studies identify the abundance of resources itself as a key determinant of 
the onset and duration of violent natural resource conflict. Common use of the term 
―resource curse‖ implies that a country that has abundant natural resources originating 
within its legal boundaries is destined to suffer from underdevelopment (deSoysa-a, 
20002). The suggestion here is that leaders will rely too heavily on one revenue source 
and/or rent-seeking officials will misuse the proceeds from that revenue source.  
The notion of predestined underdevelopment is a crucial node in connecting 
natural resource abundance to natural resource conflict. The notion of predestined 
underdevelopment suggests that states will first fail to organize their own governments. 
They will also fail to educate and train their populations for meaningful work. In 
addition, states will fail to provide adequate health care, transportation, and utilities. 
Finally, states will fail to socialize their citizens to respect property rights and rule of law. 
Most incendiary, however, is the conclusion that states will abuse their people through 
various forms of physical neglect and direct force. This approach concludes that dire 
neglect, a weak governing system, and abundant resources are strong incentives for 
natural resource conflict.  
Developing countries with vast resource(s) such as Angola, Colombia, and 
Indonesia, often struggle to meet the basic needs of their citizens (Karl, 1997). For 
example, while oil accounts for more than 95 percent of Nigeria's export earnings and 
more than 80 percent of all government revenues (Global Insight, Economic Risk 
Analysis, 2006), it is a cruel irony that Nigeria would experience an energy crisis. In such 
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situations, oil, gemstones, minerals and timber act as ―grapes of wrath‖ (Steinbeck, 
1939), laying fully in view yet very distant from the people whose lives could be 
enhanced by them. Another term that appears frequently in the natural resource conflict 
discourse is ―Dutch Disease‖ (Lewis, 1998). This term refers to the failure of countries to 
diversify their economies because of heavy dependence on a particular resource. Such 
was the case of Angola in the 1990s and its heavy dependence on the oil industry (Aunty, 
2000).  
Despite a host of anecdotal evidence that links natural resource abundance to 
conflict (deSoysa-b, 2002), some evidence suggests a tenuous link. Countries such as 
―Chile, Botswana and Norway‖ have used resource wealth as a―bedrock for economic 
development‖ (Ron, 2005:444). Ascher (1999), for example, concludes that by 
understanding the deliberate actions of governments we can know how resources become 
a hindrance to an economy rather than a boon. More specifically, he holds government 
responsible for regulating markets and making resource extractors accountable for 
attaching the appropriate value to natural resources. According to Ascher, at every step of 
the refining process, goods and services have to be priced appropriately to avoid under-
and over-exploitation. For example, raw materials must be priced according to their 
inherent value plus the value of investment capital, the cost of extraction labor, the cost 
of equipment and supplies, and the impact to the local environment. While Asher notes 
policy failures in resource abundant countries that resulted in the misuse of resources, he 
also highlights policy shifts that have resulted in more efficient uses of resources in 
Brazil (land and forests), Chile (copper), Costa Rica (land and forests) and Ghana 
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(cocoa). In short, violence vis-à-vis resource abundance is not a foregone conclusion. 
Still, mismanagement of natural resources presents a number of challenges for 
developing countries that struggle with basic organization.  
Resource abundance has presented some serious challenges for the geographically 
diverse countries listed in Table 1. While the geographic diversity represented here 
counters the notion that natural resource conflict is an African problem (Banks, 2005),  
this extensive list suggests that there might be something to the notion of ―resource 
curse.‖   
Klare (2001) adds that we can easily draw a map of conflict in the post-Cold War 
system. He says:  
The analysis would begin with a map showing all major deposits of oil and  
natural gas lying in contested and unstable areas. The zones of potential trouble  
include the Persian Gulf, the Caspian Sea basin, and the South China Sea, along  
with Algeria, Angola, Chad, Columbia, Indonesia, Nigeria, Sudan, and 
Venezuela-areas and states that together house about four-fifths of the world‘s 
known petroleum reserves…The map would also trace pipelines and tanker routes  
used to carry oil and natural gas from their points of supply to markets in the 
West.  
  
A map of contested resource zones would also show all major water systems 
shared by two or more countries in arid or semi-arid areas (53-54).  
  
This map would indicate major concentrations of gems, minerals, and old-growth timber 
in the developing world. As shown in Table 1 and described in the quote above, a variety 
of resources has played roles in intrastate conflicts across the world.  
In short, many scholars conclude that the mere presence of natural resources is a 
curse that dooms societies to violent conflict. This rather deterministic view holds that 
countries with vast natural resources will inevitably face conflict over these resources.  
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Table 1. Examples of Natural Resource Conflicts 
State Resource Period of Conflict 
Afghanistan Gems, opium 1978-2001  
Angola Oil, diamonds 1975-2002 
Angola (Cabinda) Oil 1975-Present  
Cambodia Timber, gems 1978-1997 
Colombia Oil, gold, coca 1984 
Congo, Republic of Oil 1997  
 




Indonesia (Aceh) Natural gas 1975- Present 
Indonesia (West Papua) Copper, gold 1969- Present 
Liberia Timber, diamonds, iron, 
palm oil, cocoa, coffee, 






 Phosphates, oil 1975- Present 
Myanmar
2
 Timber, tin, gems, opium 1949- Present 
Papua New Guinea
3
 Copper, gold 1988- 2001 
Peru Coca 1980-1995  
Sierra Leone Diamonds 1991-2000  
Sudan Oil 1983- Present 
Source: Ross, Michael. 2003. ―Natural Resource Wealth Can Make You Poor.‖ In Natural Resources and 
Violent Conflict: Options and Actions. Ian Bannon and Paul Collier (eds). World Bank: Washington, DC. 
Pp.17-42.  
 
                                                        
1 Sahara Press Service. February 3, 2009. West Sahara/UN-AU. ―Negotiations Between Morocco and 
Polisario Front Will be Revived ‗Soon‘ (Bon Ki-Moon).‖  
2 Evidence of low-intensity conflict: International Crisis Group . February 1, 2009. Crisis Watch. 
Downloaded February 3, 2009.  
3 US Peace Institute: Digital Collection. April 30, 2001. Bougainville Peace Agreement, Signed at Arawa. 
Downloaded February 3, 2009.  
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 This view glosses over histories of exploitation, abuse, and mismanagement of 
developing countries by former colonial powers. It also ignores that upon independence, 
developing states differed in their administrative capacities. Still, extant studies both 
support and contradict the ―resource curse‖ explanation for natural resource conflict.  
The International System 
Some studies identify the current configuration of the international political 
system as a key determinant of violent natural resource conflict in developing countries. 
The World Systems perspective, for example, suggests that the international system is 
comprised of classes of actors, where progress for one set of actors--usually in Western 
states--is dependent upon the exploitation of actors in other states (Wallerstein, 1982). 
Dunning (2005) conceptualizes natural resource conflict as a two-level game. The game 
is activated by the value of natural resources at one level--the international market. 
International market prices and supplies determine whether there will be peace or conflict 
at the state level (Dunning, 2005).  
The World Systems perspective explains natural resource conflict in terms of the 
dynamics among states, corporations, country leaders, non-governmental organizations, 
inter-governmental organizations, trading blocs, other international actors, and local 
actors. Outside ownership of oil resources and refining processes, for example, assure 
that the locals in Nigeria can only control oil through violence. The dynamics between 
Nigerian rebels and the Shell Company are influenced by local circumstances. They are 
also, however, affected by the policies, business practices, and consumption habits of the 
Western world.  
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Even efforts to modernize developing countries (in Western-style bureaucratic 
processes) appear to play a role in these struggles. For example, the International 
Monetary Fund‘s (IMF) push for foreign direct investment in developing countries may 
inadvertently increase the power base of local warlords, other local leaders, and national 
leaders who act as gatekeepers to resource-abundant land and with whom investors must 
negotiate (Reno, 1997).  Also, IMF austerity measures (to modernize and stabilize 
fledgling economies) (Noble, 1990), ―usually involve cutting public spending, devaluing 
the national currency to stimulate exports and reducing imports. By stipulating that 
governments to reduce subsidies on food staples, such programs have provoked rioting, 
most recently in Venezuela‖ (Bollag, 1989). Enduring such conditions, the unemployed 
may view short-term mining opportunities and a range of illicit enterprises as viable 
opportunities. 
Martin (2005) takes a more radical stance. He concludes that domination of local 
resources by outside corporations is part of a continuing legacy. This legacy is comprised 
of deliberate attempts to decimate the African population in order to satisfy Western 
appetites for the products made from Africa‘s natural resources.  
Other scholars working within the World Systems perspective also blame the 
current configuration of the international system for local conflicts. For example, 
Dunning and Wirpsa (2004) link the renewal of old local rivalries with the international 
demand for oil in Columbia and other former Third World countries. More specifically, 
they note that the ―revival of the National Liberation Army (ELN), Columbia‘s second 
largest guerilla group, has been linked to payments received from foreign energy 
12 
 
contractors‖ (84). Dunning and Wirpsa further contend that local conflicts in Columbia 
reflect foreign investors‘ willingness to protect their interest through military force. The 
U.S., for example, is willing to assert itself in this manner because of the growing 
uncertainty surrounding the Middle East oil supply. As a result of this willingness 
mercenaries are now thrown into the mix of old rivalries.  
The World Systems perspective relates these rivalries to the international market 
value of natural resources. For example, a devaluation of abundant natural resources cuts 
into the profits of the resource abundant country. In theory, such policies hurt the citizens 
of the resource abundant country and further entrench inequalities. If a country, however, 
is well-positioned in the international market for that abundant natural resource, that 
position provides some degree of stability in profits (Dunning, 2005). Still, citizens may 
be unable to either purchase the resources that are abundant in their own country or 
unable to benefit from them indirectly.  
It is also important to point out the roles that other developing countries play in 
the political economies of natural resource conflict. In the 1990s, for example, Liberia 
and Sierra Leone played a significant role in the ―rebellion‖ in Guinea. These countries—
most specifically Charles Taylor of Liberia--provided military assistance to the rebels and 
provided places to which rebel forces could retreat from battle. Taylor had set his sights 
on Guinea‘s natural resources. Such blatant destruction notwithstanding, states such as 
Liberia that border significant waterways may also benefit directly from natural resource 
conflict by serving as crucial links in smuggling and legitimate transportation routes 
(Gberie, 2001).  
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Scholars working from a World Systems perspective provide numerous examples 
of local, state, and international organizations‘ negative impacts on developing countries. 
However, this perspective also helps highlight a few positives in the international politics 
of natural resource management. First, non-governmental organizations, such as Global 
Witness (2004), have been instrumental in exposing (Gereffi et. al, 2001) corporations 
that exploit resource abundant countries. Such international activists have played key 
roles in nudging corporations toward stronger self-regulation. Other international 
organizations and programs have provided the structures needed for self-regulation. The 
Kimberley Process
4
 (Malone and Nitzschke, 2005), for example, is a process by which 
diamonds are certified as ―conflict free.‖ While the Kimberley Process holds some 
promise, it ignores the notion that some of the local officials who can verify authenticity, 
maintain ties in illicit markets. Also, as of yet there is no systematic analysis to suggest 
that the Kimberley Process has prevented conflict. Still, other efforts to control natural 
resource conflict abound.  
The United Nations has developed a sophisticated support network for businesses 
that are interested in implementing sustainable practices in their operations throughout 
the world. The UN‘s Global Compact
5
, helps businesses understand, develop, and 
implement best business practices around ―human rights, the environment, and anti-
corruption.‖ Also see the Association for Responsible Mining 
(http://www.communitymining.org). 





The UN and other international organizations, such as the Carter Center
6
, have 
engaged in direct peacekeeping activities and operations in areas where resources have 
been violently contested. For example, the UN has established a peacekeeping mission in 
the highly fractured DRC.  
The United Nations Security Council established MONUC (UN Mission in DR 
Congo) to facilitate the implementation of the Lusaka Accord signed in 1999. 
With a budget exceeding one billion dollars, it is the largest and most expensive 




Also, the European Union lists natural resource conflict prevention and management as 
specific areas of concern within its larger conflict prevention strategy (European 
Commission, 2001). Finally, other states have played roles in preventative measures and 
brokering peace agreements after conflicts have begun. For example, in response to the 
power shifts occurring in the post-Cold War era, the US articulated interest in preventing 
conflict in the historically fractured Balkan states (Steinberg, 1996). The problem with 
intervention by other states, however, is that their own interests may get in the way of 
preventative measures and agreements (Waltz, 1979). Of particular concern to the 
international community was the vast natural resource base in the Balkans. 
While media are replete with anecdotes about how international players have 
brought attention and accountability to resource refining processes, there is no 
systematic, empirical evidence to suggest that non-governmental or inter-governmental 
organizations have prevented the onset or shortened the duration of conflicts. For 





example, UN actions may result in a truce among factions, but not necessarily peace 
(DeRouen and Sobek, 2004; Keen, 2001) for the average citizen. Citizens may still 
endure looting, violent checkpoints, forced labor, rape, and kidnapping by the controlling 
faction. Also, as of yet, there is no systematic analysis to suggest that the Kimberley 
Process has prevented conflict.  
 In summary, a World Systems perspective suggests that natural resource conflict 
is influenced by a range of actors inside and outside the state
8
. The literature suggests that 
organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank may 
contribute indirectly to natural resource conflict when they encourage foreign direct 
investment and impose austerity measures to modernize economies. The literature also 
suggests that corporate control of markets, corporate operating procedures, and Western 
consumption habits also influence natural resource conflict. Outside influence on natural 
resource conflict is not limited to Western states or corporations. The interests of 
neighboring states also influence conflict. Neighboring states often provide legitimate 
and illegitimate transportation routes and bases for rebel organization. The negative 
impacts of corporate interests and the interests of other states seem to compound when a 
government military or paramilitary (mercenary) group is present to protect the resources. 
All of these actors are connected by a political economy in which there must be 
exploiters and exploited. There is often overlap of these two categories.  
                                                        
8 The roles of inside actors are discussed a societal conditions.  
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It is important to note that the natural resource conflict literature also suggests that 
certain actors in the world system have attempted to reduce the number and length of 
natural resource conflicts. Groups such as Global Witness expose bad corporate behavior. 
Also, there is an international effort to establish certification processes for resources. In 
addition, the UN has established peacekeeping missions. Finally, organizations such as 
the UN, the African Union, the Carter Center, and other countries have attempted to 
broker peace agreements among warring factions. For example, South Africa has 
attempted to intercede in conflicts inside the DRC. However, other states‘ own interest 
may get in the way of a settlement. Also, there is no systematic evidence that suggests 
that these interventions have reduced or eliminated natural resource conflict.  
The Role of Governance 
Some studies identify governance as a key determinant of violent natural resource 
conflict. It is widely held that state strength and state behavior—two aspects of 
governance—play intermediate roles in natural resource conflict. Fearon (2004), for 
example, concludes that weak states rather than strong rebels are to blame for increased 
violence over resources, especially fuel. The term governance appears quite frequently in 
the natural resource conflict literature. According to Malone and Nitzschke (2005:5), 
level of governance appears to be a powerful explanation for violent natural resource. For 
some the term governance signifies the presence of an independent legislature, 
independent judiciary, and independent executive (Marshall, et. al., 2006). For others 
governance comes from ―the processes and institutions, both formal and informal that 
guide and restrain the collective activities of a group‖ (Nye and Donahue, 2000:12).  
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In the natural resource conflict literature, corrupt legislatures, judiciaries, and 
executives are considered foregone conclusions because there appears to be little restraint 
on the collective activities of groups (Alao and Olonisakin, 2000). Auty (2000:30) 
conceptualizes these problems as the results of a ―two-stage, staple trap model.‖ First, 
resource abundance handicaps state development. Subsequently, the fragile state then 
fails to deliver the state services that would contribute to further development. Alao and 
Olonisakin (2000) also treat a weak, centralized state as a given in resource conflict. 
They, therefore, call for a ―systematic understanding of economic and political 
motivations‖ of people who exploit the state from the outside and the inside (27).  
For an analysis of natural resource conflict, two sets of choices appear to help 
define the strength of a state: (1) the manner in which state agents collect revenue; and 
(2) the way those agents choose to spend that revenue (Isham, et. al., 2002). The 
conditions created by these decisions determine how ―feasible‖ it is for soldiers to wage 
war, or whether or not ―permissive causes‖ will allow them to wage war (Humphrey, 
2005:512). For example, when agents of the state depend heavily upon a limited number 
of revenue sources, they can ignore the demands made by the broader society. Since 
wealth is narrowly distributed and public demands can be ignored, elites have little 
incentive to spend resources on social services including education, healthcare, job 
training, and transportation. Also, those residing in the base can use their wealth to 
suppress political contestation.  
Luong and Weinthal (2001) conclude that the interaction of low political 
contestation and availability of alternative resources appears to restrict control of 
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resources to a narrow group of people who may treat the resources as their own (Luong 
and Weinthal, 2001)
9
. In doing so, they may fail to develop other sectors. State spending 
reflects their efforts to retain control of state resources. In a well-established kleptocracy, 
for example, the entrenched elites may not be interested in devoting resources to modern 
institutions which may redistribute state control (Dunning, 2005; Cater, 2003; Auty, 
2000; Sachs and Warner, 1995). Economic diversification may create societal bases of 
power outside the control of political elites. These independent bases of power may then 
facilitate future challenges to the political power of state incumbents, especially during 
the catastrophic economic downturns and fiscal crises that typically characterize 
resource-reliant countries (Dunning, 2005:452).  
  A lack of broad-based public investment almost assures a surplus of low-skilled 
workers who have no bargaining power with employers (Ross, 2001; Goldstone, 2000; 
Cincotta, 2003). This surplus, as in the Rwanda/Congo region, becomes a hazard when 
refugees or migrants from neighboring communities place demographic pressure on a 
weak state. In the face of limited political and economic opportunities and fierce 
economic competition, resource mining, smuggling, and rebel-rousing are rational 
options (Goldstone, et. al, 2000). It is no wonder that natural resource conflict is 
associated with porous state borders (Auty, 2000). Auty attributes the success of Khmer 
Rouge factions, for example, to their commercial relationships and proximity to Thailand 
and Vietnam.  
                                                        
9 Their findings lend credence to the notion of a Dutch Disease.  
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In linking state capacity to natural resource conflict, scholars must temper their 
conclusions. The state governance explanation is riddled with problems in direction of 
causality. As previous paragraphs illustrate, low state capacity may lead to high resource 
dependence and violent competition. Resource dependence, however, can lead to low 
state capacity. It can hinder the development of organizing tools, such as rule of law and 
property rights (Barro, 2000; DeMesquita and Root, 2000; Klare, 1999). For example, 
Luong and Weinthal (2001:377) outline the process by which resource endowment 
hinders state capacity. The dissolution of the Soviet Union provided these scholars a 
unique opportunity to examine, within states with common political histories, resource 
policies that either lead to control by a narrow power base or to investment from a 
broader base.  
In summary, state strength and state behavior appear to play intermediate or 
―permissive‖ roles in natural resource conflict. Phrased differently, a weak state is 
necessary for natural resource conflicts to occur. State strength may speak to a state‘s 
physical might, the durability of the rule of law, and/or the state‘s economic vitality. The 
state must be able to restrain the collective activities of groups within the state. The state 
that cannot maintain order within its borders is certainly vulnerable to natural resource 
conflict. Also, a state must be able to protect its borders from mass migration, as well as 
hostile military invaders. Mass migrations may lead to intense resource competition.  
Even with sufficient internal order and border protection, to protect against  
resource conflicts it appears that states must adhere to a definition of rule of law that 
protects property as well as life. Contracts and ownership rights must be binding in order 
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to attract the type of local and foreign investment that will lead to long-term economic 
development. Long-term economic development necessarily includes the development of 
a range of alterative sectors, beyond resource extraction. Long-term economic 
development is important because it appears to engage more of the citizenry in the state 
economy. Having found a productive place in a legitimate economy, citizens have less 
incentive to resign themselves to various forms of war entrepreneurship, including 
artisanal mining.  
  It appears that governments mediate those factors including basic order and rule 
of law that reduce the likelihood of natural resource conflict.  Broadly speaking, the way 
government collects revenue and spends that revenue determines that state‘s vulnerability 
to natural resource conflict. If a government relies heavily upon resource revenue, it can 
afford to ignore the demands of the wider populace that is not contributing revenue 
through systematic, direct taxes
10
. Consequently, the government may not parlay resource 
revenue into public services and appropriate infrastructure projects. The literature 
suggests these dynamics create the grievances that foster natural resource conflict.  
The Role of Societal Conditions 
Some studies identify societal conditions as key determinants of violent natural 
resource conflict. These conditions include types and varieties of funding sources for 
rebels, widespread grievances among the population, a sense of economic entitlement, 
ethnic division, and demographic pressure.  
                                                        
10 A type of tax, however, may be extracted through inflation, theft, or bribery.  
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Sobels and the state 
 State behavior plays a key role in rebel behavior. As I mention above, a weak, 
kleptocratic state provides opportunities for rebel organization. Rebels may seek control 
of the state itself or separation from the state (Ross, 2002). These efforts, however, are 
not the exclusive domain of rebel groups. The literature indicates that in conflicts such as 
those in Sierra Leone and the Sudan, the state directs or is at least complicit in rebel 
behavior. ―The oft-cited ‗sobel‘ phenomenon (‗soldiers by day, rebels by night‘) [is] 
witnessed in Angola and Sierra Leone where soldiers frequently collude with rebels for 
personal gain in the diamond-rich areas, with negative consequences for military 
discipline and the civilian population‖ (Malone and Nitzschke, 2005:7 and Reno, 
1998:125-7).  
Sources of rebel funding 
Other factors such as access to diverse forms of funding and the funding sources 
themselves, however, help explain when rebels are able to organize and maintain group 
cohesion. Framed differently, Humphrey (2005) discusses when it is ―feasible‖ (512) for 
rebels to organize. Weinstein (2005), for example, focuses on how amount and types of 
funding sources determine the types of members that rebel groups can attract. Because of 
consistent external support from Cuba and the Soviet Union, the Ethiopian secessionist 
group (1972-1991), the Eritrean People‘s Liberation Front‘s (EPLF), was ordered like a 
military unit. It was characterized by division of labor, ethnic diversity, and self-reliance. 
The organization could recruit and train the highly educated as well as the impoverished.  
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Hegre (2004) finds that diverse funding sources for rebels tend to prolong 
conflicts. He adds, ―civil wars become long when no parties have the ability to achieve a 
decisive victory‖ (249). Similarly, Fearon (2004) points out how asymmetries in power 
shorten conflict. He reports that ―civil wars in post-Soviet Eastern Europe have been 
relatively short…because the rebels in most of them had support from a strong power 
against quite weak and new states‖ (298). On the duration of interstate war, Smith and 
Stam (2004) conclude that the exhaustion of resources during prolonged wars tends to 
lead to negotiation. Government resources are important to this discussion. Given the 
lack of government military intelligence in African countries, decisive victories and 
negotiations are difficult for governments to come by (Hegre, 2004).  
Despite the time and space to anticipate and counter the government‘s efforts, 
today‘s resource rebel is faced with a number of collective action problems (Weinstein, 
2005). Pegg (2003) concludes that today‘s rebel is motivated away from group loyalty 
because of scattered funding sources. Cold War rebel activity was funded by one of two 
superpowers. Relying upon a powerful outside funding source required that groups be 
easily identifiable and easily manipulated. Group cohesion was essential to group 
existence. Pegg contends that since rebels now have to go where the resources are, rebels 
are more mobile, less connected to the land, and more destructive. All resources, 
including those yet unexplored, are ripe for rebel exploitation. However, Ross (2002 
paper presented at APSA) contends rebels are typically unsuccessful in creating 
momentum around the promise of future resource exploitation or ―booty futures.‖  
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Resource exploitation and ownership are as much political as they are economic. 
Those who control resources can have many of their political demands met. These 
demands may include control of the state itself or the creation of a new, separate state 
(Buhaug and Lujala, 2005; Buhaug and Gates, 2002). For example, natural gas politics 
played a key role in the separatist politics of Aceh from Indonesia (Duva, 2007). The 
politics in Indonesia typified the separatist conditions laid out by Fearon (2004). The 
island of Aceh was ―culturally distinct from the [majority] Javanese‖ (Duva, 2007). 
Because Indonesia is comprised of a string of islands, the conditions also fit Fearon‘s 
(2004) criterion of a minority group occupying an isolated and distinct area. According to 
Fearon, quest for minority self-determination, which includes recapturing a lost homeland 
(a ―sons of soil‖ conflict), appears to be a strong determinant of the onset of separatist 
conflict.  
Greed 
According to Collier and Hoeffler (2001), rebel greed for resources trumps 
historical grievances. This greed may manifest in war and peace. A key assumption in 
comparative politics and international relations is that peace is desirable (Keen, 2001). 
Peace in countries affected by natural resource conflict, however, often means that 
warlords, such as Salvatore Mancuso (commander of the United Self-Defense Forces of 
Columbia – AUC) (Ashcroft, 2002), may have simply overpowered enemy combatants, 
including representatives of the state.  
Peace that involves personal security for all (Caprioli, 2004), not just security for 
the state or the military, is even more difficult to come by because war entrepreneurs 
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stand to benefit from the chaos. In the cases of natural resource conflict, conflict 
entrepreneurs are not interested in using those resources to develop the country; 
development of the state would render them unnecessary. They would no longer flourish 
through protectionism, patronage, the control of food staples, and harassment. While 
some war entrepreneurs clearly benefit from the chaos in these ways, war entrepreneurs 
can be found in the extraction, bargaining, refining, shipping, marketing and selling of 
natural resources (Reno, 1998). War entrepreneurs can also be found among heads of 
state.  
Grievance 
Collier and Hoeffler (2001) contrast the greed motivation with grievance as a 
determinant of natural resource conflict. Grievance refers to a claim that an injustice 
exists and is rooted in economic and/or social inequality. Olsson and Fors (2004:322) 
―model [grievances] as deliberate institutional differences, installed by the ruling group, 
between formal and informal sector production.‖ For example, the Rwandan genocide of 
1994 appeared to have spawned from the deeply ingrained social disparities between the 
Hutus and the ruling Tutsis (Verdeja, 2002). Since the spoils, in this case land, of a 
grievance war are potentially ―public goods,‖ then ―justice rebellions…face [the threat 
of] free-riding‖ (Collier and Hoeffler, 1999:8). The motivation for greed rebellions, 
however, dampens this problem (Collier and Hoeffler, 1999).  Still, extrapolating from 
case studies of Zimbabwe, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Liberia, Alao and 
Olonisakin (2000:35) conclude that ―the potential for armed conflict in societies that are 
endowed with natural resources is great when group demands are not managed 
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effectively and access to these resources is denied through a process of fair and just 
distribution.‖  
Weinstein (2005) concludes that greed and grievance can be at work 
simultaneously. This point is important for those who are interested in extinguishing 
these conflicts. Giving a group access to revenue producing resources does not 
necessarily address underlying historical grievances, which may continue to fester.  
As Collier and Hoeffler (1999:15 and Kisangi, 2003) point out:  
the two motives for rebellion are potentially [emphasis added] empirically 
distinguishable…the motivation for instigating a rebellion war may commonly be 
a blend of an altruistic desire to rectify the grievances of a group and a selfish 
desire to loot the resources of others. 
Also, the model used in Collier and Hoeffler (1999:12) appears to under-specify 
the causes of civil conflict. The pseudo R-squared value is only .20 for their narrow 
(incomplete) data set and .22 for their augmented data set
11
. Still, their study has been 
pivotal in shifting the study of intrastate conflict in developing countries from ethnicity to 
natural resources.  
Ethnic divisions 
Ethnicity is also invoked by many as a determinant of natural resource conflict. Heads of 
state, such as Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, are skillful at maintaining their strategic 
positions, wedged between their countries and other international actors. One of the ways 
they remain in such positions is by invoking the language of ethnicity. While ethnicity is 
                                                        
11 The authors imputed data by taking averages of the available years and filling in the missing years based 
on increments of these averages.  
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a social construct, it plays a real role in people‘s everyday lives. It helps mask the 
underlying problems associated with resource mismanagement and poor investment. 
Ethnicity occupies a large role in the lexicon of conflict. ―Often, the weak political force 
of ethnic romanticism latches on to the stronger force of economic self-interest so that the 
secessionist movements voice ethnic grievances – Biafra (Nigeria), Cabinda (Angola), 
and Aceh (Indonesia) come to mind‖ (Collier, 2003).  
While clearly there is a connection between ethnicity and conflict, studies show 
that ethnicity is not a primary cause of natural resource conflict. The explanatory power 
of ethnicity is believed to be enhanced by its interaction with other factors. Collier and 
Hoeffler (2004) point to population dispersion to explain the likelihood of conflict. 
Cincotta, et al. (2003), however, emphasize the tension created by rapid urbanization and 
a surplus of young, unemployed males (Nichiporuk, 2000). Still, ethnicity is invoked as a 
singular determinant of natural resource conflict because racial differences provide 
convenient, clear, polarizing cleavages. When rebel leaders are strapped for resources, 
they must invoke ethnic tensions to maintain member loyalty (Weinstein, 2005). 
In summary, scholars are interested in the societal conditions that lead to resource 
conflict; the conditions that turn ordinary people into rebels. In one way or another, 
scholars have examined two broad determinants, rebel greed and rebel grievance. The 
rebel grievance thesis postulates that rebels organize in resource-abundant countries in 
response to injustices created by the misuse of resource abundance. As mentioned earlier, 
leaders in countries that rely heavily on resource revenue, as opposed to systematic, 
direct taxes from the citizenry, can ignore the demands of the populace. Therefore, poor 
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education systems, unsanitary water systems, shoddy roads, and inadequate healthcare 
persist without broad scale revolt. Often, neglect by the government is viewed along 
racial lines. It is no wonder that scholars look to ethnicity to explain natural resource 
conflict. There are reasons to believe, however, that it is the interaction of ethnicity with 
other conditions, even beyond a weak state, that produce or agitate natural resource 
conflicts. These conditions include dispersed populations (and thus isolated pockets); 
rapid urbanization; and surpluses of young, unemployed males.  
While the grievance explanations may have meaning a broader sense, the greed 
thesis looks beyond these conditions. It postulates that rebel groups form to control 
natural resources. From this perspective, they are nothing more than war entrepreneurs 
who benefit from the chaos, the control of mining resources, and the monopoly of 
supplies people depend upon for day-to-day existence. Some scholars see the greed thesis 
as inseparable from the grievance thesis. For example, individuals may initially organize 
in opposition to a rent-seeking government. Absent major foreign sponsors, group 
cohesion and loyalty are difficult to maintain among post-Cold War rebels. Therefore, 
control of resources becomes vital to the organization‘s survival.  
Regardless of motivation, rebel activity is mediated by a weak state. The greed 
and grievance theses explain why natural resource conflict occurs. The weak state 
explanation provides the how. For example, the possibility of rebel activity appears to 
increase where military intelligence and deployment are limited by a poor transportation 
network and where the state cannot control its borders.  
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Conditions among the rebel groups themselves also foster natural resource 
conflict. The literature suggests that groups that have access to diverse funding sources, 
including resource wealth, revenue from foreign companies, remittances from expatriates, 
or advances (―booty futures‖) on revenue from resource extraction are more cohesive 
than groups that rely on a single revenue source. Also, diverse funding may allow a rebel 
group to be selective in choosing its members. In addition, such funding allows for 
strategic divisions of labor. However, where one group has a clear revenue advantage 
over other rebel groups or the state, resource conflicts appear to shorten.  Even in the face 
of diverse funding sources, rebel activity is dampened by a strong state. 
The Role of Resource Characteristics 
Yet another set of studies identifies the resources themselves as key determinants 
of natural resource conflict. For example, Snyder and Bhavnani (2005) find that mode of 
natural resource extraction, which is determined by the resource, affects risk of conflict. 
If the resource requires extraction primarily by free-lancing individuals, the state loses 
revenue and therefore capacity. If the resource is extracted primarily by industry, the state 
can channel revenue to state coffers. Also, streamlining of state revenue through industry 
reduces the amount of revenue available to rebels opposing the state. Ross adds, ―oil 
dependence appears to be linked to the initiation of conflict, but not conflict 
duration,…and gemstones, opium, coca, and cannabis…seem to lengthen pre-existing 
wars‖ (Ross, 2004:352; Auty, 2004; Fearon, 2004). Isham, et al. (2002) suggest that the 
type of resource contested may lead to weakness in the state apparatus in the first place. 
―Resources such as oil, diamonds and plantation crops can be easily captured by an elite-
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simultaneously exacerbat[ing] social tensions and weaken[ing] institutional capacity‖ 
(Isham et al., 2002:11 also read Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Klare, 2001). In addition, 
Luong and Weinthal (2001:370-373) find that availability of ―alternative‖ resource bases 
(interacting with ―political contestation‖) determine whether resource policy develops 
along a private or state controlled (read as stifled) path.  
 Scholars have examined the impact that the resources themselves have on natural 
resource conflict. Simply put, the literature suggests that ―lootable‖ resources (Ross, 
2004) such as diamonds and minerals that are easier to extract lead to more natural 
resource conflict because they are more accessible to even poorly organized rebel groups. 
Rebels cannot erect or maintain the type of infrastructure necessary for oil operations and 
other deep-shaft extractions. The state is usually the only domestic institution with the 
level of organization needed for such long-term investment.  
The Role of Geography and Topography 
Another set of studies identifies resource location as a determinant of natural 
resource conflict. According to DeRouen and Sobek (2004) and Collier and Hoeffler 
(2004), the presence of mountain and forest cover helps to explain resource conflicts. 
Cover may provide rebels a safe haven to which they can retreat. Forest and mountain 
cover also provides routes through which rebels can smuggle resources to outside 
brokers. In addition, timber may become another source of revenue for rebels. However, 
Rustad, et al. find that forests play a limited role in internal conflicts and should not be 
associated with diamonds and oil. Others (Fearon and Laitin, 2003) find that rough 
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terrain itself is a key factor. Still, others (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Buhang and Gates, 
2002) are unsure about the impact of rough terrain on rebel behavior.  
Other geographical determinants seem to offer more certainty in explaining 
conflict. For example, it appears that rebels are emboldened to wage longer wars if their 
resource base is located far from the capital (Buhaug and Gates, 2002; LeBillion-b, 
2001). Also, Herbst (2004) finds that a larger country with poor infrastructure is more 
likely to experience conflict. From this perspective, groups are able to set up strongholds 
in remote areas. Also from this perspective, poor infrastructure makes government 
military deployment difficult.  
In summary, the literature suggests that location plays a critical role in natural 
resource conflict. It suggests that geographical conditions such as heavy mountain and 
forest cover, rough terrain, location of resources from the state capital, and poor 
infrastructure, especially in remote areas increase the likelihood and intensity of natural 
resource conflict.  
Summary of Determinants 
Several themes move to the foreground and suggest opportunities for fruitful inquiry 
about the causes of natural resource conflicts and the conditions that prolong them. State 
capacity appears to be an overarching theme in this discourse. It appears to combine with 
other factors to affect the onset, the nature, and the duration of natural resource conflict. 
In short, it appears to be the permissive cause (Humphrey, 2005) of natural resource 
conflict. State capacity also seems to work in tandem with other determinants to cause or 
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prolong natural resource conflict. State capacity can be evaluated by examining the 
manner in which the state raises and expends revenue.  
Studies identify different variables as determinants of the onset and duration of 
natural resource conflict in developing countries. Some studies conclude that the 
abundance of resources itself may cause natural resource conflict. Other studies conclude 
that the international market for natural resources affects conflict and peace in developing 
countries. Still others conclude that governance plays an intermediate role with other 
factors. Yet others conclude that societal conditions cause and prolong natural resource 
conflict. These societal conditions include variety and types of funding for rebel groups, 
widespread grievances, a sense of economic entitlement, ethnic diversity, and 
demographic pressures. Other studies conclude that the characteristics of the natural 
resources themselves are determinants of the onset and duration of natural resource 
conflict. Finally, studies conclude that resource location is a key determinant of the onset 
and duration of natural resource conflict.  
Which factors are most and least important in determining the onset and 
endurance of natural resource conflict? This is the question I will address subsequently. 
However, before I get to this question, I will describe my approach to answering it. This 
is what I will do in Chapter 3.   
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Chapter III: Data and Methods 
 
In Chapter 2 I identified several determinants of natural resource conflict. In this 
chapter I discuss my research methods for addressing this question: What factors 
appear to be associated with the onset and duration of natural resource conflict? I 
use case studies to address this research question. In these case studies, I examine 
qualitative data over time.  
My Approach: Case Studies of Natural Resource Conflict 
This study uses a systematic comparison of two cases to examine the determinants 
of natural resource conflict. The use of such small-N case studies and qualitative data has 
been heavily debated in comparative politics (George and Bennett, 2005; King, Keohane 
and Verba, 1994; Rueschemeyer, et al., 1992; Eckstein; 1975). One reason scholars 
challenge the use of small-N case studies is that such studies seemingly limit the number 
of observations that are available for comparison, especially compared to a quantitative 
study with multiple cases over multiple years.  
As illustrated by groundbreaking studies (Rueschemeyer, et al., 1992; Moore, 
1963), small-N case studies, because of the complexity of any one person, group, society, 
state or region, offer multiple opportunities for observation. In short, small-N analysis 
helps move us toward ―normal science‖ (Kuhn, 1962). An often-cited example of how 
small-N studies can yield systematic and fruitful evaluation is Theda Skocpol‘s 
explanation of the causes of revolution in France, China, and Russia (Skocpol, 1979).  
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While other scholars (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994) acknowledge the value of 
case studies, they relegate them to a limited role in political science. From this 
perspective, case studies are useful in developing research questions and forming 
hypotheses. In other words, they are most useful in the discovery phase of scientific 
development (Hempel, 1965). I argue, however, as do McKeown (1999) and Dion 
(1998), that case studies are also useful for testing theories. Well-crafted case studies can 
be crucial to theory-building because case studies offer in-depth analysis. Through this 
in-depth analysis, validity is enhanced; the tests measure what we think we are 
measuring. Conversely, validity may be compromised in a quantitative study where a 
single value represents a complex observation.  
Reliability is the challenge for case studies. Can we generalize the findings of a 
few cases to a universe of cases? Sartori (1984) suggests there is danger in using a few 
cases to represent broad explanations. Although generalization is limited in a single case 
study, the aggregated findings of a small number of cases provide the bases by which we 
can further test findings from other case studies and cross-panel studies. In the short term 
our ability to generalize findings from small cases is limited. These findings, however, 
deepen our understanding of social dynamics. They therefore help clarify the questions 
we ask about larger sets of comparative cases.  
Admittedly, small-N studies are limited when it comes to demonstrating causal 
inference (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994; Popper, 1968). For example, scholars can use 
descriptive analysis to explain the development of democratic institutions in terms of 
levels of party competition (Chavez, 2003). In their explanation, however, they cannot 
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fully account for the universe of variables that may interact to produce the observed 
outcomes. Still quantitative studies face similar challenges, as scholars must 
operationalize terms effectively to demonstrate causal relationships (Rose, 1991). In the 
conflict discourse, for example, Suhrke, Villanger and Woodward (2005) argue that 
previous ground-breaking, quantitative studies in the natural resource conflict discourse 
(particularly Collier and Hoeffler, 1998 and 2004) have relied upon data (read as 
Correlates or War or COW) that record conflict only in terms of battle-related deaths. 
This accounting system worked well for the Cold War paradigm of conflict. The concept 
of war, however, has changed in recent years. War is no longer largely the domain of 
military organizations; war increasingly involves non-military targets. ―The most 
notorious mass murder committed during the [Bosnian War, 1992 to 1995] was the 
Srebrenica massacre of 1995, in which Bosnia Serb forces and Serbian paramilitaries 
systematically slaughtered about 8,000 Muslim men and boys‖ (Flintoff, 2008). A more 
meaningful understanding of modern conflict would consider other factors, such as 
number of people displaced and loss of property, in addition to number of casualties, to 
indicate that a significant conflict has occurred (Angstrom, 2001). Without this holistic 
perspective, even large data sets that span time and space may inaccurately reflect the 
amount of conflict taking place in the world.  
Case Selection 
This study uses the most-similar design system (Prezworski and Teune, 1970) to compare 
natural resource management in two countries--Botswana and the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo. The precedent of fruitful study emanating from the most-similar design 
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system is well established in comparative politics. This design continues to play a role in 
the maturation of the field.  
For example, Firmin-Sellers (2000), testing a principal-agent theory, begins with 
two similarly structured colonial, economic structures that resulted in two different post-
Independence economic structures. In the 1950s the economies of Ghana and the Ivory 
Coast were both largely based on coffee and cocoa. In her selection of countries with 
similar economic levels and structures, she controls for these determinants. With these 
controls in place, she looks to the political colonial arrangements between the colonizing 
state, as principals, and tribal leaders, as agents, to explain why Ghana moved toward 
socialism and the Ivory Coast moved toward capitalism. Similarly, Shi (2001) begins his 
evaluation of what engenders or challenges political trust with states of a common 
historical background. He bases his findings on a comparison of China and Taiwan. This 
method of controlling for similarities has been used to evaluate a broad range of issues in 
comparative politics.  
In small-N studies case selection is critical because within the choices for study 
cases are imbedded determinants of the dependent variable. As illustrated above, by using 
two cases with similar characteristics but different outcomes I am controlling for the 
effects of those similar characteristics. Geddes (1990) contends that selecting cases on the 
dependent variable creates a selection bias. However, the notion of a selection bias in 
such studies may be overstated because data informs theory and theory informs the data 
we use (McKeown, 1999; Dion, 1998) in all types of studies. Also as Diesling (1991) 
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suggests, selection of cases, even on the independent variable, are informed by a prior 
understanding of what the outcome might be.  
The Specific Cases 
The universe of cases that can be used to address the questions posed above includes 
developing countries with contestable natural resources (Mahoney and Goertz, 2004). 
The natural resource conflict literature has identified the following types of resources as 
the most contested: timber, illicit drugs, oil, minerals and gemstones (Ross, 2004). In this 
study, if I can narrow the universe of cases to two resource-rich, sub-Saharan African 
countries--one plagued by natural resource conflict and one that has been able to control 
such conflict--I can further dispel the notion that natural resource conflict is an African or 
sub-Sahara African problem. In keeping with this goal, the universe of possible cases 
narrows to sub-Sahara African cases.  
In the modern state system political, economic, and social development are 
closely tied to resource management (Nye and Donahue, 2000; Ascher, 1999). Therefore, 
it is important to understand how some countries with coveted resources have managed to 
parlay those resources into at least the likeness of development, while other countries 
have actually receded. Since independence, Botswana appears to be the only resource-
rich, sub-Sahara African state consistently moving development indicators in a positive 
direction. From this perspective, Botswana is the ―crucial case‖ (Eckstein, 1975:116-118) 
and the ―counterfactual‖ case (Weber, 1949:272, 278) that shows how a resource-rich, 
African country can consistently show signs of average annual growth. Also, despite 
documented cases of minority discrimination, struggles with HIV/AIDS, and pockets of 
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poverty, Botswana appears to have some influence over the international market of 
diamonds. The example of Botswana challenges both the notion of a resource curse and 
the dangers associated with a state‘s reliance on primary commodities. Botswana‘s 
diamond industry brings in ―$2 billion of the country‘s $3 billion annual foreign revenue‖ 
(Mutume, 2004). Therefore, other factors are clearly at work.  
Several sub-Saharan, post-colonial cases are available for comparison to 
Botswana including Angola, the Republic of the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC), Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the Sudan. A number of conditions suggest that 
the examination of the DRC‘s resource politics would result in the most interesting case 
study. Because of the DRC‘s location, its tumultuous resource politics figure into the 
resource politics of at least six other countries. At various points in recent history, 
factions from Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Uganda, Burundi, and Rwanda have 
sponsored the capture of the DRC‘s natural resources (Global Witness, 2004; UN Panel 
of Experts, 2002). The DRC‘s resource management problems are regional problems.  
The thresholds that scholars use to indicate natural resource conflict range from 
25 battle-related deaths per year (Hegre, 2002) to 1,000 battle-related deaths per year 
(Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; 1998). Several resource conflicts in the Congo exceed this 
threshold range (Global Witness, 2004). However, Suhrke, Villanger and Woodward 
(2005) suggest that civil conflict scholars, in their focus on the causes of conflict, have 
failed to acknowledge the range of consequences associated with civil conflict (LeBillion, 
2003:216 and Ross, 2003:17). Guided by an economic development agenda, these 
scholars point to the importance of understanding the consequences of conflicts for 
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various outside groups who attempt to repair war-torn areas. While 1,000 battle-related 
deaths may indicate that a major conflict has occurred, the number of people displaced by 
smaller-scale conflict is also important. Even if we ignore the notion that about 3.3 
million people have died in the Congo as a result of the war(s) that began in 1998 (Global 
Witness, 2004; Lemarchand, 2003; UN Panel of Experts, 2002), we are still confronted 
with the estimate that 2.7 million Congolese were internally displaced in 2003 alone. The 
politics of the Congo suggest that if we are to really understand conflicts of any type, we 
must understand the costs to the living and the dead (Angstrom, 2001).  
Scope of the Study 
This study covers resource dynamics in Botswana and the Congo that occurred after their 
independence, leading up to the resource dynamics in the 1990s. The case study of 
Botswana‘s resource politics covers the 1990s. Land competition heightened in Botswana 
around 1997, when the state began removing minority Sans people from a game reserve 
where diamonds were believed to be. While this contest was non-violent, the existence of 
such a contest in a resource-rich, African country suggests a fruitful comparison with the 
war-ravaged Congo. In contrast, the Congo has experienced continuous rebel activity, 
with significant rebel uprising in 1996 and 1998.  
An analysis of resource management in Botswana and the Congo can offer insight 
into the permissive causes of violent natural resource conflict. The Congo case, however, 
may better address how a permissive cause, such as a weak state, interacts with other 
causes to create or prolong violent natural resource conflict. Conversely, the Botswana 
case may be more useful in demonstrating the limitations of other explanations, when a 
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permissive cause is not present. Despite the different resource politics, the Congo and 
Botswana are similar enough to allow a fruitful comparison.  
Summary of Methods 
This study uses a most-similar design system to compare two cases, resource 
management in Botswana and the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the 1990s.  
A comparison of these two countries eliminates a number of determinants: sub-Saharan 
location, a subordinate status in a colonial relationship, the presence of lootable 
resources, and resource abundance. All these conditions are present in each case. 
However the Congo‘s resource management is associated with intense civil conflict, 
while resource management in Botswana has helped move development indicators in a 
positive direction. This study examines commonly debated explanations about the cause 
and agitating factors of natural resource conflict. A number of these explanations have 
evolved through quantitative studies that have used single values to represent complex 
observations. While these quantitative findings are broad enough to apply to a range of 









Chapter IV: Case Study Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo 
 
This case study provides insight into the determinants of natural resource conflict in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)/Zaire, located in the Great Lakes Region of 
Africa
12
. More specifically, this case provides details of the circumstances surrounding 
conflicts in the 1990s. In the 1990s, there were two distinct periods of natural resource 
conflict: 1996-1997, and 1998 to the present (Ross, 2003:49). While observers use these 
two periods to mark recent civil wars in the DRC, this dissertation provides evidence that 
illustrates persistent violent conflict in the everyday lives of average Congolese citizens 
since the 1960s.  
Several sections of this case study focus on the politics of Mobutu Sese Seko, 
who ruled the Congo from 1965 until 1996.  Mobutu established the modern legacy of 
private ownership of state resources. His state apparatus permitted the conflict to occur in 
1996. Therefore, the first sections of this chapter will explain the political and economic 
conditions under which he ruled. It will also highlight the role, if any, that phenomena 
such as a resource curse or Dutch Disease played in this state‘s unraveling.  
In his efforts to retain power, Mobutu ultimately laid the foundation for both 
wars. Mobutu resorted to a range of tactics from coercion to anti-communism to maintain 
power. When Mobutu‘s coercive power and the West‘s fight against communism waned, 
he increasingly sustained his patronage system with revenue from resource exports 
                                                        
12 For the period 1965 to 1996, the name Zaire shall apply. For the period 1997 to the present, the name 
Democratic Republic of the Congo shall apply. 
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(Kiakwama and Chevallier, 2001). ―The government‘s use of resources rose from 11 
percent of GDP in 1984-86 to 14 percent in 1987-89, with a peak of 17 percent in 1988‖ 
(Kiakwama and Chevallier, 2001:641). 
Mobutu‘s legacy continues even today (beyond the scope of this case study). The 
Congo is entangled in a web of problems that reinforce each other. Despite the Herculean 
task of detangling ownership, motives, intentions, and responsibilities, the resource 
politics of the DRC offer some early insight to the role that natural resources can play in 
civil conflicts.  
An Independent Congo 
The Democratic Republic of the Congo is a former Belgian colony. Before it was an 
enterprise of Belgium, the DRC was the personal enterprise of King Leopold II 
(Hochschild, 1999). Under pressure from the international community, in 1908 King 
Leopold relinquished his personal hold on the colony to the Belgian state. DRC gained its 
independence from colonization in 1960.  
The First Republic (1960-1965) was led by President Joseph Kasavubu and Prime 
Minister Patrice Emery Lumumba. The new regime could not rely on coercive 
compliance and the high degree of centralization was immediately challenged 
(Mokoli and Binswwanger, 1998:29).  
 
Like many new states, political instability and problems with legitimacy marred 
the DRC‘s promising start towards democracy. Kinship and familial ties thwarted the 
development of modern political institutions. Also, the colonizers left behind structures 
and institutions that were not compatible with the economic and political development of 
a modern, bureaucratic state. Because the Belgians controlled all political and economic 
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structures and because the Belgians had not prepared the Congolese for independence, 
the Congolese did not posses the skills needed to run the state (Kiakwama and Chevallier, 
2001:630). In addition, while colonizing forces removed their physical presence, 
economic structures that benefited the imperialist powers remained in place. For 
example, the Belgian mining company, Union Minière du Haut Katanga (UMHK) 
continued to operate in the Shaba region and even supported Shaba in its secessionist 
movement from the central government headed by Patrice Lumumba (Gramot, 1964). As 
a result of economic domination by foreign business interests, revenue from state-run 
businesses, bureaucratic fees, and bribes for state services became convenient sources of 
revenue to dispense through patronage systems (MacCaffey, 1991).  
Consistent with the business interests of the former colonizers, the colonizers left 
behind a system of economic/administrative boundaries that had no connection to the 
way people in the central African region related to each other. The colonizers also left 
behind administrative structures that could not represent popular interests of the newly 
independent citizens because these structures reflected the economic interests of the 
colonizing state. These same structures became convenient tools of repression for post-
independence African dictators. In the Congo,  
…the Second Republic, including the Transition Period (November 23, 1965-May 
17, 1997) was led by Mobutu Sese Seko who took office after a military coup. In 
order to rule Zaire, Mobutu created a highly centralized state, thus reproducing 
two of the key features of the colonial state. He undermined or co-opted 
competitors. The absence of equally powerful groups prevented the emergence of 
self-sustaining representative institutions. The lack of accountability led to the 
dissipation of potential revenues into bureaucratic fiefdoms, economic privilege, 
and corruption….the Mobutu regime was a mixture of traditionalism and 





This study provides a great deal of detail about political and economic conditions 
in Zaire under Mobutu. Since the 1980s, the Congo had been in economic and political 
freefall. As dismal as its indicators were, they do not completely describe the decline, as 
the formal economy was intertwined with the undocumented, informal economy. These 
conditions persisted despite the country‘s vast resources and the West‘s support of 
Mobutu for supporting the Western position in the Cold War. Mobutu continued a legacy 
(begun by King Leopold of Belgium) that has made the Congo vulnerable to civil war 
and foreign occupation.  
This case study uses conditions in Zaire
13
 (Democratic Republic of Congo
14
) to 
identify determinants of natural resource conflict. This country is a good case study since 
it became embroiled in what was labeled as a civil war in 1996, and scholars have treated 
this case as if natural resources played a prominent role in that conflict. The Congo 
became embroiled in a second civil war in 1998, in which resources clearly played a 
prominent role. 
Geography 
The DRC is about 2,345,000 square kilometers (Ministry of Mines, 2003). From 1973 to 
1997, the country was spread out over eleven political provinces: Kinshasa, Bas-Zaire, 
                                                        
13 State name during the Mobutu years from 1973 to 1996. 
14 Renamed by Laurent Kabila in 1996.  
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Equateur, Haut-Zaire, Maniema, Nord Kivu, Sud-Kivu, Shaba, Bandundu, Kasai-Oriental 
and Kasai-Occidental (US Central Intelligence Agency, 1973-1997)
15
.  
The natural resources in the DRC are significant in number and variety.  Table 2 
illustrates the DRC‘s vast mining potential. Despite this extensive list of resources, the  
DRC‘s Ministry of Mines suggests that the Congo‘s resource potential may still be 
unknown (Ministry of Mines, 2003). 
A number of the resources that are associated with conflict in Zaire –DRC are 
materials in products considered vital to the worldwide economy. Gemstone quality 
minerals are valuable in their most pure form.  Other resources included coltan used in 
laptops and cellular telephones, casserite used in electrical components, copper used in 
utility lines, oil, gas, and timber. Extraction of these resources requires both surface and 
deep-shaft mining.  
The Democratic Republic of the Congo is a vast country, surrounded by nine 
other countries. Its central position in the Sub-Saharan region made Zaire an important 
ally to Western interests. Zaire was important to the worldwide economy for other 
reasons. Administratively, the Congo consists of eleven provinces. Each of these 
provinces contains resources from which valuable products are made. 
The Economy under Mobutu 
Despite its resource wealth, as Table 3 suggests, the Congo has been in economic decline 
at least since the early 1980s. The decline in growth in 1982 came on the heels of the 
                                                        
15 After 1997 Bas Zaire became Bas-Congo, Haut-Zaire became Orientale, Bas-Zaire became Bas-Congo, 
and Shaba became Katanga (UN Map of the Congo; Ministry of Mines 2003).  
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Table 2. Extractive Potential of Individual Provinces in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo 
Province Resources 
Bandundu Diamond*, kaolin, clays 
 
Bas Congo  (Bas Zaire) Bauxite, copper*, lead, zinc, vanadium, phosphates, asphaltic sands, 
gold*, diamond*, manganese, marble, granite, rock salt, iron, clays, 
gypsum, pyrite, talc, silica, kaolin, barytine, calcareous.  
Equator (Equateur) Diamond*, gold*, iron, calcareous, kaolin, clays, copper, granite, 
niobium*, ochre 
 
Eastern Kasai Diamond*, clays, chrome, cobalt*, copper*, nickel, gold*, iron, 
kaolin, talc. 
Western Kasai Diamond*, clays, gold*, chrome, nickel, cobalt*, platinum, copper, 
iron, kaolin, lead, saline 
Katanga Copper*, cobalt*, uranium*, niobium*, gold*, platinum, lithium, 
talk, tantalum*, wolfram, zinc, clays, bismuth, cadmium, tin stone, 
coal, iron, granite, gypsum, kaolin, manganese, monazite, saline, 
emerald, sapphire, diamond*, silver, calcareous 
Kinshasa Clays, silica, kaolin 
Maniema Gold*, tin*, stone, amblygonite, lithium, clays, copper*, diamond*, 
iron, kaolin, manganese, niobium*, lead, talk, tantalum*, wolfram 
North Kivu Clays, tin*, stone, basnaesite, emerald, coal, granite, monazite, 
niobium*, gold*, wolfram, tantalum*, calcareous 
Eastern Province Gold*, diamond*, clays, copper*, iron, kaolin, niobium*, ochre, 
phosphates, saline, bituminous, schists, talc. 
South Kivu Gold*, tinstone, amblygonite, silver, basnaesite, emerald, bismuth, 
diamond*, diatomite, monazite, niobium*, wolfram, zinc, tantalum*, 
calcareous 
Source: Adapted from Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ministry of Mines. June 2003. ―Guide to Mining 
Investor.‖ Pp. 16-17.  
*Resources linked directly or indirectly to conflict in the Congo. (The range of deposits is presented here to 












GDP Per Capita Growth 
(Annual Percent) 
1980 14.39 2.19 -0.87 
1981 12.54 2.35 -0.62 
1982 13.65 -0.46 -3.28 
1983 11.01 1.41 -1.44 
1984 7.86 5.54 2.55 
1985 7.20 0.47 -2.43 
1986 8.10 4.72 1.67 
1987 7.66 2.68 -0.33 
1988 8.86 0.47 -2.56 
1989 9.02 -1.27 -4.41 
1990 9.35 -6.57 -9.73 
1991 9.09 -8.42 -11.73 
1992 8.21 -10.50 -13.87 
1993 10.71 -13.47 -16.68 
1994 5.82 -3.90 -7.18 
1995 5.64 .70 -2.30 
1996 5.77 -1.02 -3.51 
1997 6.09 -5.62 -7.65 
1998 6.22 -1.62 -3.58 
1999 4.71 -4.27 -6.25 
2000 4.31 -6.90 -9.05 
2001 4.69 -2.10 -4.63 





international downturn in the price of diamonds (Johannesburg SAPA. September 29, 
1987) and the preceding decline in copper prices (1995; Coakley, 1996).  This decline is 
even more pronounced when we examine growth on a per capita basis. On a per capita 
basis, Zaire shows a negative growth rate from 1982 forward, with the exception of a few 
years. Also, economic decline in the late 1980s corresponded to Western countries 
withdrawing support from the Mobutu regime, as the Cold War drew to a close (Turner, 
1994). 
The Informal Economy 
We cannot take at face value the broad indicators presented in Table 3. First, 
while Zaire compiled information during these years, it did not always release this 
information (Reno, 2008). The second concern here is the inability of formal indicators to 
measure the activity of the informal economy, which was vibrant in Zaire and flourishes 
even today. ―Calculations show that the real economy of Zaire may well be as much as 
three times the size of the official GDP‖ (MacGaffey, 19991:11). According to 
MacGaffey, the ―second, informal or underground economy competes with and supports 
the formal economy in DRC. People in Zaire refer to l’economie de debrouillardise, or 
systeme D, or say simply: ‘Nous vivons mysterieusement’, for which the meaning is 
unambiguous‖ (MacGaffey, 1991:8,11). 
The second economy is here defined as economic activities that are unmeasured, 
unrecorded and, in varying degrees, illegal. They consist of i) legal production of 
goods and services concealed to avoid taxes or other charges; ii) production of 
illegal goods and service; iii) concealed income in kind, which includes the profits 
of barter; iv) other income opportunities that are illegal or in some way deprive 
the state of revenue…its most important underlying cause has been extremely low 
wages relative to prices (MacGaffey, 19991:12).  
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Scholars have conceptualized the informal sector as one that weakens and hinders, but 
also sometimes supports the formal economy. Consistent with MacGaffey‘s observations, 
Williame, et al. (1997:vii) describe the economic system in Zaire as a ―system of parallel 
currencies.‖ These views suggest that macro-indicators do not accurately reflect the 
weakness of the system, the vitality of the informal economy, nor the interdependence of 
the two systems. The informal economy of Central Africa, of which Zaire is a critical 
node, developed during colonization in response to artificial boundaries and trade  
restrictions created by the Belgians. These informal trade routes allowed indigenous 
groups to continue historical trade relationships disrupted by political boundaries 
(MacGaffey, 1991). 
Mobutu‘s economic policies, such as printing un-backed currency, drove the 
economy further underground and deeper into neighboring states. Zaire‘s informal and 
formal economies are fragmented across provinces. The provincial economies‘ 
connections to the nation‘s capital are also tenuous. For example,  
Because the national Government in Kinshasa, 600 miles away, denies East Kasai 
the right to open its airport to international traffic, there are plans to build a 
highway linking East and West Kasai to the Angolan port of Lobito, 600 miles to 
the west, bypassing the faraway capital altogether (French, 1996).  
 
There was certainly economic interdependence among Kinshasa and Bas-Zaire, for 
example. However, there were more vibrant trade patterns flowing from the provinces to 
border countries.  
Trade routes reflected efficiency rather than political boundaries. It was more 
efficient for the Congolese in the Kivus to trade with Uganda and Rwanda than it was for 
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them to trade with the Congolese in Kinshasa or Katanga, (French, 1996), especially 
when the principal modes of transportation were poor roads, waterways, and a 
disconnected rail system. Some argue that this cross-border, black market, necessarily 
operated by organized crime, helped maintain peace, as warlords counter-balanced each 
other (Reno, 2008). Williame, et. al, (1997) contend that Mobutu‘s dictatorship came 
under real threat only when people could no longer rely on their informal economic 
networks for basic survival; people could not bribe state officials for service, people 
earned less in illicit resource trades, and state price controls filtered down to the informal 
economy.  
When the Belgians relinquished political control of the Congo (MacGaffey, 
1991), the informal economy became a key source of revenue, power, and wealth in Zaire 
(MacCaffey, 1991). While this new state had potential competitive crops, such as coffee 
and palm oil (Smith, Merrill, and Meditz, 1994) the state had little administrative 
capacity. Eventually, the state itself became the product through which ruling groups 
acquired wealth. Under a mercantilist system
16
, the ruling clique disrupts the formal 
economy. For example, Mobutu expropriated farms and small businesses and 
redistributed them through his system of patronage to people who lacked the management 
skills, innovation, or even interest to run these businesses (Wrong, 2000). Anyone who 
wanted to operate above ground and contribute openly to the formal economy had to 
                                                        
16 ―States such as Zaire are described as mercantilist, meaning states in which the economy is governed by 




reconcile his/her ambitions with the interests of this clique through payoffs, bribes, 
protection plans, or extortion payments (MacGaffey, 1991).  
Dependence upon the state for revenue imposed limitations on people who would 
participate in the formal economic system. This dependence in Zaire stifled innovation 
and economic competition. Understanding these limitations, it makes sense that Mobutu‘s 
efforts to liberalize the economy had the effect of driving the economy further 
underground. Liberalization measures placed new transaction costs on the mercantilists 
and higher barriers to people whose access to the formal economy was already restricted. 
The logic of the underground economy in the Congo appears to be more enduring than 
specific liberalization measures and more powerful than the government itself. It has 
adapted to systems of supply and demand under an oppressive king, foreign occupation, 
an inefficient dictator, and now rebel factions. Under each of these conditions, the 
informal market incorporated and even circumvented rent-seeking actors. The informal 
economy in Zaire was a complete system in which natural resources played key roles. It 
was the exchange of natural resources for day-to-day products and money to purchase 
day-to-day products that made the system valuable to the Congolese. Still, as resilient as 
the informal economy might have been, it placed huge limitations on centralized, state 
development. It also freed state officials from their official responsibilities, as people 
learned to fulfill their needs by hustling the system.  
Mining 
The informal economy, as vibrant as it may have been, could not mitigate the 
impact of weak economic policies. From independence to the 1970s, Zaire‘s central 
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government and the Shaba region in particular relied heavily upon copper revenue to 
support the economy. Copper revenue allowed Mobutu to take a hefty personal profit and 
still contribute to the state coffers (while he was still interested in doing so). The price of 
copper plummeted in the international market in 1975 (Kiakwama and Chevallier, 2001). 
Short-sighted economic policies compounded the problem of lost revenue. Gegamines 
(Le Generale des Carrieres et des Mines du Zaire), the state‘s copper extraction and 
production facilities, fell into disrepair, due to neglect and theft (Coakley, 1996; Mobbs, 
1995). ―Formerly the nation‘s major foreign currency export earner, [Gecamines] 
continued to struggle to maintain copper production at only 5% of peak 1985 output 
levels‖ (Coakley, 1995). Also, countries such as Chile were cornering the market 
previously captured by Zaire through more efficient copper smelting processes. 
―Domestic copper companies continued to look toward South American investments to 
increase their capacity and lower their average production costs‖ (USGS Minerals 
Commodity Survey, 1996) 
The crash of the copper industry was one of many threshold moments for Zaire; 
moments in which the country could have begun developing other sectors. History 
records that in these threshold moments, Mobutu chose to secure his profits from other 
natural resources rather than develop the infrastructure for efficient use of those 
resources. In the early 1990s, with the failure of the copper mining throughout the 1970s 
and 1980s, diamond extraction became the chief mining revenue source (Merrill, Meditz, 
and Smith, 1994). ―Despite its decline, the diamond industry remain[ed] vital to the 
Zairian economy – and to the Mobutu regime – because it [was] widely regarded as the 
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country‘s last remaining source of hard currency‖ (Smith, et al., 1994).  ―Diamond 
exports, chiefly from the Kasai provinces, became Zaire‘s most important source of 
foreign exchange derived from the mineral sector‖ (Coakley, 1995). The economic 
vitality in the regions provided Mobutu with an alternate income. Because of its vibrant 
diamond industry, Mobutu allowed the Kasai regions to exercise some degree of 
economic autonomy.  
 ―In the 1960s Mobutu set up MIBA (Societe Miniere de Bakwanga), a state 
diamond company intended to run the major mining concessions in Mbuji-Mayi‖ in 
Kasai (Global Witness, 2004:28). The state owned 80 percent and Sibeka owned 20 
percent of MIBA.  Sibeka was a Belgian company of which DeBeers was part owner 
(Mobbs, 1994). Under Mobutu, DeBeers maintained exclusive three to five-year 
contracts to buy diamonds in the DRC (Global Witness, 2004:30; Coakley, 1996). In 
1994, MIBA accounted for about 40 percent of diamond production (Mobbs, 1995; 
Coakley, 1995).  
 DeBeers was heavily invested in the production and purchase of industrial 
diamonds and in the purchase of alluvial diamonds. In the artisanal mining industry, the 
buyer--De Beers (not the sellers – dealers in Zaire)--is in the most advantageous position. 
Artisanal miners pan for resources along riverbeds and streams (as opposed to industrial 
mining in which producers force diamonds to the earth‘s surface). Artisanal mining is so 





. By the 1990s, Artisanal mining accounted for 60 percent of diamond 
production. Artisanal mining activity often included encroachment upon MIBA property. 
Estimates of the number of unauthorized mines digging on and around MIBA 
concessions ranged from 40,000 to 100,000. Their ranks swelled by Kasai 
refugees who had fled the ethnic violence in Shaba Province (Mobbs, 1994:945).  
In 1981, Mobutu opened artisanal mining to licensed miners and dealers. He undertook 
this strategy to avert illegal mining in Zaire. Despite overt theft by miners and the 
deceptive practices of buyers, Zaire was a significant producer of diamonds in the early 
1990s. In 1994, 1995, and 1996, Zaire‘s diamond production still constituted 13 percent 
of world mine productions each of those years (Mobbs, 1994; Coakley, 1995, 
                                                        
17 Resource extraction generally takes on two forms, industrial and artisanal. Artisanal miners mine 
resources from open pits or alongside riverbeds. In the 1990s, Zaire had only three industrial mining 
operations because most of Zaire‘s diamond supply consisted of alluvial diamonds or diamonds that are 
found along riverbeds, in soft sediment and streams. (IIED) ―Diamonds from artisanal production are 
provided mainly by the following major centres: Tshikapa in Western Kasai Province, Mbuji-Mayi in 
Eastern Kasai, Kisangani in Eastern Province, Kahemba and Tembo Centres in Bandundu Province‖ 
(Ministry of Mines, 2003:26).  
Zaire began officially promoting artisanal exploration in 1983 (Ministry of Mines, 2003).  
Mobutu‘s efforts to legalized artisanal mining was one component in a broader attempt to liberalize the 
economy. Artisanal mining involves extraction by panning by unskilled labor with rudimentary 
instruments. Also, artisanal miners can gain entry into the mining sector with little to no overhead or 
regulation. Mobutu legalized artisanal mining in an unsuccessful effort to curb smuggling and extract 
exchange fees. Legalization was one of two measures Mobutu undertook control the extractive industries. 
In the first major attempt to control these industries, Mobutu nationalized (Zairianized) the mining industry. 
Mining operations and their products became the property of the state. Zairianization and the expansion  of 
artisanal mining sector pushed the trade even further underground, where traders could avoid exchange 
fees.  
One estimate suggests that between 1995 and 2000, smugglers smuggled an annual average of 
$409 million worth of diamonds (Dietrich, 2002).  
The diamond mining sector is one of the industries that require both industrial and artisanal 
mining.  ―Geologic processes create two basic types of diamond deposits, referred to as primary and 
secondary sources. Primary sources are the kimberlite and lamproite pipes that raise diamonds from the 
Earth's mantle, where they originate. Secondary sources, created by erosion, include such deposits as 
surface scatterings around a pipe, concentrations in river channels, and fluxes from rivers moved by wave 
action along ocean coasts, past and present.‖ (American Museum of Natural History). Industrial mining is 




1996). These figures do not account for the lucrative diamond smuggling trade. Because 
of their low weight ratio, diamonds were easy to smuggle, even in the absence of a 
modern transportation infrastructure (Global Witness, 2004).  
Industry 
Mobutu did not demonstrate the political will to support industry outside the 
mining sectors in a systematic fashion. Compounding a colonial legacy of a largely 
uneducated, unskilled populace, Zaire did invest in an adequate transportation system and 
other necessary infrastructure. The rail system, Sizerail, covers only 5,118km
18
 (Ministry 
of Mines, 2003) [5,138 km reported in 1994 by Meditz and Merril] of the country, even 
today. Also, roads become impassible and nonexistent during heavy rains. The most 
reliable transportation routes connected the provinces with other countries better than 
with each other. The disrepair of Gecamines, the country‘s economic life source until the 
1980s, is another compelling example of the state‘s lack of investment in meaningful 
capital projects (Coakley, 1996:1).     
The state apparatus, from independence even until today was uneven across the 
provinces. The central government, i.e. Mobutu, doled out resources as needed to make 
statements about his power (Wrong, 2000). He devoted a disproportionate amount of 
resources to the capitol city and to his home village, Ghabolite in Equateur. Compared to 
the neglected Kivus (with 20.2 people per square kilometer), Equateur was sparsely 
populated, at 8.4 persons per square kilometer (Almquist, 1994). Consequently, provinces 
                                                        
18 ―Within 858Km are electrified‖ (Ministry of Mines, 2003:7).  
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sought to distance themselves from the economically strapped central government. At 
various times, mineral-rich provinces sought (de facto and dejure) independence from the 
central government. As a show of independence and in an effort to survive, the Kasai 
refused to use Mobutu‘s newly issued money in 1993, using instead Zaires (the first 
generation of money issued under Zairianization rather than the Noveau Zaires). The 
vibrant diamond trade in that region backed the first generation of currency (UN 
Department of Humanitarian Afffaires, 1997). This point is important because by 1993 
and 1994, the national inflation rate was 12,000 and 6,030 percent, respectively (Mobbs, 
1995). These worthless banknotes were at the center of a number of social problems. 
Much of the violence and looting perpetrated upon average citizens during Mobutu‘s 
reign was committed by disgruntled soldiers who had either not been paid or had received 
worthless banknotes (Human Rights Watch, 1994).   
In response to neglect and abuse, citizens created a safety net in their local 
communities. Williame, et. al. (1997) find that locals in the Kivus and Bas-Zaire pooled 
resources to provide economic, social, and physical security for themselves.  East 
Kasians built their own university in Mbuji-Mayi, ―recruiting visiting professors from 
abroad who often [taught] without pay‖ (French, 1996). The Kasians also built their own 
schools and hospitals. In addition, they embarked upon infrastructure projects involving 
roads, water, and electricity (The Economist, March 15, 1997). The local government 
sought exemptions from national taxes for providing these projects.  At the same time, 
Kasai attempted to build local capacity without drawing too much attention to the region. 
―Already, East Kasai‘s style of creeping independence, in which the region‘s elites have 
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been careful never to provoke a tottering state into direct confrontation, is being copied 
by other regions‖ (French, 1996).  
Shaba Province‘s Governor had declared the Province‘s autonomy from the 
Nation in December 1993. Calling itself the Katanga Parliament, the provincial 
parliament announced that it was claiming ‗concessions and leases on the 
province‘s land, mines, minerals, mineral oils, and hydraulic resources‘ (Mobbs, 
1995:943; French, 1996).   
 
As a result of poor infrastructure, neither manufacturing nor agriculture ever 
played a significant role in the national economy. Although the agricultural sector was 
promising, average annual growth rates hovered around two to three percent during the 
Mobutu years. Promising crops such as the cassava suffered man-made catastrophes 
(Williame, et. al, 1997:5). In a personal cost-benefit analysis, farming for the average 
Congolese was a less profitable way of life than mining. Soldiers looted, burned, and 
pillaged agricultural land. Disgruntled soldiers often committed these acts because the 
Mobutu Administration failed to pay the soldiers or issued them worthless banknotes. In 
addition, land ownership often became entangled in ethnic cleavages (Norwegian 
Refugee Council, 2002). For example, the Shabans expropriated land after they forcibly 
removed the Kasians, who had lived in Katanga for about three generations. Kasians who 
survived these episodes of fury, fled to the Kasai regions in which they were truly 
foreigners. The ―lack of clear title prevent[ed] land from being offered as collateral for a 
loan and discouraged individual farmers from making the capital investment in land 
improvement needed to raise output‖ (Smith, Merrill, and Meditz, 1994:171). Those who 
did farm were subsistence farmers (Smith, Merrill, and Meditz, 1994).  
  Agricultural development provides another example of how Mobutu incorporated 
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public funds into his patronage system. ―Rural and agricultural development projects and 
programs, [funded by international aid], were mostly implemented in Shaba and other 
regions which were harboring political opposition to Mobutu, as well as in the native 
villages of the most influential political and military leaders‖ (Mokoli and Binswanger, 
1998:13). Mobutu, as representative of this sovereign state, was the proxy through which 
aid was distributed. Therefore, distribution of aid reflected his personal connections and 
agenda to deflect opposition, instead of utility or need.  
The loss of agricultural production, the lack of manufacturing, the competition 
among miners, and the personal risks involved in artisanal mining intersected to produce 
a high unemployment rate. ―One estimate placed unemployment in the mid 1980s at 40 
percent for Kinshasa and as high as 80 percent for other cities. Only mining towns had 
unemployment at lower figures‖ (Smith, Merrill, and Meditz, 1994:166). However, 
higher rates of employment did not equate to vibrant economies. Also, the high 
unemployment rate and the lack of employment alternatives beyond mining and public 
service were detrimental to trade unions. The only official trade union, at least until 1992, 
was the National Union of Zairian Workers (Union Nationale des Travailleurs Zairois – 
UNTZA). UNTZA was affiliated with Mobutu‘s central party the MPR (Smith, Merrill, 
and Meditz, 1994:166). The proliferation of any meaningful trade unions, until 1992, was 
stifled by the central government. Also, the surplus of unemployed workers undermined 
workers‘ bargaining positions. In addition, since the central government had not 
organized the mining industries across the country, artisanal mining placed workers in 
isolated working conditions where it was difficult to organize (International Labor 
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Organization, 1999).  
  Because of a lack of investment in infrastructure and human resources, 
plummeting commodity prices, and a lack of fiscal discipline, Zaire was heavily in debt 
to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Western countries. While Zaire fell victim 
to spikes in oil prices in 1973-74 and the decline in the price of copper (its chief export) 
in 1975, a number of the country‘s woes can be attributed to the nationalization of 
enterprises in 1973 under Mobutu‘s (African) authenticity program. His public rhetoric 
suggested that he undertook Zairianization to signify a clear break with Zaire‘s colonial 
past, even reassigning provinces African names. This program was not sustainable and 
acceptable to Western donors, so Mobutu began to reverse this process in 1975. Also, in 
1972-1973 foreign donors financed ridiculous public projects, such as a power line from 
the Shaba region to Kinshasa that would allow Mobutu to pull the plug on the region for 
bad behavior.  
By financing nonviable projects under commercial credit conditions in the early 
1970s, and not providing appropriate debt relief ten years later when the country 
was in the process of reforming, [the donor community] contributed to making 
adjustment difficult to sustain (Kiakwama and Chevallier, 2001:629).  
In addition, each time donors rescheduled debt, made structural adjustments, or extended 
credits to Zaire, Mobutu made it clear that he would not abide by the financial restrictions 
attached to these plans.  
New plans to adjust Zaire‘s debt emerged in 1979, 1980, 1981, 1986, and 1988 
(Kiakwama and Chevallier, 2001). These liberalization efforts resulted in reputable and 
not-so-reputable companies profiting from the shadow economy (Reno, 1998).  This 
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brand of liberalization involved Mobutu being courted by foreign companies who saw 
Zaire as a cash cow. They had to put down investment money.  Mobutu would then 
connect business owners with Mobutu‘s favorite warlords, who served as surrogate police 
forces for their respective territories. It was a win-win for everyone except the average 
Congolese. The foreign company would be able to operate with few restrictions, while 
appearing to aid in the liberalization process (Reno, 2008).  
The uneven application of liberalization measures wreaked devastation upon rural 
communities.  
Our studies in Kivu, Lower Zaire and Shaba show that this reform has not been 
put into effect in rural areas distant from the central government: price controls 
continue to be imposed with the result that food crops are extensively smuggled 
across the borders to take advantage of higher [selling] prices and acquire 
commodities scarce or unobtainable in Zaire (MacCaffey, 1999:19).  
Mobutu engaged Western organizations with promises of liberalization. As show in Table 
4, he instituted just enough reforms and showed enough progress to keep them on the 
hook until the early 1990s. By itself, this see-saw relationship seems irrational for these 
organizations. However, they stood to gain from Zaire‘s vast resources. Equally as 
important, they could use Zaire as a post from which to mount anti-communist 
campaigns. 
Until the late 1980s, Zaire‘s mounting debt seemed a minor concern for the 
Western community. The physical location of Zaire in the African continent was of 
strategic importance to the US in its crusade against communism. Mobutu‘s relationship 
with Western states precedes his presidency. ―On November 24, 1965, with the support 
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 of Western governments, Mobutu seized power in a bloodless coup‖ (Kiakwama and 
Chevallier, 2001:630).  ―Together with Cuba and Vietnam, Congo had the dubious 
privilege of being a hot spot in the conflict between the Soviet Union and the West during 
the Cold War‖ (Kiakwama and Chevallier, 2001:630; ―Secretary of State on New  
Government in the Congo,‖ 1998). Through Zaire, the US supported rebels in Angola, for 
example. In return, the Angola government would play a critical role in Mobutu‘s 
overthrow (―Secretary of State on New Government in the Congo,‖ 1998).  
Throughout Mobutu‘s rule he was considered a friend of the United States. The 
US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had a strong hand in Zairian politics. However, 
Mobutu was a source of frustration for the CIA (Rising Star, 1997). ―The United States 
actively supported Mobutu with weapons‖ (―Secretary of State on New Government in 
the Congo,‖ 1998:877). Mobutu made several appearances at the Reagan and Bush I 
White House (Government Printing Office/US State Department, 1987) (Kiakwama and 
Chevallier, 2001). Other prominent US citizens have had strong economic ties to the 
Mobutu regime. Pat Robertson, the Christian Broadcast Network (CBN) evangelist, 
contends that he established the Operation Blessing in Zaire for humanitarian purposes. 
However, Robertson is less vocal about the African Development Corporation he 
established for resource extraction in Zaire, with Mobutu‘s blessing (Sizemore, 2003).  
The relationship between Mobutu and Western interests, until the 1990s, meant a 
steady stream of aid and arms to Mobutu from Western powers, even in the face gross 
human rights violations. It also assured Mobutu cash flow, although he failed to invest in 
his own economy. At the end of the Cold War, the U.S. had little need for Mobutu. In 
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1996, the US Congress denounced Mobutu‘s for his gross violations of human rights. 
Citing the commitments Mobutu agreed to in the Declaration of the Cairo Conference of 
November 29, 1995, and the Tripartite meeting of Zaire, Rwanda, and the United Nations 
High Commission for Refugees (December 22, 1995). A House Resolution pointed out 





Session: 1996), which he is partially responsible for creating.  
Given the U.S.‘ economic and political ties to Zaire, it is no wonder that these 
officials looked away from evidence of economic and political mismanagement. While 
some of Zaire‘s economic woes were due to the plunge of copper values in 1975, these 
woes stemmed largely from Mobutu‘s mismanagement. He failed to develop other 
sectors, skimmed off the profits of parastatal companies, and even failed to invest in new 
equipment for his copper operations. When Mobutu defaulted on loans (which was 
often), from other countries and through the IMF, the Western authorities interceded to 
ask for the debt to ask for leniency and that the debt be rescheduled (Kiakwama, 
Chevallier. 2001).  
―The World Bank closed its office in Zaire in January 1994, due to the country‘s 
failure to pay its debts‖ (Human Rights Watch). ―In 1990, official development aid to 
Zaire reached a peak of more than $800 million‖ (Williame, et. al, 1997:8-9). These debts 
reached dizzying heights, despite efforts by the IMF and individual Western powers to 
assist in the stabilization of the Zairian economy (Kiakwama and Chevallier, 2001).  In 
retrospect, however, IMF and Western efforts appeared to be hollow, since these same 
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organizations had supplied Mobutu a seemingly unlimited amount of money and military 
aid, with little accountability for state spending or treatment of his people.   
Summary 
Throughout most of Mobutu‘s tenure, Zaire‘s economy declined. A number of the 
worst periods of decline corresponded with downturns in resource prices and also with 
the ending of the Cold War. However, Zaire was in a general state of freefall from the 
1970s onward. As dismal as its macroeconomic indicators may have been, these numbers 
do not reveal the depth of despair. Since the formal economy intertwined with the 
informal economy, the extent to which the average Congolese struggled was difficult to 
quantify.  
Mobutu continued the legacy of private ownership of the state begun by King 
Leopold of Belgium. When the Belgians relinquished the Congo, they had failed to 
prepare the Congolese to administer the political state and to regulate its economy. While 
the Belgians withdrew to some degree from Congolese politics after independence, they 
continued to control the Congolese economy. Given the limited opportunities for 
economic development through a private sector, the Congolese depended upon the state 
at a source of revenue. The state resources provided convenient sources of revenue for 
Mobutu and his patronage system. However, he failed to develop the very infrastructure 
that would have made the mining industry competitive. For example, he failed to develop 
a strong education system and transportation system to support the mining sector and 
other sectors. Zaire became heavily indebted to Western donors, who knowingly funded 
untenable projects. Consequently, Mobutu went through many cycles of economic 
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readjustments with development banks and other Western donors. These cycles led to 
more debt and a mountain of evidence that Mobutu was not interested in strengthening 
the economy.  
People and Patterns 
Despite the importance of Zaire‘s location to Western states, the people of Zaire did not 
reap the benefits of Zaire‘s association with the West. The few macro-economic 
indicators that suggest growth in Zaire‘s economy are discounted by larger growths in 
population (Almquist, 1994:70-75). Between 1991 and 2000, the population of the Congo 
grew from approximately 39 million to approximately 52 million. Despite this  
growth, Zaire was sparsely populated. Table 5 illustrates the wide range of average 
population size throughout the eleven provinces.  
Despite exponential population growth, DRC has been plagued by low life 
expectancies. Between 1991 and 2000, life expectancy for the average Zairian ranged 
 
Table 5. Population Density by Province in Zaire, 1994 
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Haut Zaire 8.4 
Adapted from Almquist, Alan. 1994. ―The Society and Its Environment‖ In Zaire: A Country Study. Sandra 





from 48.06 to 50.81. In comparison, life expectancy for the average American during this 
same period ranged from 75.50 to 76.62 (U.S. Census Bureau, International Database).  
Human displacement has played a key role in population shifts in Zaire. After the 
1993 Burundi civil war and the 1994 Rwandan genocide 800,000 to 1.2 million 
(―Secretary of State on New Government in the Congo,‖1998; Reed, 1998) Hutus poured 
into refugee camps in the North Kivu region of eastern Zaire. Also, between 1991 and 
1994, Shabans displaced about 100,000 Kasians from the Shaba Region to the Kasai 
Provinces (Human Rights Watch, 1994). ―Most of them are thought to have returned to 
impoverished farming communities in Eastern Kasai, although many remain crowded 
into certain towns in northern Shaba, where they depend on international assistance for 
survival‖ (US Department of State, 1995). Ethnic manipulation has historically played a 
role in human mobility in Zaire. The population in the Congo has historically consisted of 
four major ethnic groups: the Bantu, the Sudanian group, the Pygmoid group, and the 
Nilotic group
19
. The Bantu group has covered two-thirds of the country. The Sudanian 
group has generally resided in North Congo. The Nilotic group consists of a few tribes 
living in North East Congo. The Pygmoid group have been scattered throughout the 
country (Ministry of Mines, 2003). These groups can be subdivided further into over 250 
different groups (Meditz and Merrill, 1994), many of whom are related through these 
four major groups. Despite these familial connections, Mobutu was able to exploit the 
subtle and the obvious differences among other groups.  
                                                        
19 I say has historically to account for the recent and current human displacements.  
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  Throughout his reign, ethnic tensions resulted from deliberate acts by Mobutu 
or his agents to ensure that national or sub-national groups did not unite against him. In 
Southern Zaire, the governor of the Shaba province, Kyunguwa Kumwanga incited 
atrocities against (and incited the removal of) ethnic Kasians (French, 1996; Human 
Rights Watch, 1994; Noble 1993) who had migrated to the Shaba region decades before. 
The Kasians constituted the professional class in Zaire. Ironically, Mobutu often 
dispersed Kasians throughout the country to lead administrative activities. This status, 
which elicited resentment from other Congolese, was fostered by Belgians during 
Colonialism. The Belgians circulated the idea that the Kasians were more malleable to 
the Western-style of administration (Noble, 1993). While the refugee Kasians bore the 
brunt of this divisiveness, the entire national economy suffered as a result of this forced 
exodus. ―The Shaba Government actively forced the departure of engineers and 
technicians from Shaba-based Gecamines through May. Nearly 50% of Gecamines staff 
was harassed to leave Shaba (Mobbs, 1995:943).   
In one final example of ethnic manipulation for political expediency, Mobutu was 
careful to place provincial officials who were of mixed race. Since the mixed race official 
would have no allegiance to any particular group, the official would not mobilize his own 
ethnic group in opposition to Mobutu‘s power. The divisiveness of coordinated racial 
tension was sufficient to prevent the formation of viable opposition to the state (Reno, 




Through 2000, Zaire-DRC was a country of about 52 million people. Populations 
across the provinces ranged from 7.8 people per square kilometer in Shaba to 266.3 
people per square kilometer in the much smaller Kinshasa. Civil wars in border countries 
and human displacements figured prominently in where these people lived. Although 
Zaire‘s – DRC‘s population consisted of four key groups, the ethnicity of some 250 
subgroups played a large role in Zairian politics.  
Political Structures 
By every standard imaginable, Zaire was ungoverned. Zaire certainly did not meet the 
basic standards of a modern, bureaucratic state (Weber, 1965). History suggests that the 
goal of the Mobutu patronage system was not to govern, but to maintain itself through an 
elaborate patronage system (Wrong, 2000). The beneficiaries of this system managed to 
enrich themselves without providing social services, transportation infrastructure, health 
infrastructure, or a disciplined military. Policy decisions over time suggest that Mobutu 
became less and less interested in meeting the needs of his people. Further in this 
discussion, we see that a number of structures left over from the Mobutu regime 
supported the new mercantilist class, under the Kabila regime.  
Illegal activities also benefited from the old transportation network that existed 
prior to the 1998 war. This network consists of key airlines and trucking 
companies, a number of which aided ADFL troops in their war against the 
Mobutu regime. The pattern of transport remains similar today: merchandise or 
arms are flown in and natural resources or their products are flown out (UN Panel 




The transportation arrangement under the Kabila regime was marked by the use of more 
air transportation. This arrangement reflected the increased economic activity of 
Ugandans, Rwandans, and other foreigners in the Congo (UN Panel of Experts, 2002 
#72).  
  Under Mobutu, there were few political institutions through which meaningful 
negotiations for adequate infrastructure to take place. In reality, Zaire‘s legislature, 
judiciary, executive, and labor unions were governed by the MPR party for 35 
years. Human Rights Watch contends, ―President Mobutu repeatedly undermined 
prospects for multi-party elections, which he promised in April 1990. His term officially 
expired December 1991‖ (2004). Mobutu held power six years beyond that expiration 
date.  
Before his decree of almost absolute sovereignty in the 1990s, Mobutu had 
appeared to allow a host of reforms in Zaire. He had suggested that a more independent 
legislature and judiciary, free and fair elections, and tolerance of opposition parties were 
within reach. The lip service paid to reforms was the direct results of new domestic and 
international realities. The Soviet Union was imploding and political revolt against 
repressive regimes was gaining moment in Eastern Europe in other parts of Africa. This 
mood was reflected in the student uprisings and Christian marches in the Congo in 1990 
and 1992, respectively (Human Rights Watch, 1993) in reaction to Mobutu‘s unfulfilled 
promises of democratic elections. In response, Mobutu ―announced a limited transition to 
‗three-party‘ democracy on April 24, 1990‖ (Mokoli and Binswwanger, 1998: 17). 
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Mobutu also agreed to the demand for a Sovereign National Conference, through which 
various forces in society could negotiate their interests (Mokoli and Binswanger, 1998).  
The Transitional Act of August 1992 established an independent judiciary. In 
addition to ignoring the mandates of the Transitional Act and reconfiguring the 
legislature to suit his needs, Mobutu installed a cabinet and prime minister to compete 
with the legitimate cabinet and prime minister selected by the legislature. In 1993, the 
DRC was being run by two competing governments.  
Since March 1993, Zaire has had two cabinets. One is headed by Tshisekedi, 
elected by the CNS under the terms of the Transitional Act. This transitional 
government, the so-called government of national union, was reconfigured and 
broadened in September 1993. The rival, Mobutu- appointed government, the so-
called government of national salvation, is headed by Birindwa as prime minister 
(Turner, 1994).  
 
However, Tshisekedi was never a formidable opponent considering his lack of access to 
military, other state apparatus, and other state resources (Turner, 1994). For these 
reasons, the West did not accept Tshisekedi as the sovereign figure (Reno, 2008). The 
West recognized Mobutu‘s authority. However, his people did not give him legitimacy. 
Since Mobutu did not depend upon the public for his resource base, Mobutu could 
ignore the needs of his people. The state did not collect taxes from a wide base of 
citizens, in a systematic fashion. Citizens paid taxes in the way buying off violent soldiers 
or bribing state officials for goods and services. However, these types of revenue 
collections were isolated and personal. They undermined the prospects for a formal 
economy in which citizens pay fair taxes for the goods and services they need 
consistently (Weber, 1965). Citizens did not pay, in a systematic way, into the state 
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operations. ―The share of income taxes and taxes on goods and services in total revenue 
declined an average of 60 percent [from 1984-86 to 1988-89] to an average of 35%‖ 
(Kiakwama and Chevallier, 2001:641).  
Apart from potential and actual fiscal revenues there were three other financial 
flows that served to enrich Mobutu, his family and associates: 1) covert payments 
by foreign governments, including the United States, 2) diversion payments for 
mineral export, and 3) foreign aid and investment funds. Of these export 
revenues, the mineral industry provided the most important and reliable source of 
hard currency. Identifiable ‗leakage‘ often exceeded $100 million per year 
(Mokoli and Binswanger, 1998:8).  
 
Consequently, state expenditures did not reflect the interests of the average Congolese.  
The share of defense, security, foreign affairs, and administrative and political 
functions increased from 38 to 62 percent of the total during the period, while the 
share of education and health declined from 39 to 22 percent (Kiakwama and 
Chevallier, 2001:641).  
 
There was no systematic welfare distribution plan in place. Redistribution of wealth was 
based upon favor. The political elite were patrons of a system that rewarded them with 
political positions, unchecked graft, agricultural lands, expropriated business, and direct 
wealth. Mobutu‘s clients (in this case his extended family) received wealth or tools to 
acquire wealth without having to invest much into economic ventures of the broader 
society.   
Bureaucracy 
Mobutu gave his public employees incentives and opportunities to rob the state. It 
was common for the regime to allow lower-level clerks and public agents to profit 
personally from the state services they provided.  
Among the most threatening for the people and businessmen [were]: Army and 
Garde-Civile (Police), Service National d’Immigration (National Service of 
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Immigration), Office des Douanes et Assises (Customs), and Office Zairois de 
Commerce (OZAC) (Mokoli and Binswinger, 1998).  
 
There seemed to be a tacit understanding that since the state would not pay adequate and 
consistent wages, employees could compensate themselves through bribes, excessive 
fees, and all out robbery. Also, public employees understood that their positions were 
tentative, based on the mood of the president. Public employees understood that they 
needed to get as much as they could, while they still had his favor. For example, 
provincial governors needed to establish a power base quickly because Mobutu was 
especially careful to rotate them. He would not allow them to build a following in their 
respective regions (Mokoli and Binswanger, 1998). ―During the 1980s Zairian 
governments lasted on average less than one year‖ (Kiakwama and Chevallier, 
2001:642). Mobutu also appointed national commissioners to monitor the provincial 
governors. Given the precarious nature of public employment under Mobutu, it was 
difficult for a state bureaucracy to become institutionalized. Also, ―civil servants were 
reluctant to make policy decisions or to enforce changes based on the World Bank 
recommendations for fear of losing favor with Mobutu‖ (Mokoli and Binswanger, 
1998:11). 
  Mobutu‘s was a generous wealth distribution system with a limited number of 
beneficiaries. The beneficiaries of the state‘s wealth consisted of ―a tiny, extremely rich 
ruling class that absorb[ed] more than 45 percent of the national wealth‖ (Williame, et. 
al, 1997:6). People who could not get a piece of the state‘s action resorted to looting and 
rioting. ―A series of revolts and looting [took place] in Kinshasa in December 1990, in 
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Mbuji-mayi in May 1991, in Kinshasa again in June 1991, then in almost all the Zairian 
cities between September and October 1991‖ (Williame, et. al, 1997:7). Obviously, 
citizens were dissatisfied with their central government. Yet rioting and looting were 
their most powerful responses, as coordinated rebellions had been undermined by 
Mobutu‘s social and political manipulation. One example of this manipulation was the 
constant shifting of provincial leaders so they could not build a power base. Using the 
looting and plundering as indicators, we can say that contestation against elites was high. 
However, this contestation was also difficult to organize and target because Mobutu was 
constantly redefining who the elite were.  
Military 
Mokoli and Binswanger (1998:14) point out that upon the DRC becoming an 
independent state, ―the army was the only political organization with a national base.‖ 
Mobutu corroded this institution by failing to pay the military or issuing personnel 
worthless banknotes. This behavior diminished loyalty. However, Mobutu did not want 
loyalty from the rank-and-file. He used them in their desperate states to frighten the 
people into submission and to contain each other. As they competed with each other, they 
could not form coalitions against him. Consequently, the military‘s reach corroded 
because it was disorganized and undisciplined. Ultimately, Mobutu‘s rag tag brigade 
would not prevail against outside forces in 1996-1997.  
Illustrating the weakness of the state army, Mobutu‘s confidence and his life lay 
in the hands of his special military guard, the Service for Action and Military Intelligence 
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(Service d’ Action et de Renseignements Militaires (SARM) and Division Speciale 
Presidentielle (DSP). Mokoli and Binswanger write that this guard was: 
drafted mainly from his Ngbadi and Ngbaka tribes. They were loyal only to him 
and his family, but were paid and armed out of state revenues. After a while, they 
also were affected and weakened by the mismanagement. During this process 
other competing sources of coercion not under state control, such as private 
militias, grew in influences for public and mostly for personal goals (Mokoli and 
Binswanger, 1998:9). 
 
 Upon the advance by the ADFL, one of the government‘s ―principal strategies was 
reportedly to recruit mercenaries from Europe, South Africa, and Angola‖ (Reed, 
1998:150).  
Education 
Education in the DRC was also farmed out to organizations outside the state. 
Since colonization, education in Zaire had largely been provided by the Catholic Church. 
Upon gaining independence, there were only about 30 college graduates in the vast 
Congo. However, given the unnecessarily dire conditions, it is no surprise that education 
in Zaire in the 1980s and 1990s was taking a back seat to survival. Still, individuals and 
communities pooled resources to compensate for this neglect. Also, the Catholic Church 
continued to be the principle source of education in Zaire. Mobutu further undermined 
the capacity of the educated populace. Mobutu recruited heavily from among young, 
college graduates who, in most societies, would struggle to break into the job market. 
Since Mobutu recruited them, they would not have to struggle against the experience and 
expertise of their senior colleagues. This tactic ensured the loyalty of grateful, young 
college graduates (Almquist, 1994). However, it also assured a brain drain from 
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entrepreneurial markets and authentic political development. From a different 
perspective, higher education in Zaire may have had a dampening impact on opposition 
to a repressive regime. The idea is that people in Zaire still psychologically connected 
education opportunities with economic mobility despite overwhelming of limited 
mobility. So in assessing their plight, they might have been focusing on their ambitions 
rather than their realities (Almquist, 1994).  
Infrastructure 
Despite citizens‘ attempts to pull themselves up by their bootstraps, they suffered 
immensely because some important institutions were missing from the DRC 
society. Rather than fight the central government, the conditions in Zaire forced people to 
retreat to their local ties and their own resources. Regional systems of transportation, for 
example, developed around the informal economy and smuggling routes. Both formal 
and informal transportation routes were decentralized. Producers in the south relied upon 
the rail system in Angola. When it shut down due to rebel fighting, producers had to rely 
on the South African transportation system (Kiakwama, Gilbert and Jerome Chevallier. 
2001).   ―The national [roads] network is [only] about 145,000 Km throughout the 
country‖ (Ministry of Mines, 2003:8). ―The Congolese railways network has [only] a 
total of 5,118 Km within 858 Km are electrified‖ [sic] (Ministry of Mines, 2003:7).  
Rule of Law and Property Rights 
The resourcefulness of the Congolese was no substitute for clear rules, 
regulations, and enforcement.  For example, land ownership and property rights, for the 
average citizen, were tentative, if they existed at all. Regardless of the official rules, the 
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average understanding of land rights was caught between the concept of land tenure, 
which requires land to be used for the present livelihood of the members of kinship 
groups and the notion that land could be expropriated for the state or on behalf of 
corporations for commercial activities. Technically, the land belonged to the present and 
future kinship group, and therefore could not be sold. Mobutu exploited the tension and 
confusion between the traditional concept of land ownership and a modern concept of 
land ownership (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2002). The judicial system offered little 
recourse to the Congolese in matters of private property. Despite the presence of a 
supreme court, Zairian law was largely the domain of local chiefs, with no law 
credentials (Turner, 1994).    
Under Zairianization the state could expropriate any land and whatever lay below 
ground. As of 1971 and 1973, ―individual land rights [were] derived from either 
concessions by the state or indigenous customary law. These laws did not abrogate 
preexisting customary land rights, but they left unclear the future concessionary status of 
these lands‖ (Turner, 1994:171). In reality, under the Zairian system, property rights were 
based on favor with Mobutu or forced control.  
  In settled regions, such as Shaba, a whole group of people could be uprooted 
(French, 1996; Human Rights Watch, 1994; Noble, 1993). Well-established communities 
were often threatened by people who felt neglected by the state. Since systematic political 
and economic changes appeared to be beyond the reach of the Congolese people, unpaid 
soldiers, along with groups of citizens, felt entitled to loot and to pillage (Human Rights 
Watch, 1994). Their behavior further threatened the development of property rights and 
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continuation of well-established communities. However, the lack of enforceable property 
rights cannot be taken to mean a lack of order entirely. Mobutu used desperate soldiers 
and territorial groups to control property and to maintain order and fear at the local level. 
He did not neglect order. He simply allowed others to provide it.  
Despite these difficulties, history reflects attempts to democratize Zairian politics 
and liberalize the Zairian economy. Both came as a result of pressures by Western 
powers, to whom  Zaire was deeply in debt. The IMF had pressured Zaire in 1983 and 
then again in 1986 to open its market and attract foreign investment (US International 
Trade Administration, 1991).  
Following Zaire's liberalization of its economy in the late1980s, several U.S. 
firms invested in telecommunications, agribusiness, and manufacturing 
enterprises under the joint protection of Overseas Private Investment Corporation 
insurance and the implementation of a U.S.-Zaire Bilateral Investment Treaty.  
  
The largest U.S. investor in Zaire in 1990 is Chevron Oil, with its Zaire Gulf Oil 
subsidiary.  Other U.S. investors include Citibank, Intercontinental Hotel, and 
Mobil.  U.S. investments include a livestock biofeed project, a tire factory, a 
group of plantations and ranches employing some 12,000, and a flour mill.  
  
The Government of Zaire made a commitment to foreign investment in the  
U.S.-Zaire Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) signed in 1984.  The  
government is favorably disposed towards American companies and is focusing  
increased attention on attracting U.S. firms to Zaire.  Zairian laws  
  
covering investment, with minor exceptions, do not differentiate between foreign 
and domestic enterprises (US International Trade Administration, 
1991:Investment in Zaire Section).  
 
Summary of Grievances 
By the early 1990s, several groups were openly expressing discontent with the 
Mobutu regime and expressing their aspirations for democracy. They had good reason to 
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do so. In the Zaire years, most Congolese were locked into patterns of destitution and 
desperation. These positions did not occur by accident. They resulted from Mobutu‘s 
deliberate efforts to entrench himself in Zairian politics (Wrong, 2000) at others‘ 
expense. Not only were people living in dire straits, the society lacked the institutions that 
could help them rise out of these conditions. Their grievances are many and varied. They 
included the following: 
 Land ownership rights were vague. The regime often challenged these rights with 
violence by Mobutu‘s underpaid soldiers. Farmers were reluctant to invest in 
improvements given the tenuous nature of ownership.  
 The regime failed to compensate military and other civil servants. Consequently, 
soldiers sought compensation in looting the citizens of Zaire (Human Rights Watch, 
1994).  
 Groups experienced disparate treatment under the law. This treatment reflects 
Mobutu‘s efforts to pit one group against another.  
 Despite the short-term and long-term resource wealth available, educational 
opportunities were privately negotiated.  
 The Zaire currency was worthless. When the state ran out of money, he simply 
printed more, to the point of becoming indebted to printing firms (Smith, Merrill, 
Meditz, 1994).  
 The banking system collapsed in the early 1990s. Again, citizens found themselves 
relying even more on the informal economy for (limited) financial services. When the 
banking system was active, ―the central bank, the Bank of Zaire (Banque du Zaire) 
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and seventeen commercial banks had been underdeveloped and largely confined to 
urban areas‖ (Smith, Merrill, and Meditz, 1994:165).  
 Since Mobutu operated a system based on patronage rather than administrative logic, 
there were no legitimate through which citizens could address political concerns.  
A Very Bad Year: 1994 
The genocide in Rwanda had a direct relationship to the wars that broke out in Congo in 
1996 and 1998. In 1994, the ethnic Hutus controlled the Rwandan government. The 
Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF-Tutsi) had invaded through Uganda, and in 1990 and 
waged a civil war inside Rwanda; the Hutu/Tutsi competition in Rwanda had been 
smoldering  for at least four years (The Economist, October 18, 1996). In 1994 the 
smoldering heat erupted into a full-blown fire.  Rwanda‘s Hutu president Juvenal 
Habyarimana and Burundi‘s president were killed when their plane was shot down as it 
prepared to land in Kigali (US Department of State, Background Notes, 2008).The Hutu 
extremists circulated the rumor that the Tutsis shot down the plane. Tutsis circulated the 
rumor that the Hutus themselves had staged the whole episode in order to ignite the 
passions of the other Hutus. As news of the plane crash spread, an increasing amount of 
hate speech filled the airwaves. Hutu leaders called upon all Hutus to arm themselves 
with machetes, and exterminate the ―cockroaches‖ (Barker, Greg, 2004).  When the dust 
settled, 800,000 Tutsis and Tutsi sympathizers lay dead.   
The Tutsi-led RPF gained control of the Rwandan government as they drove the 
Hutu west into Zaire. A humanitarian crisis quickly ensued.  In an effort to flee the actual 
or the perceived retaliation of the new Tutsi regime, Hutu refugees from Rwanda and 
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Burundi fled into refugee camps in the Congo and Tanzania (The Economist, October 19, 
1996). They also fled into the Zaire proper. These camps included the Kibumba Camp in 
Goma (Kirpatrick and Ghedini, 1996) and Runingo, just west of the Burundian border 
(CNN: Dateline October 13, 1996; Wallis, October 19, 1996). At a cost of about $2 
million a day, 1.5 million Rwandans and Burundian Hutus poured into their camps 
(CNN: Dateline October 13, 1996). In addition to the staggering costs, this mass exodus 
created a dilemma for humanitarian organizations because humanitarian personnel could 
not distinguish the killers who had committed genocide from the innocent citizens. Also, 
to make matters worse, the fleeing Hutu militia members used innocent refugees as 
human shields in their violent conflicts with the Congolese militia, Rwandan army, and 
paramilitary groups.  
The Camps 
New efficient communities developed within the camps housing the Hutu 
refugees (UN Panel of Experts, April 2001; Reed, 1998). From these camps, the Former 
Government of Rwanda (FGOR) (Hutu) was able to reorganize aspects of their formal 
social order, including their military order. Reed writes, ―Movement into and out of the 
camps was regulated by the FGOR, which also controlled the movement of goods and 
services, including information‖ (140). The camps altered local Zairian economies by 
injecting new goods. Congolese could find items in the camps that they could not find 
previously in Zaire‘s formal or informal economy (Reed, 1998).  
The flight of Hutus into Zaire and the newly organized economies within the 
camps agitated local ethnic tension, where none previously existed. For example, 
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Banyarwanda Hutus and Tutsis living near Masisi in North Kiva had found a way to 
reconcile their separate ethnic identities (The Economist, October 19, 1996). Their 
relationship had emphasized their common ancestry. The Hutu militia brought attention 
to the locals‘ Hutu-ness or Tutsi-ness.  Also, this new military order was able to launch 
attacks on the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) from the camps (The Economist, October 
19, 1996; Reed, 1998). Actions taken by the US government suggest that Mobutu may 





 Session: 1996; Kirpatrick and Ghedini, 1996; The Economist, 
October 19, 1996). The instability of the border region would justify Mobutu‘s attempt to 
expel the refuges and secure military aid from the West, as his regime came under serious 
attack. It would also justify Uganda‘s and Rwanda‘s foreign occupation of Zaire.  
The Banyamulenge: Congo Tutsis 
At this point in the narrative we come back to the Banyawardina and 
Banyamulenge issues with citizenship. The Hutu militia living in the refugee camps 
inserted themselves in these local citizenship disputes. In the north the militia exploited 
the marginalized position of the Banyawardinya of Masisi (Kirpatrick and Ghedini, 
1996). The militia expropriated the Banyawardinya‘s land and chased them into the 
forests of North Kivu. In a similar fashion, militants from the southern camps crossed 
over into South Kivu to challenge the Banyamulenge. In the summer/fall of 1994 the 
Rwandan government signaled that it was safe for Hutu refugees to return, without threat 
of retaliation. Since the FGOR controlled information in the camps, as Reed (1998 and 
also Perlez, 1994) finds, they convinced Hutu refugees that the RPF was waiting to 
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slaughter them upon their return. ―Despite the smooth return of Rwandan refuges from 
Burundi, Rwandans in Zaire and Tanzania refused to return to Rwanda until security in 
Rwanda could be guaranteed‖ (Kirpatrick and Ghedini, 1996) The people‘s reluctance to 
return to Rwanda created a proper justification for Rwanda to occupy the border regions.  
 The Zairian government offered no protection for these Tutsi groups. The state 
acted in concert with the attackers.  
In Uvira, on September 11, 117 Zairians--104 women and children--of Rwandan 
Tutsis ancestry arrived at the compound of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)…In their fight for recognized Zairian 
citizenship,…threats turning into killings, jeopardizing the safety of the 400,000 
Zairian Tutsis living in southeastern Zaire….The intimidated refuge seekers 
agreed to be repatriated to Rwanda, though they do not consider themselves 
Rwandan. These Zairian Tutsis most recently came under attack after three 
Zairian soldiers were killed in an ambush on August 30. Two of the attackers 
were killed and identified as Rwandan Tutsis. Local military officials believe that 
these Tutsis entered Zaire through Burundi and were assisting Zairian 
counterparts in their struggle for political recognition. 
 
This uprooting of Zairian Tutsis in the Uvira region bears an eerie resemblance to 
the ethnic cleansing of another part of eastern Zaire, that of Masisi 
(Banyawardina) (Kirpatrick and Ghedini, 1996). 
 
CNN reported that ―during September, Zairian authorities executed 35 Banyamulenge, 
and 50 more disappeared. [Also], South Kivu deputy governor Lwasi Ngabo Lwabanji 
last week [October 7, 1996] gave the Banyamulenge a week to leave Zaire or be treated 
as rebels and face all-out war with Zairian soldiers‖ (CNN, Dateline: October 13, 1996; 
The Economist, October 19, 1996). These reports chronicle the origins of the ―rebel‖ 
attack that would ultimately overthrow the Mobutu regime. 
The Banyamulenge‘s responses to these invasions were quite different from the 
Banyawardina response. The Banyamulenge were thought to have previous ties to RPF 
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and Rwanda. Those who made this connection, contend that the Banyamulenge had 
received military training in Uganda by the RPF (Kirpatrick and Ghedini, 1996; CNN, 
1996).  
There is evidence that they have been creating a militia among Zairian Tutsis as a 
counterforce to the Rwandan and Burundi Hutu militias operating from Zaire. 
Last month a well-equipped unit of the Burundi army was reported to have driven 
through Uvira, heading up to the Mulenge hills. And Zaire and Rwanda 
exchanged artillery fire on the border between Cyangugu and Bukavu (The 
Economist, October 19, 1996). 
 
 In what, at the time, appeared to be bold and daring move, as early as October 13, 1996, 
the Banyamulenge launched offensives into the camps (the Runingo Camp) (CNN 
Interactive, October 13, 1996). However, a Tutsi coalition consisting of Rwandans, 
Burundians, and Ugandans flanked the Banyamulenge offensive. This offensive sent 
Hutu militia, along with innocent people, into the Congolese hills. Others fled back to 
Rwanda.  
As early as late October, observers reported Rwandan interference in the 
Banyamulenge skirmishes in Zaire (Facts on File News Service, October 31, 1996). This 
interference seemed to be part of a vicious cycle in which Rwanda claimed security 
threats by the Hutus and Zairian soldiers. ―While denying involvement, Rwanda twice 
has sent troops into the fray [Bukavu and Goma]– first on Tuesday and then today‖ 
(Buckley, November 2, 1996). Rwandan and Ugandan fingerprints were all over these 
campaigns. As they gained momentum, ―ADFL soldiers would move through the bush, 
leaving room for soldiers to retreat on the main roads‖ (The Economist, March 8, 1997). 
This approach would allow retreating soldiers time to alert people ahead of the ADFL‘s 
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arrival. Analysts argue that this sort of tactic comes from state military training. 
―Disciplined and purposeful, the ADFL copies the tactics of its mentors, the National 
Resistance Army, which seized power in Uganda in 1986, and its offspring, the Rwandan 
Patriotic Front, which seized power in Rwanda in 1994‖ (The Economist, March 8, 
1997). 
The instability of the border regions served several actors in different ways. The 
instability justified the presence of Uganda and Rwanda. Their presence justified 
Mobutu‘s request for military assistance from the West. At this point, the French were 
willing to intervene to maintain its presence in the region, as it had lost its Hutu alliance 
and was in threat of losing its alliance with Mobutu (The Economist, October 15, 1994). 
The French had previously maintained diplomatic ties with the Hutu regime (The 
Economist, October 19, 1996). Since the U.S. had not come to the aid of the slaughtered 
Tutsis in Rwanda, the US was balancing its guilt about failing to address the genocide in 
Rwanda and its concern for human rights violation perpetrated by the new Tutsi 
administration in Rwanda (The Economist, October 19, 1996).  
History has revealed the depth of Rwanda‘s and Uganda‘s involvement in 
Mobutu‘s overthrow.  Rwanda actually provided forces and Uganda at least provided 
artillery and armored personnel carriers (Bonner and French, 1997). Despite Rwanda‘s 
initially denying involvement, in 1997 Paul Kagame (Rwanda‘s former Defense 
Minister) admitted to the Washington Post (1997) that Rwanda played a key role in the 
campaign. He even said that the plan for the overthrow originated in Kigali. Also, 
Rwanda helped capture key cities and provided training to the rebels (Pomfret, 1997).   
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Western officials suggested that Mobutu negotiate a settlement with Kabila during 
talks on April 29, 1997. However, Kabila refused to make concessions because the odds 
of winning were on his side; negotiations might have actually weakened his position. By 
this time Kabila had already taken Kisangani and moving towards Kinshasa (Secretary of 
State on New Government in the Congo, 1998). The New York Times reported that US 
Intelligence indicates that the ADFL received reinforcements from Angola in April, for a 
final push. Much of the Angolan reinforcement came from Zairians previously exiled 
there by Mobutu (Bonner and French, 1997).  
Mobutu‘s request for aid from international entities was based on legitimate need. 
To illustrate the seriousness of threat perceived by Mobutu, he placed a capable general 
in charge of defensive operations against the campaign mounting in the eastern region, 
outside the camps. Although they were armed with French and American weaponry (The 
Economist, November 2, 1996), the Congolese forces were too fragmented to contain the 
situation. Mobutu was relying upon forces which he had underpaid or failed to pay for 
years. Many in his military had taken second jobs in order to sustain their families 
(Bonner and French, 1997). Mobutu was also confronted with the mentalities of men 
whom he had allowed to make their livings looting and pillaging villages.  
Mercenaries form Serbia, France, and Belgium; Israeli training for the president‘s 
special guard; French training for the airborne brigade; assistance for the air force 
from the Italians; a military academy run by the Belgians; and US logistical 
support (Bonner and French, 1997:A1 and The Economist, November 2, 1996)  
 
Mobutu‘s dilapidated military was weak.  The troops were too undisciplined to convert 
into an organized and professional military outfit (The Economist, November 2, 1996).  
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Mr. Mobutu has brought in a few hundred European mercenaries, reviving 
memories of the 1960s ‗dogs of war‘. But they have found that a white man with 
a gun no longer petrifies the natives. Mostly Russians and Serbs, the mercenaries 
are inexperienced in Africa and, while their helicopter gunships initially disrupted 
the rebel advance, they did not stop it. Yet it would not be hard to hit Mr. Kabila‘s 
men as they approach the key city of Kisangani. Impenetrable jungle forced the 
rebels to keep to the road, and where that crosses big rivers in spate from the 
recent rains, they could easily be ambushed (The Economist, February 2, 1997).  
 
Rag-Tag Rebellion 
The weakness of Mobutu‘s army is further illustrated by the weakness of the 
opposing forces. One report says that ―the rebel army grew, training on the march in war-
combat fatigues, t-shirts, rubber thongs and tennis shoes. [However], they were 
motivated‖ (Bonner and French, 1997:A1). Bonner and French (1997) concluded that the 
war shortened and cost less because the army did not slow down the rebellion.  
Mobutu‘s inability to organize a defensive operation against the Banyamulenge 
offensive exposed weaknesses that a range of players were poised to exploit. The 
Banyamulenge offensive was eventually packaged and labeled as the rebel offensive of 
the ADFL (Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo/Zaire), the 
organization that would ultimately overthrow the Mobutu regime. The legitimizing face 
of the ADFL was that of Congolese Laurent Kabila, who had been associated with the 
Reviving his People‘s Revolutionary Party. This fledgling party had challenged the 
central government in 1984 and 1985 (Turner, 1994).  In his manuscripts, the Cuban 
revolutionary Che Guevera depicted Kabila as a man more committed to the trappings of 
rebel leadership than actual leadership. He also depicted Kabila as a man prone to 
partying and chasing women. Guevera‘s depictions suggest that Kabila would leave the 
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serious organizing to others (Guevara, 1999 1
st
 American Edition). Despite his attempts 
to portray himself as revolutionary, Kabila was really a gold and ivory smuggler.  
Kabila formed an alliance with the Mouvement Revolutionnaire pour la 
Liberation du Zaire, the Alliance Democratique des Peoples (dominated by Tutsi 
from North and South Kivu), and the Counseil National de Resistance pour la 
Democratic (whose members came from eastern Zaire and Kasai), creating the 
Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo/Zaire (ADFL). 
Resting on a regional base in three provincial areas – eastern Zaire, Shaba 
(formerly known as Katanga), and Kasai – the ADFL was to spearhead the battle 
against Mobutu (Reed, 1998:146). 
 
This movement was different from earlier protests against Mobutu in that it had the 
military power of at least two countries backing it--Uganda and Rwanda. Without this 
assistance, the ADFL‘s efforts might be remembered as another insignificant botched 
attempt to overthrow a ruler who seemed destined to rule until he died (Reed, 
1998). While these groups constituting the ADFL were united in their desire to overthrow 
the dictator, they were not united in their visions for DRC.  
Prior to the exposition of Mobutu‘s weaknesses against the Banyamulenge 
offensive, no group known as the ADFL had previously staged guerilla operations in the 
Congo. News accounts from December 1996 referred to the ADFL action that occurred in 
mid-October. However, news accounts released round October appear to make no such 
references. One of the first references to Kabila as leader of the offensive was made on 
November 2, 1996. The article in question does not refer directly to the ADFL but the 
Tutsi rebel movement (Buckley, November 2, 1996). Before the name ADFL started to 
appear in news accounts reporters cast what was happening in Zaire as the Banyamulenge 
campaign to protect their homeland. Reports from the fall of 1996 were laden with 
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examples of violence against this group. ―In mid-September 1996, more than 100 
Banyamulenge, mostly women and children were massacred in the villages of Lueba and 
Mboko by armed Babembe ‗combatants‘‖ (AI, December 19, 1996). Zairian soldiers 
committed these atrocities allegedly in response to atrocities committed by the 
Banyamulenge. The Banyamulenge had reportedly attacked a Lemera Hospital, near 
Uvira, which housed military and civilian patients (Amnesty International, 1996).  
The Banyamulenge defensive campaign became an offensive campaign, turning 
its attention to the refugee camps. The Economist and Amnesty International documented 
the campaign‘s shift from defending the Banyamulenge homeland, to raiding the camps, 
to capturing major cities. They write,  
From mid-October onwards, the refugee camp of Kangunga, Runingo, Kibigoye, 
and Luberezi were attacked by ADFL forces. Kagunga camp was heavily shelled 
on or around 18 October. Then it was the turn of the Runingo Camp. Luberezi 
camp was attacked on the night of 20 or 21 October (Amnesty International, 
December 19, 1996).  
 
The Tutsis of South Kivu – the Banyamulenge, as they are called – did not stick 
to defending their mountain land and homes. A well-armed and co-ordinated force 
swept north up the road along Lake Tanganyika, capturing towns as it went. (The 
Economist, November 02, 1996) From the camps, the offensive focused its 
attention on the major cities Kiliba and Uvira (AI, December 19, 1996). 
 
Table 6 outlines the rapid progress of the ―ADFL‖ offensive through the major cities. In 
response to news of the rebels‘ approach, MIBA officials in Kasai said that they would 
not resist (The Economist, March 15, 1997). ―The most powerful man in the province 
[Kasai], Mukamba Kadiata Nzemba, declared he would collaborate with Mr. Kabila 
when he [came]. Mr. Mukamba [was] the boss of MIBA‖ (The Economist, March 15, 
1997; African Mining and Energy, March 19, 1997).
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Table 6. The Course of the ADFL Military Campaign 
City/Province Date 
Uvira,  October 25, 1996 
Village of Mboko October 28, 30, 1996 
Bukavu, South Kivu Previous Tuesday; October 29, 1996 
Town of Goma, North Kivu November 2, 1996 
Bunia, Orientale (North East) December 27, 1996 
Kisangani (3
rd
 largest city) March 15 
Mbuji-Mayi April 4 
Lubumbashi (2
nd
 largest city) April 9 
Kinshasa (capitol) May 17 
Sources;  
(1) Amnesty International. ―Hidden from Scrutiny: Human Rights Abuses in Eastern Zaire.‖ December, 19, 
1996.  
(2) Amnesty International. ―Hidden from Scrutiny: Human Rights Abuses in Eastern Zaire.‖ December, 19, 
1996.  
(3) Buckley, Stephen. November 2, 1996. ―Rwandan Army Captures Refugee-Filled Zairian Town: 
Thousands of Hutus Flee Joint Tutsi Attack.‖ The Washington Post. A Section, Page A01. and Facts on 
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No 196.  
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News Digest. Retrieved July 27, 2008 from Facts on File World News Digest. 




Mobutu‘s involvement in the hate politics of the Hutus and the Tutsis predated the 
Rwandan genocide in 1994. Mobutu had sponsored rebels in Uganda against President 
Museveni and against the Tutsi leadership in Rwanda (Human Rights Watch, 
1999). Also, prior to the Hutus‘ mass exodus to Eastern Zaire Mobutu had challenged the 
citizenship and land rights of the Banyarwanda (a Tutsis group native to Zaire) of the 
North Kivu Province, even forcing them to provide evidence of citizenship (Norwegian 
Refugee Council, 2002; Human Rights Watch) dating back before ―colonial partition‖ 
(Reed 1998:143). When the Hutus fleeing Rwanda began expropriating Banyarwanda 
(native Zairian‘s) land, Mobutu looked the other way (Reed, 1998). Not only did the 
Hutus expropriate foreign land, their flight into Zaire taxed the limited capabilities of an 
 
already fledgling Congo state. For example, ―the pyrochlore operations at Societe 
Industrielle et Miniere du Kivu (Somikivu) at Lueshe, 70 kilometers (km) north of Goma, 
were discontinued, owing in part to the disruption of its transportation route by the influx 
of Rwandan refugees‖ (Mobbs, 1995:943).  
The Tutsi label provided a clear target for ethnic persecution. Anti-Tutsi groups 
lumped all Tutsis together, even loosely affiliated groups, whether they were from 
Uganda, Burundi, Zaire, or the Congo. The state‘s general neglect of its population meant 
that marginal or ostracized groups such as the Tutsi collective received no protection 
from the state. To make matters worse the state was one of the agitating forces. The 
Banyamulenge of the South Kivu, in contrast, resisted the Hutu invasion more vigorously 
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than the Banyawardina. However, it became clear shortly after the resistance, that the 
Banyamulenge had received military assistance from Rwanda and Uganda. Still, the 
Banyamulenge resistance exposed fundamental weaknesses in Mobutu‘s army.  
Shortly after the resistance began it became an offensive campaign under the 
auspices of the rebel group ADFL. Kabila Laurent, a Shaban, became the face of the 
largely Tutsi coalition. Prior to his leadership in the campaign, he was known as a 
shadowy gold and ivory trader. The ADFL campaign began in September 1996. By May 
1997 the group had taken the capital, Kinshasa. As further indication of the weakness of 
Mobutu‘s forces, the ADFL was able to overtake the army while wearing t-shirts and 
flip-flops. Moreover, Mobutu‘s soldiers and his citizens were willing to sign on with or 
endorse the ADFL forces.  
Internal political organizations had formed in opposition to Mobutu‘s rule. 
Zairians had legitimate grievances related to resource mismanagement, state decay, and 
social disparities created from resource wealth, and tenuous property rights. Indicators of 
well-being, as dismal as they were, understated the real wealth gap between the elite and 
the poor (French, 1996). Several groups took Mobutu to task on these issues. Groups 
such as Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS) appealed to Mobutu‘s 
democratic inclinations. In 1980 a group of 13 members of the parliament released an 
open letter to the press outlining Mobutu‘s abuses (United Nations, 1986). In return 
Mobutu jailed them. In 1990, Mobutu turned his elite guard on students who were 
peacefully protesting against the poor conditions in educational institutions (Almquist, 
1994).  While groups may have acted on their litany of grievances against Mobutu, 
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ultimately their strategies and tactics could not overthrow the dictator. These groups were 
clearly outmatched as they attempted to use democratic approaches to address a leader 
who was willing to use undemocratic methods of suppression. Also, they lacked a clear 
base of international support.  
A Crucial Period: 1997-2001 
Kabila initially projected the public image of a liberator and a substantive alternative to 
the Mobutu regime. He promised a multi-party system and a ―national salvation 
government‖ (―Secretary of State on New Government in the Congo,‖ 1998:877). In 
reality the transition occurred from a loosely centralized feudal system, under Mobutu, to 
an even less centralized feudal system in the latter Mobutu years and under the new 
Kabila regime.  
The system of resource management under Mobutu involved private ownership of 
public resources (Mokoli and Binswwanger, 1998). As one observer noted: ―Mr. Mobutu 
has run the country like a medieval king, taking personal dues from his appointed barons 
around it. Already, its mineral-rich provinces of Shaba and Kasai are virtually 
autonomous‖ (The Economist, February 15, 1997). The Mobutu regime designed a 
business model that other entities could exploit immediately. The general model changed 
very little from one regime to the next. In the period between the overthrow of Mobutu 
and the second civil war (1998), the constellation of players simply realigned. 
―Previously, the distribution norm was (via legal and illegal channels) through locally 
based Congolese, mostly civilian-managed, business operations. However, these 
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traditional modes were quickly overtaken by a new power structure‖ (UN Panel of 
Experts, 2001, #23).  
Problems with Legitimacy 
Shortly after the takeover the new power structure consisted of Uganda, Burundi, 
and Rwanda and their front-man, Laurent Kabila.. After power consolidation, Kabila‘s 
legitimacy among the Congolese waned for a number of reasons. First, Kabila and his 
representatives engaged in gross human rights violations. Second, Kabila stifled the 
multi-party system and other democratic institutions he had promised. He also failed to 
exert bureaucratic control over the Congo. In addition, he hired people with little or no 
experience for the jobs he assigned them. His justice minister formerly worked in the 
district attorney‘s office in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. His finance chief was an adjunct 
professor of agricultural economy at the University of Kentucky. His foreign minister had 
no government experience at all (McKinley, 1997). Kabila also initially refused to 
appoint long-time opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi to the new government. This 
decision led to two days of protesting (Secretary of State on New Government in the 
Congo, 1998a; New York Times, May, 25, 1997).  
The Seamless Rebellions 
The Congolese balked most strongly at Kabila‘s appointment of Tutsi supporters 
to top-ranking posts in the government (McKinley, 1997). Consequently, Kabila asked 
foreign forces to leave Congo (New York Times, July 29, 1998). This request marked a 
turning point in Kabila‘s relationship with Rwanda and Uganda. A storm had already 
been brewing for months between Kabila and his Rwandan supporters about the 
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continued attacks from the Hutu refugees living in the camps on the Congolese border 
(Bonner and French, 1997; McKinley, 1997). Again, the power structure realigned, as 
Kabila sought reinforcement from Angola, Chad, Namibia, and Zimbabwe to battle 
Rwanda and Uganda. In this new arrangement Zimbabwe was Kabila‘s principal ally 
(UN Secretary General Annan on the War in the Congo, 1999) and a chief beneficiary of 
economic contracts.  
At least by July/August 1998, Rwanda and Uganda had planted rebels in the 
Congo to fight the new Congolese government they had helped install (Erlanger, 1998). 
Concurrently, Tutsi coalitions inside the Congo began staging rebellions. Because of the 
leverage Kabila had allowed his former Tutsi allies, they were able to stage open attacks 
in Kisangani, Goma, and Bakuva. Tutsi coalitions controlled the eastern region (French, 
1998).  
Shifting Alliances 
Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) was a principal rebel group from which 
other groups spawned as a result of factional fighting. Rwanda and Uganda initially 
backed the RCD. One observer stated: ―The RCD was put together in Kigali rather than 
in the Congo, and did not gain the support of the local population being a coalition of 
self-interested individuals rather than a popular movement‖ (Global Witness, 2004:12). 
Before his ouster as RCD leader Wamba da Wamba  had planned to repair the road from 
Kisangani to Bunia. He also planned sanitation projects, most for clean water (Fisher, 
1999). It seems local legitimacy was of some concern to the RCD. However, the 
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infrastructure projects he advocated would also benefit his economic enterprises. Emile 
Ilunga became the new leader (New York Times, August 2, 1999).  
Uganda planted its own rebel group in northwest Congo. The Movement for the 
Liberation of Congo (MLC) was headed by the son of one of the Congo‘s richest men 
(Fisher, 1998:A8). Wamba da Wamba had been hostile to the second force of the 
Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) sponsored by Uganda and led by John 
Pierre Bemba (Fisher, 1999). The group Global Witness reported: ―The New-RCD (RCD 
– Kisangani/Liberation Movement), [formed by Wamba da Wamba to better establish 
local legitimacy], emerged in November 1998, which challenged the movement over its 
inability to mobilize the people of the Congo. This led to the original RCD being referred 
to as the RCD (Goma)‖ (Global Witness, 2004:12).  
As shown in Table 7, in this new system Rwanda and the rebel group RCD 
controlled North and South Kivu. Jeane-Pierre Bemba (MLC), representing Uganda, 
controlled Equateur and part of Orientale. The RCD-ML controlled North Kivu, Ituri, and 
sections of Orientale. These rebel groups functioned more like cartels than rebels. The 
second civil war that formally began on August 2, 1998. (HRW, 1999), looked more like 
a hostile, economic takeovers rather than military coups. Because of struggles among and 
within rebel groups warlordism in remote areas increased (UN Secretary General on the 
War in Congo, 2000).  
By December 1998, reports estimated that Uganda had a heavy military presence 
700 kilometers from the border, in the name of peacekeeping. Uganda had begun fighting 
the Hutu rebels in the border camps and Congolese rebels the previous spring. Also, at  
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Table 7. Rebel Groups: Regions and Resources Controlled and Foreign Supporters 
“Rebel” Group Region Controlled Resources 
Controlled 
Foreign Support 
Congolese Rally for 
Democracy (RCD) – 
Congolese Rally for 
Democracy – Goma 
(RCD-G) – 
Launched the initial 
war against the 
Kabila regime in 
August 1998 
Sections of North 
and South Kivu, 
sections of 
Maniema, Orientale 






Union of Congolese 
Patriots (UPC), by 
Uganda earlier  
Movement for the 
Liberation of the 
Congo (MLC) – well 
organized group 
Equateur Province, 









Congolese Rally for 
Democracy – 
Kisangani/Congolese 





Kivu, Ituri, sections 
of Orientale 
Gold, coltan Uganda, Kinshasa 
RCD – National Near Bafwasnede 
and Osiro, Orientale 
Province 
Gold, diamonds Uganda 
Source: (UN Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth, 
2001, 2001; Global Witness. 2004. ―Same Old Story: A Background Study on Natural Resources in the 





least by December 1998, the media had begun questioning Uganda‘s motives, since these 
conflicts were primarily between the Hutu rebels and the Rwandan government. From 
spring to winter, Uganda‘s troop level increased from 1,500 to 6,000. This military build-  
up further weakened the fragile diamond-trading network. The rebels and their backers 
bought up diamonds so quickly, ―presumably to finance the war,‖ that they distorted the 
diamond value. In this confusion, diggers stopped digging (Fisher, 1998:A4). Before 
Mobutu‘s overthrow about 465 diamond dealers operated in the Congo. After the second 
rebellion began, there were only 47 dealers (Fisher, 1998). As further evidence of 
Uganda‘s economic involvement in the Congo. The New York Times reports,  
In September, a plane crashed in the Ruwenzori Mountains, along the two 
countries‘ borders, carrying a Uganda colonel, several gold traders, and business 
associates of President Museveni‘s brother, Salim Saleh, a general in the Ugandan 
army (Fisher, 1998:A8).  
 
Former Secretary of State Madeline Albright called this regional conflict ―Africa‘s first 
world war‖ (―UN Secretary General on War in the Congo,‖ 2001:159). The Lusaka 
Accord (1999) was supposed to end the fighting. The Accords also stipulated that foreign 
forces had 180 days to leave Congo after signing the Lusaka Accord (Onishi, 1999). The 
Inter-Congolese talks (stipulated by the Lusaka Accords) were to be moderated by former 
Botswana President Keumile Quett Masire (UN Secretary on War in the Congo, 2001). 
Although their backers signed the Accords on July 10, 1999, the main rebel groups, the 
MLC and RCD would not sign the Accords (McNeil, 1999; ―UN Secretary General 
Annan on the War in the Congo,‖ 1999). The countries could appear to have pulled out 
but still have economic, political, and military representation. Even if their backers had 
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actually withdrawn support, the rebels were becoming more autonomous in raising their 
own cash (UN Panel of Experts, 2002). Jean-Pierre Bemba of Former Secretary Former 
Secretary of State Madeline Albright called this regional conflict ―Africa‘s first world 
war‖ (―UN Secretary General on War in the Congo,‖ 2001:159). The Lusaka Accord 
 (1999) was supposed to end the fighting. The Accords also stipulated that foreign forces 
had 180 days to leave Congo after signing the Lusaka Accord (Onishi, 1999). The Inter-
Congolese talks (stipulated by the Lusaka Accords) were to be moderated by former 
Botswana President Keumile Quett Masire (UN Secretary on War in the Congo, 2001). 
Although their backers signed the Accords on July 10, 1999, the main rebel groups, the 
MLC and RCD would not sign the Accords (McNeil, 1999; ―UN Secretary General 
Annan on the War in the Congo,‖ 1999). The countries could appear to have pulled out 
but still have economic, political, and military representation. Even if their backers had 
actually withdrawn support, the rebels were becoming more autonomous in raising their 
own cash (UN Panel of Experts, 2002). Jean-Pierre Bemba of the MLC signed the 
Accords on August 1, 1999 (New York Times, August 2, 1999; ―UN Secretary General 
Annan on the War in the Congo,‖ 1999).The RCD finally signed the Accords in August 
31, 199 (New York Times, September 1, 1999; UN Secretary General Annan on the War 
in the Congo, 1999). Robert Mugabe, a prime Kabila supporter, had ―objected to the 
rebels sitting alongside the presidents‖ (McNeil, 1999). The war(s) continued even after 
the signing of the Lusaka Accords (Onishi, 1999).  
Continuing to shift alliances, Kabila allied with the Hutus (Interwahame) against 
the Rwandans and Ugandans. The Hutus eventually lost his support (Onishi, 1999). 
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However, his recruitment helped to equip the Interwahamwe for future cross-border raids 
into Rwanda (UN Secretary General Annan on the War in Congo, 1999), thereby 
lengthening their conflicts with Rwanda.  The local Congolese Mayi-Mayi and the Hutu 
guerillas united in their common hatred for the Tutsi. The guerillas depended upon the 
Mayi-Mayi for local goodwill (Fisher, 1999). There were many other examples of former 
enemies setting aside differences to pursue their common economic interests. ―That is the 
case of Mai-Mai doing business with RPA civilian coltan leaders, who in turn sell to 
comptoirs controlled by Rwandans and their companies Grands Lacs Metals and Rwanda 
Metals‖ (UN Panel of Experts, 2002:179).  
Resource Motivations 
Although Kabila was a self-proclaimed Marxist who said he would return 
production and resources to the people (The Economist, June 3, 1997), his economic 
intentions became clearer very early in his rule. Two experts have noted: ―Two weeks 
after the uprising Mr. Kabila publicly appeared on the scene. He first set his sights on the 
gold-producing region of Zaire around Isiro north of the refugee camps‖ (Bonner and 
French, 1997:A1). An African publication stated: 
At the end of last week the rebels were advancing deep into the concession of the 
Office des Mines d‘Or de Kilo-Moto (OKIMO), whose ownership was recently 
transferred on paper to the Barrick Gold Group…It was clear that AFDL was 
keen on grabbing mining riches in the north-east country, either as a bargaining 
chip or with the idea of financing it war effort. Confirmation of the fact was 
provided by the movement‘s leader, Laurent-Kabila on December 26 when he 
issued an ultimatum to companies with interests in South Kivu (Banro-Cluff 
Mining) and in Upper Zaire (Mindev and Barrack). They were warned to make 
contact with him within a week regarding a resumption of mining on the different 
sites. Otherwise, he said, AFDL would ‗call on other investors to mine them.‘ 
AEM has learned that the movement, at least in Belgium, was taking steps before 
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the week lapsed to recruit mining engineers and technicians (African Mining and 
Energy, January 8, 1997).  
 
Kabila, a shadow figure only a few months before, began identifying production goals in 
January. He also appointed an economic minister. In addition, he began stipulating the 
conditions of agreements with foreign investors. First, however, he suspended about 50 
state enterprises and even arrested mining operators so that they could ―give detailed 
account of the pillaging of the country‘s resources under Mobutu‖ (―Congo Business 
Shakedown,‖ 1997:3). He also seized Sizerail and removed the private management 
(McKinley, 1997). African Mining and Energy reported: 
A boost in production from 2kg [gold] a month to 10 is the goal of the ADFL‘s 
‗economy minister‘ Mawapanga Mwana Nanga, believes could be achieved by a 
‗recovery plan‘ proposed by Zairian executives of the Office des Mines d’Or de 
Kilo-Moto (OKIMA). He said this would be an alternative to Zaire‘s agreement 
with Barrick since the American company hadn‘t yet made contact with the rebel 
movement…As for SOMINKI, Mawapanga told AEM that several local 
entrepreneurs had come forward to ask for operating permits on its concessions. 
This was also the case on small-scale diamond-extraction sites in Upper Zaire 
which are presently being occupied by AFDL soldiers. The operators are specially 
keen because the ‗rebel‘ government‘s policy calls for a tax on export revenue but 
not ‗a fee of $100,000‘ for operating permits, as the Kinshasa government had 
done‖ (African Mining and Energy, March 19, 1997).  
 
The Economist magazine (June 3, 1997) reports that mining representatives were 
aggressively courting the rebels. ―Companies were lining up outside the Ministry of 
Mines‖ (Bonner, 1997:D4). American Minerals Fields reportedly gave Kabila access to 
its jet. The Economist wrote: 
On April 16
th
 [the] company signed a $1 billion deal to recycle the tailings of the 
Kolowezi copper mine and build a plant to produce 200,000 tonnes a year of zinc 
at Kipushi. The rebel alliance will have a 49% share – but, in theory, ultimate 




One report contends that the US Embassy in the Congo facilitated the signing of new 
contracts with American investment bankers (Keppel, 1997).  Also, ―the U.S. honorary 
consul in Bakavu, as he presented himself, Ramnik O. Kotecha, in addition to promoting 
deals between American companies and coltan dealers in the region, is himself Chairman 
of the Kotecha group of companies based in Bakavu and deals in coltan (UN Panel of 
Experts, 2002:#183).  
During the second war Kabila blamed his former allies Rwanda and Uganda for 
fighting between rebel factions in the face of the Lusaka Accords (New Pittsburgh 
Courier, August 14, 1999). Consistent with this accusation, The UN later argued that 
Rwanda and Uganda aggressively sought Zaire‘s riches. Prior to the invasion, both 
countries had set up financial institutions through which they could easily funnel 
proceeds from natural resources (UN Panel of Experts, 2001). Uganda‘s economy 
eventually increased in exports such as gold and diamonds. Ugandan soil does not 
produce gold in massive quantities (UN Panel of Experts, 2001; Human Rights Watch, 
1999). However, the war appears to have kept Kabila in power. ―Without it he would 
have virtually no power base and no resources to confront the country‘s underlying 
economic and social problems (―UN Secretary General on the War in Congo,‖ 2000:979). 
The UN Panel of Experts (2002:#175) concluded that ―without control of Mbuji-Mayi, 
the DRC government could not sustain the war. It is no small wonder that he would not 
participate in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue‖ (―UN Secretary General on the War in 
Congo,‖ 2000:979).  
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 Even after signing the Lusaka Accords, Uganda and Rwanda continued to protect 
their economic interests in the Congo. ―Residents closed shops and schools to protest 
high taxes and insecurity they blame on the Rwandan army which controls the town‖ 
(New Pittsburgh Courier, February 12, 2000:A2). On August 15, 1999, a news source 
reported that Uganda and Rwanda sponsored rebels in Kisangani. They were fighting for 
the main airport in Bangoka. At this point the former leader of the RCD, Wamba da 
Wamba insisted on signing the Accords. Emile Ilunga, the current leader refused to sign. 
Uganda, Ilunga‘s sponsor, had expanded its hold on ―Kampala‘s hold on lucrative timber, 
tea, coffee, gold, and diamond markets in northern Congo. Uganda favor[ed] a quick 
withdrawal from Congo as long as its interests are protected‖ (New York Times, August 
16, 1999:A6). Rwanda‘s condition for withdrawal was that the Hutus be handed over for 
trial for genocide (New York Times, August 16, 1999).  
 Becoming further entrenched in the areas they occupied even after the Accords 
these countries exploited local politics. ―Lendu tribesmen have killed 5-7,000 members 
of the Hema tribe since June partly over land disputes in Bunia about 200 miles north of 
Goma‖ (New Pittsburgh Courier, February 12, 2000:A2). Rebel leader Ernest Wamba da 
Wamba blamed the economic and political instability, not ethnicity, on the conflict (New 
Pittsburgh Courier, February 12, 2000). However, the rebel factions and their backers 
exploited these land disputes for their own ends. ―Reports clearly showed that while the 
Kazini camp was helping with the training of the Hemas, the Colonel Peter Karim camp 




As fighting continued, the New Pittsburgh Courier (City Edition) (May 13, 2000) 
reported that Uganda and Rwanda continued to position their troops around abundant 
resource areas. ―Rwandan attacks seem to coincide with the period when coltan has been 
extracted and put in bags for evacuation by the Mai-Mai‖ (UN Panel of Experts, 
2002:#177). Reports surfaced of fighting between the Mai-Mai and Rwandan soldiers in 
the coltan belt (UN Panel of Experts, 2002:#176). Table 8 lists some attacks in resource-
rich areas.  
The final report of the UN Panel of Experts, published in 2002, helps bring the 
conditions and intentions of the 1998 war into perspective. At the time of the report‘s 
release in 2002, Uganda and Rwanda still occupied Congo land, controlled resources, 
monopolized trade, and avoided (DRC) state taxes. Zimbabwean business interests also 
controlled extractive industries with the blessing of the Congolese government. Uganda 
and Rwanda continued to justify their presence by invoking insecurity near their borders; 
the insecurity they helped create by agitating racial tensions and disrupting local 
economies. In 2002, the UN Panel of Experts predicted that while the Pretoria and 
Luanda Agreements of 2002 (UN Panel of Experts, 2002) called for the withdrawal of 
 
Table 8. Attacks on Resource-Rich Areas in DRC, 2000 
Date Rebel Group Resource Location 
November 18 RCD-Goma  Diamonds 50 mi northwest of Kisangani 
December 31 RCD-Goma Diamonds & Coltan Kandole 
Late December RCD-Goma Diamonds Lakutu 
Sourrce: UN Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2002:#178.  
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foreign forces from the Congo, withdrawals would not change the economic 
structures and networks that the occupying forces had institutionalized in the Congo 
(2002). Those networks became further entrenched.   
Summary 
 The second war was simply a realignment of bandits. By this time, Kabila had his 
own problems of legitimacy with the Congolese and his former allies. The Congolese 
were disgruntled about the number of Tutsis in high-ranking positions in the government.  
Kabila responded by exiling the Tutsis. They responded with their own internal uprisings. 
Rwanda supported its Tutsi brothers in their rebellion. Rwanda had already been engaged 
in harsh exchanges about Kabila‘s unwillingness to control the Hutus launching attacks 
into Rwanda. When Rwanda and Uganda interceded, Kabila was only able to stave off an 
overthrow because of help from Namibia, Angola, Chad, and Zimbabwe. In return for 
their support, Zimbabwean players were able to entrench themselves in the Congo 
economy.  Kabila also solicited help from the Hutu militias in the border camps. Before 
his alliance with them ended, he had reequipped them.  
 By the end of this surge by Rwanda, Uganda, and internal Tutsis, rebels would be 
in charge of over one-third of the Congo. Rwanda and Uganda planted rebels on the 
eastern border. A later split between the two countries resulted in the formation of a 
second rebel group and other splinter groups. These groups controlled or sought to 
control key resource areas. Eventually the countries would sign a cease-fire agreement, 
although their sponsored rebel groups would refuse to sign. The rebels‘ refusal to sign 
meant that the countries received credit for disengaging, while still protecting their 
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economic interests in the Congo. Ultimately, the two major rebel groups would sign the 
agreement. Despite this show of goodwill, the fighting continued and countries continued 
to pillage resources. By Kabila‘s death in 2001, rebels would control almost one-half of 
the Congo. Also, the UN Panel of Experts reported dramatic increases in exports from 
Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi of natural resources that are not indigenous to those 
countries in those amounts.  
Kabila had been in power a little over a year when the second major war began. 
However, his short tenure does not absolve him of responsibility for the war. The war 
involved institutions that Kabila allowed to be put in place and factions he ushered into 
Zairian politics. The war also reflected institutions Kabila failed to put in place. While a 
large ship must be turned slowly, it still needs direction. Kabila gave direction by 
allowing factions to establish business enterprises in the Congo and also by failing to set 
up critical institutions.  
Sovereignty and Laurent Kabila 
Kabila gave ―legality or legitimacy to otherwise illegal operations‖ (UN Panel of Experts, 
2002 #207) by selling contracts in a state over which he did not rule. The UN Panel of 
Experts (UN Panel of Experts, 2001) recorded sources who testified that Kabila, 
President Paul Kagame of Rwanda, and President Museveni of Uganda had already 
created a network through which resource wealth could flow back to them. ―During the 
early months of the rebellion, the financial setting and networks were already in place. At 
the heart of the financial setting was the Banque de commerce, du developpement et 
d’industrie (BCDI) located in Kagali [Rwanda]‖ (UN Panel of Experts, 2002 #29). BCDI 
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is part of the Citibank network (UN Panel of Experts, 2002:184). The Panel of Experts 
also found that many of the Rwandan and Ugandan military personnel who became 
active in the resource trade in 1997 had become familiar with the wealth potential as a 
result of their presence in the Congo during the first civil war. There is a great deal of 
overlap between those foreign military officials who later set up extraction operations and 
the military personnel present during the first war (UN Panel of Experts, 2002). From this 
perspective, these officials acted as much like economic prospectors as they did military 
personnel protecting their home borders (UN Panel of Experts, 2001). 
The short-term business model for these occupying factions was to pillage 
resources and financial instruments from stockpiles and banks (UN Panel of Experts, 
2001). The long-term business model involved extraction, transport, and bartering 
operations. ―Between September 1998 and August 1999, occupied zones of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo were drained of existing stockpiles, including minerals, 
agricultural and forest products and livestock‖ (UN Panel of Exports, 2002 #32). These 
groups also dismantled factories and robbed banks, under the pretense of corporate 
restructuring.  Each occupying force engaged in its own brand of raiding based upon 
resource availability. The UN Panel of Experts found evidence suggesting that the 
between November 1998 and April 1999 Rwandans pillaged ―between 2,000 and 3,000 
tons of cassiterite and between 1,000 and 1,500 tons of coltan‖ from SOMINIKI (Societe 
miniere et industrielle du Kivu). That same report cites evidence of Ugandan generals 
looting logging operations. ―In late August 1998, General Kazini‘s soldiers absconded 
with the stockpiles of timber belonging to the logging company Amex-bois, located in 
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Bagboka‖ (UN Panel o Experts, 2002 #34). In addition, that report cites evidence that in 
1999 Jean-Pierre Bemba and General Kazini of Uganda looted coffee beans from vendors 
in the Equateur Province. ―The localities of Bumba, Lisala, Bosonzo, Binga and 
Mindembo for a year did not have coffee stocks to export because of these seizures. The 
Societe congalaise du café, the largest owner of coffee stocks in the area, went bankrupt‖ 
(UN Panel of Experts, 2002 #35). The report further suggests that the initial looting 
camouflaged the level of sophistication and organization of the foreign sponsored 
extractive operations. These processes were legitimized by the same veneer of standard 
business practices used by the likes Pat Robertson (Sizemore, 2003).  
 These same groups necessarily disrupted local economies. First, the Panel 
received accounts of soldiers robbing the locals of their personal savings in gold. ―In 
Bukavu, individuals have told Panel members how Rwandan soldiers confiscated their 
life savings in dollar notes and some of the gold they were buying and keeping as 
monnaie refuge in the face of the repeatedly devalued Congolese franc‖ (UN Panel of 
Experts, 2002 #42). Second, the occupying forces determined what price would be paid 
for goods and services and who would trade with whom. They also forced (literally by 
force) their foreign products into the local markets. In a field visit Panel members 
identified Uganda as the country of origin for beer, most cigarettes, beverages, and toilet 
paper found in Ghabolite and Bunia (UN Panel of Experts, 2002 #64; Fisher, 1998). The 
Panel also identified Burundi and Rwanda as the countries of origin for goods found in 
Kisangani, Bukavu and Goma (UN Panel of Experts, 2002 #64). Finally, monopolies and 
price controls by the occupying forces forced small businesses out of local economies.  
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These systems insured that locals would not be adequately compensated for their 
products or benefit from taxes paid by local businesses. As a result of price controls, the 
Rwandans and Ugandans undervalued the prices they should have paid for local goods, 
while inflating the selling price of these goods in foreign markets. ―Mahogany originating 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is largely available in Kampala, at a lower price 
than Ugandan mahogany‖ (UN Panel of Experts, 2002 #48). Also, The Ugandan-Thai 
Company DARA-Forest extracted timber without regard for sustainability (UN Panel of 
Experts, 2002). In addition, Ugandans exported mahogany without paying taxes to the 
DRC customs and in violation to the Forest Stewardship Council‘s certification of 
process. Occupying forces could easily circumvent certification processes because of the 
lack of border controls and the complicity of importing countries (UN Panel of Experts, 
2002).  
As further protection for their investments, occupying forces also appointed local 
(DRC) officials. For example, 
Congolese in the civil administration in areas potentially rich in natural resources 
in order to secure his networks. This was exactly the case in Ituri, where he 
appointed Adele Lotsove in 1999 (UN Panel of Experts, 2002 #44).  
 
In the case of coltan, all the needed documentation for its export is provided in 
Kigali, but there are accomplices in Kinshasa in the Ministry of Mines. The 
importing companies and their facilitators are aware of the real origin of their 
coltan, however. According to manifests that the Panel received, Sabena Cargo as 
well as SDV of the Bollore Group have been among the key companies in this 
chain of exploitation and continuation of war. Thousnads of tons of coltan form 
the DRC were carried from Kigali through the port of Dar es Salaam (UN Panel 




―Ugandans [also] operated in partnership with a Congolese permit holder‖ (UN Panel of 
Experts, 2002 #49), as they had operated previously through Kabila. 
Human Rights for Sale 
As the UN Panel of Experts points out, the transition from Mobutu to Kabila was 
marked by a ―redistribution‖ of political and financial resources (UN Panel of Experts, 
April 2001). Both leaders lacked control of basic law and order. The feudal groups, i.e. 
the resource cartels (presented as rebel groups) dispensed the law in their respective areas 
of control. Legal standards were set by individual groups. For example, ―the RCD 
established a human rights branch within its Department of Justice and Human Rights‖ 
(HRW, 1999).  Usually, however, protection of human rights was reserved for people 
who were members of the investigating group.  
Many claimed to have been raped, beaten, and tortured by RCD troops (US 
Department of State, 1999). Human Rights Watch (1999) documented mass executions 
and scorched earth campaigns. ―Authorities from the RCD have publicly acknowledged 





page). Rapid urbanization occurred as people retreat to urban areas to avoid the insecurity 
of living in rebel-held areas (Moyroud and Kataunga, 2002).  
In general, the state under Kabila remained a force of repression and fear. The 
FAC (government soldiers) were able to erect roadblocks at which they extorted money 
and obstructed humanitarian aid (HRW, 1999:21
st
 printed page).  In its own efficient 
approach to public dissent, the regime drained the country of its intellectual class. The 
humanitarian group Human Rights Watch writes:  
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Two well-known political prisoners, Professor Kabila Kalele, a lecturer of 
sociology at Kinshasa University, and his collaborator Jean-Francois Kabanda, a 
free lance journalist, both prominent members of the UDPS political party were 
arrested on October 24, 1997, following the publication of an article in which they 
alleged that President Kabila had ‗sold the country‘ to the Rwandan Tutsis (HRW, 
1999: 14
th
 printed page).  
 
Kabila jailed many political opponents (Secretary of State on New Government in 
the Congo, 1998). The UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Congo had set out in 
1997 to investigate human rights violations by the ADFL and the new regime (Special 
Rapporteur, 1998). ―Evidence mounted that Kabila‘s forces had slaughtered thousands of 
Hutu refugees during their drive for power‖ (―Secretary of State on New Government in 
the Congo,‖ 1998: 880). After blocking investigations (―Secretary of State on New 
Government in the Congo,‖1998), Kabila finally permitted investigations in 1999, aimed 
at abuses committed by Rwandans (HRW, 1999).  As under Mobutu, the weak and 
vulnerable populations had no protection in this system.  
Even before officially taking power Kabila wielded a heavy hand. He was a 
strong authoritarian figure throughout the ADFL campaign. A strong executive can be an 
effective force in uniting a divided polity and bringing discipline to a fragmented 
economy. As discussed above Zaire was a divided polity that had struggled to 
accommodate diversity. However, Kabila was willing to use his influence to control 
resources, but not to accommodate disparate interests. He allowed state officials to spew 
hateful rhetoric. Human Rights Watch found that rebels and government officials alike 
often used to the radio as a medium for hate speech (HRW, 1999). On August 4, 
President Kabila‘s cabinet director Abdoulaye Yerodia made a public declaration on 
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national television in Kikongo, the language of Bas-Congo, addressed to the population 
of that region. His declaration was a thinly veiled call for ethnic attacks on Tutsis. 
Yerodia instructed ―‗his brothers to rise up as one man to kick out he who looks like the 
common enemy‘‖ (HRW, 1999:16
th
 printed page). Human Rights Watch further 
contends, ―the virulent discourse and incitement to violence from state agents, ended only 
in mid August after international pressure‖ (HRW, 1999:16
th
 printed page).  
The Kabila regime did not appear interested in providing a civil system of justice 
to provide due process. ―A military court, which superseded civilian courts, conducted 
trials without due process guarantees and imposed death sentences on political suspects 
and criminals, some of whom were executed immediately, without the possibility of 
appeal‖ (HRW, 1999). The regime even sought to actually expand the authority of the 
military court that had been established in 1997. The official reason was to respond to 
threats by foreign invaders. In 1998, the regime added ―new chambers at Lubumbashi, 
Kananga, Mbuji-Mayi, Kamina, Madadi, Lakasi, and new roving courts. The jurisdiction 
of the Military Court was further expanded on January 2, 1999 by Decree Law 171‖ 
(HRW, 1999: 11
th
 printed page).  
The accused in the Congo had to navigate legal minefields. The regime subjected 
them to arbitrary arrests, poor defenses, hasty rulings, blocked appeals, an ineffective 
pardon system, and summary executions. Human Rights Watch observed instances in 
which release orders did not guarantee a prisoner‘s release (HRW, 1999; US Department 
of State, 1998). ―Over seventy-three death sentences have been carried out since the 
creation of the court. The court lacks an appeal process, even for those sentenced to 
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death. Many executions were carried out the same day as sentencing or shortly after. .A 
convicted pregnant woman in the town of Uvira was granted a stay of execution until she 




 printed pages). Also, the courts 
allowed little time for defense attorneys to prepare their cases. The system lacked other 
transparencies. Human Rights Watch (1999) felt compelled to ask the government to hold 
―prisoners only in publicly recognized places of detention, and that [it maintain] up-to-
date registers of all prisoners in every detention center.‖ The people‘s best hope lay in a 
―cluster of organizations [that] came together to provide legal assistance to cases before 
the military court‖ (HRW, 1999:25
th
 printed page).  
The Kabila regime suppressed the possibility of an independent, civil judiciary in 
a number of ways. Jurists suffered harassment by the Kabila regime. ―Mukuntu Kiyana, 
the president of the Military Court, was himself arrested on August 6 and released after 
four days, only to be rearrested on August 28 reportedly for having ordered the death 
sentence of a group of twenty-four [of Kabila‘s] soldiers‖ (HRW, 1999. 13
th
 printed 
page). Even judges lived below the law. 
Legislative Functions 
Kabila made a public call for a multi-party system in 1999 (Special Rapporteur, 
1998). However, he failed to foster an environment in which opposing parties could voice 
legitimate dissent. He also instituted irrelevant and excessive barriers to party 
participation. ―Despite a January 29 decree law that called for a return to multi-party 
politics, excessive registration requirements for political parties [a $10,000 fee] 
effectively excluded many of them from participation in the political process. Arrests of 
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civilians and leading politicians increased in 1999‖ (HRW, 1999). In addition, the regime 
would often raid the headquarters of opposing political parties (HRW, 1999). Finally, 
Kabila initiated a constitutional review process. ―Most human rights groups stepped up 
their work on constitutional and electoral issues and civic education in advance of 
elections promised for 1999‖ (HRW, 1999:25
th
 printed page). However, Kabila limited 
the circle of reviewers of the new constitution to a small number of ―yes men.‖ Even 
those in his cabinet who disagreed with the process were dismissed and/or harassed 
(HRW,1999: 25
th
 printed page).  
Executive Control 
During the ADFL invasion, the ADFL instituted three types of power structures: 
―civilian government, ADFL political authorities, and the military‖ (Bedford, 1997). 
Bedford recounted that conquest was too rapid for adequate government organizations to 
be installed. He wrote: 
The ADFL retained local government structures. Most mid-level bureaucrats 
under Mobutu [had been] reinstated, the Alliance appointed governors in Goma 
and Bukavu. In Kinsangani, the Alliance permitted popular elections of local 
officials by show of hands. The governor in Kisangani is the regional President of 
the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS), the political party of 
opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi. Kisangani‘s vice governor is a popular 
university president (Bedford, 1997).  
 
However, these local officials possessed little decision-making power. Also, ―during the 
year, presidential appointees gradually replaced governors popularly elected during 
Kabila‘s overthrow‖ (US Department of State, 1999: 11).  It appeared that military 
commanders were the only local officials with real authority shortly after the takeover 
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(Bedford, 1997). Local communities became the fiefdoms of these military leaders and 
other foreign occupants.  
The fiefdoms that emerged after the ADFL invasion had their own rules. 
Therefore, institutions and implementation took on different forms. Consequently, this 
arrangement inhibited coordinated efforts to stimulate industry and manufacturing 
(Mokoli and Binswwanger, 1998) and create jobs. As a result, a number of unemployed 
youth were vulnerable to appeals from various militia groups (Cincotta, 2003). These 
arrangements also stifled the development of a national bureaucracy. As mentioned 
before, Ugandan, Rwandan, and Burundian factions had played key roles in the ADFL 
invasion, during which they staked out their resource bases in Zaire. They also identified 
Congolese citizens to legitimize ownership, provide themselves a rebel cover, and secure 
their holdings with military protection. This arrangement set up a fragmented resource 
management system. In this system, local factions, not the national government, 
determined rates and modes of resource extraction (Mokoli and Binswwanger, 1998). 
Also, certification requirements, such as that on timber, did not deter unsustainable 
extraction products (UN Panel of Experts, 2002). 
The fiefdoms became more entrenched after the war in 1998 began. By 1999, the 
RCD controlled more than 1/3 of the Congo (US Department of State, 1999). ―By 2000, 
Congo was essentially divided in half, with most of the north and the east controlled by 
Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, and the rebel forces aligned with them; most of the south and 
the west were controlled by remnants of Kabila‘s army, various militias, and the armies 
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of Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia‖ (―UN Secretary General on the War in Congo,‖  
2000:978).  
 In addition to resource management problems the Kabila regime lacked control 
over a number of basic state functions. Dealers experienced some success in flooding 
local markets in the Equateur Province with fraudulent money. Oddly, rebel leaders with 
control of that area acted to rein in these counterfeit notes.  
A very reliable source told the Panel that in mid-1999 Jean-Pierre Bemba ordered 
the production of 100-franc Congolese notes. Simultaneously the Victoria Group 
also produced counterfeit Congolese francs. By the end of 1999, Equateur 
Province was flooded with counterfeit Congolese currency so that Mr. Bemba 
decided to suspend all 100-franc notes, including the ones he had produced, so as 
to stop inflation in the areas he controlled (UN Panel of Experts, April 2001:#67).  
 
Also, the regime lacked the basic control to stimulate local, provincial, and national 
economies. The arrangement that the regime established with occupying forces--carving 
out fiefdoms--actually crowded out the local agricultural economies. Occupying forces 
enforced inefficiency among local farmers. They also forced and lured workers from 
productive farming to mining activities. As the locals were relegated to mining activities, 
their lives became more precarious. These unregulated mining activities were fraught 
with dangers from which the national government offered no protection. Also, Kinshasa 
was deprived of tax revenue in a number of ways. Given the lack of support from the 
central government, locals could not afford to send tax revenue to Kinshasa (UN Panel of 
Experts, April 2001).  
As they had done under the Mobutu regime, some locals pooled resources to 
provide police, military, education, and health services. However, locals were willing to 
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pay this price, without seceding, as long as the central government left them alone (The 
Economist, November 11, 1996).  
In addition to neglecting the affairs of the state, the Kabila regime intentionally 
impoverished the state through the pursuit of the regime‘s self-interests. The U.S. 
Department of State noted: 
Most sectors of the economy continued to decline. Production and incomes 
continued to fall and the modern sector virtually disappeared. Physical 
infrastructure suffered serious damage, financial institutions collapsed, and public 
education and health deteriorated. Annual per capita national income was 
estimated at $115. Subsistence activities, a large informal sector, and widespread 
barter characterized much of the economy. The insolvent public sector could not 
provide even basic public services, and external economic assistance remained 
limited (U.S. Department of State, 1999). 
 
Evidence suggests that Kabila skimmed a percent of profits from private and parastatal 
companies. These companies either delivered money to a Kabila associate or encouraged 
these companies to open accounts with BCD (UN Panel of Experts, 2002 #41). The UN 
Panel of Experts wrote:  
In a letter signed by J.P. Moritz, General Manager of Societe minere de Bakwanga 
(MIBA), ad diamond company, and Ngandu Kamenda, the General Manager of 
MIBA ordered a payment of US$ 3.5 million to la Generale de commerce 
d’import/export du Congo (COMIEX), a company owned by late President Kabila 
and some of his close allies, such as Minister Victor Mpoyo (UN Panel of 
Experts, 2002 #30).  
 
The Government has claimed from MIBA since August 1998 on average two 
fifths of their earnings. The contribution of Gecamines to the war effort appears to 
be on two levels. On the one hand, one third of the company‘s profit was taken 
directly by the Government in 1999 and in 2000. On the other, the Government 
contributed directly to the expenses of the Zimbabwe Defense Forces between 
May 1999 and October 2000. The former Government of the DRC often used the 
potential of its vast resources in the Katanga and Kasai regions to secure the 
assistance of some allies or to cover some of the expenses they might incur during 
the war. The late President Kabila transferred two of MIBA‘s richest concessions- 
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the kimberlite deposits in Tshibua and the alluvial deposits in the Senga River. 
[Two Zimbabwe affiliated companies], Oryx Zimcom and OSLEG together 
created Segamines (UN Panel of Experts, 2002 #161).  
 
The occupying forces in the guise of rebels collected their own taxes while evading DRC 
taxes (UN Panel of Experts, 2002 #68). Both the Ugandans and Rwandans used profits 
from the Congo to provide social services in their home countries. even while these 
countries continued to accept foreign aid for development projects. 
Sectors benefiting from this assistance [to Ugandan and Rwanda] are related to 
poverty, education and governance. Priority sectors have been water and 
sanitation, health and governance, including institutional reforms, justice and 
human rights, especially for Rwanda (UN Panel of Experts, 2002 #185).  
 
Aid from donors to Rwanda and Uganda had the effect of freeing up government funds 
for military operations that should have been used to build social and political institutions 
The UN Panel of Experts (20002) suggests that even while earning profits in the Congo, 
both Uganda and Rwanda were recipients of World Bank aid. In this same period 
Uganda‘s and Rwanda‘s defense budgets continued to increase (UN Panel of Experts, 
2002 #189-190). A number of Western donors steadily increased aid to Rwanda between 
1997 and 1999 (UN Panel of Experts, 2002:185). Also, ―as is the case of Uganda and 
Rwanda, Burundi‘s export of diamonds dates from 1998, coinciding with the occupation 
of the eastern DRC‖ (105).  
Summary 
 Kabila received the gift of sovereignty from Western governments and 
companies. However, he compromised his own sovereignty even before he took office. 
The presence of foreigners during the ADFL campaign gave them a stake in the outcome. 
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They essentially used the ADFL campaign as a prospecting campaign; they became 
aware of the wealth potential. Persistent instability provided foreigners pretext to plant 
themselves in the Congo. They set up cartels to pillage resource stockpiles, to 
systematically extract resources, and to control local economies. Kabila was not able to 
protect local communities in certain regions.  
 Kabila wanted the perks that came along with sovereignty, but not the 
responsibilities. He was not interested in protecting law and order. Under Kabila, human 
rights were negotiable and justice was arbitrary. He jailed political opponents and 
allowed summary executions. He even allowed a military court to dispense civilian 
justice. Kabila excluded legitimate opposition groups from the decision-making process. 
During the ADFL campaign he had allowed locals to elect their officials by a show of 
hands. Later in his tenure, he began replacing these elected officials with appointees. 
Many of his bureaucratic appointments were unqualified for their positions.  
 Kabila became the new, insecure king over the fiefdoms within the Congo. He 
extracted profits from parastatals. He extracted fees for contracts. He required that 
companies funnel money to his private accounts.  
Epilogue 
―At the outset of 2001, the Congo conflict had been in stalemate for nearly two years, in 
large part because of resistance to UN-sponsored peace moves by the Congo‘s self-
declared president, Laurent Kabila‖ (―UN Secretary on War in the Congo,‖ 2001:159). 
One of Laurent Kabila‘s bodyguards assassinated him on January 21, 2001. At the time 
of Kabila‘s death, the second war, begun in 1998, continued (―UN Secretary on War in 
118 
 
the Congo,‖ 2001). This war has morphed into the conflict we see even today in eastern 
Congo.  
Chapter IV Summary 
Chapter 4 discussed the conditions that made civil wars possible in Zaire-Congo in 
1996 and 1998. This chapter gave a great deal of attention to the Mobutu regime 
because this regime established the conditions that would lead to Mobutu’s 
overthrow and to subsequent challenges to state power. Understanding the 
workings of the Mobutu regime is also important to understanding how the legacy 
of private ownership of state resources passed from Leopold, to the Belgian state, to 
Mobutu, to Kabila.  
 By 1996 Zaire’s economy had been in freefall for at least 20 years. The extent 
of its economic woes is unknowable because a vast portion of its citizens relied 
upon their informal economic ties for survival. Despite vast resources, Mobutu failed 
to develop the infrastructure needed to support a modern economy.  Consequently, 
citizens leveled a host of grievances against him. However, their actions were 
insufficient to overthrow Mobutu because of his support from the West. For many 
years, the West propped up Mobutu’s dictatorship in exchange for his support in 
Cold War politics. In short, citizens’ complaints about how resources were being 
misused did not result in an organized effort to capture state resources.  
 This chapter highlights the border politics among Zaire, Rwanda, Uganda, 
Burundi, and other African countries. Following the Rwandan genocide in 1994, 
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humanitarian organizations established refugee camps for expelled Hutus on the 
border shared by Zaire and its eastern neighbors. The Hutu militia reorganized 
inside the camps and waged attacks on Rwanda and the Zairian Tutsi. The Tutsi 
Banyamulenge’s defense of its homeland transformed into attacks on the camps and 
a campaign to capture major resource areas inside Zaire. Rwanda and Uganda aided 
in this campaign and packaged it as a rebel attack from within Zaire. Uganda and 
Rwanda initially tried to conceal their involvement in this effort by using a washed 
up Congolese smuggler, Laurent Kabila, as the face of the movement.  
 The “rebel” movement swept through Zaire with relative ease because the 
Zairian army was so dilapidated from Mobutu’s years of neglect. When defeat was 
eminent, the West all but asked Mobutu to step aside. However, before Mobutu 
stepped aside and before the “rebels” even captured the capital, Kabila advised 
companies that were interested in doing business in the Congo to contact him 
immediately with their offers. After assuming power, Kabila’s legitimacy was short-
lived. His human rights abuses from the “rebel” campaign and his administration 
had drawn the ire of local and international human rights organizations. However, 
more critical to his future, the Congolese were displeased that he employed a 
number of Tutsi in key administrative posts.  
 Kabila responded to his crisis of legitimacy by attempting to expel Tutsis 
from the Congo. This act, along with Kabila’s unwillingness to control border attacks 
on Rwanda from the Hutu refugee camps, ignited conflicts with Uganda and Rwanda 
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against the Congo. Given the weakness of his administration, Kabila avoided defeat 
only by enlisting the help of other African militaries. Despite this narrow escape, 
Rwanda and Uganda continued to control critical resource areas through cartels 
packaged as “rebel” groups. The UN Panel of Experts provided evidence suggesting 
that Rwanda and Uganda military officers had become aware of the wealth potential 
of the eastern regions of the Congo during the initial “rebel” campaign.  
After parting ways with Kabila, Uganda and Rwanda became embroiled in their own 
disputes, resulting in a reordering of rebel groups. There were many starts and 
stops to peace processes among these and other players. Despite political 
withdrawals from the Congo, as with the Belgian exit from the Congo, regional 
players continued to control portions of the Congolese economy.  
Chapter IV: Analysis Zaire/Democratic Republic of the Congo 
Mobutu‘s overthrow--which led to the violence that engulfed the country for years--did 
not begin as a rebel movement per se. It began as an uprising in anticipation of brutality 
from Hutu extremists living in refugee camps near the Rwandan/Zairian border. The 
conditions that allowed this uprising to escalate into a war were the Congo‘s weak 
military and foreign intervention.  
A Weak State  
In 1996, a weak Congolese military combined with foreign intervention turned a local 
uprising into a war. Ironically, the weakness of the Congolese military actually served to 
shorten the conflict. However, military weakness and foreign intervention alone were not 
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sufficient to launch these conflicts. These conflicts began due to conflicts over citizenship 
and property rights, ethnic agitation, and porous borders. They continued due to foreign 
aid, military strength in refugee camps, porous state borders, and ethnic manipulation. 
Inadequate state services, poor transportation, an abusive military, and a corrupt 
bureaucracy also contributed to a decline in Mobutu‘s legitimacy, which led to ADFL 
victories across the country.  
Poor infrastructure made it difficult for military personnel to reach rebels in towns 
and villages. Poor transportation infrastructure was a problem for both sides because 
people simply could not travel efficiently. After the first war in 1996, poor infrastructure 
affected the type of companies that set up shop in the Congo. Less reputable companies 
that were willing to risk harsh conditions would establish production in remote areas,  
particularly ―Canadian junior mining and exploration companies, for new grassroots 
exploration and joint ventures with Gecamines‖ (Coakley, 1997:J1).  Once their 
operations were up and running, they would sell them to more reputable, established 
companies (UN Panel of Expertise, April 2001).  
In 1997, a weak military and foreign intervention moved three countries into full 
blown conflict again. However, these factors alone did not lead to these conflicts. Kabila 
lacked legitimacy because of poor state services, poor transportation, an abusive military, 
and a concentration of power. But most important was Kabila‘s placement of Tutsis in 
positions of authority. To increase his legitimacy Kabila ordered Tutsi leaders and 
foreign troops out of his country. These orders, together with border issues, inflamed 
Kabila‘s relationship with former allies Rwanda and Uganda. Conflicts began over 
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citizenship and property rights, lawlessness, ethnic agitation, and porous borders. They 
continued because of foreign aid to the militants in the refugee camps, ethnic agitation, 
and porous borders. This time around resource revenue and revenue from Rwandan and 
Ugandan-rebel control of local economies lengthened the conflicts. Foreign intervention, 
which already involved Rwanda and Uganda, now involved Angola, Zimbabwe, Chad 
and Namibia. Kabila sought help from these countries to counterbalance Rwanda, 
Uganda, and Burundi. This move made things even worse. 
A Crisis of Legitimacy 
A weak state also contributed to conflict in indirect ways. The weak state created 
legitimacy problems that encouraged people to submit to the ADFL takeover. Throughout 
his 30-year tenure, Mobutu increasingly concentrated executive, legislative, and judicial 
powers in this hands. Single-handedly he determined most state priorities. His 
administration did not protect citizenship rights, land rights, rule of law, or human rights. 
Prior to the Banyamulenge conflicts with the Hutu refugees in the camps, Mobutu had 
allowed (and even encouraged) refugees to attack the Banyarwardinya in the Northern 
Kivus. It was clear to the Banyamulenge in the Southern Kivus that the justice system 
would not protect them. They trained, with the aid of the RPF, to defend themselves.  
The average Congolese had to fend for him/herself in a number of ways, as the 
state did not meet people‘s basic needs. For years, people‘s needs had been met through 
the informal economy. Mobutu had used resource wealth and foreign aid to enrich 
himself and his patronage network at the expense of healthcare, employment training, and 
education. State bureaucracies were corrupt and inefficient. Many of the administrative 
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structures that remained after Mobutu‘s ouster were remnants from colonialism 30 years 
earlier. Local citizens often pooled resources to fill the gaps in police services, education, 
and healthcare. For example, the Mbuji-Mayi Region, MIBA and the Kasians provided 
their own university and schools through the resources they were allowed to retain from 
the parastatal MIBA. As mentioned earlier, the Mobutu regime neglected the borders of 
the far-east regions. The social service needs of the region were neglected entirely. 
Consequently, six to seven months into the ADFL campaign people ceased to resist.  
Ultimately, Mobutu‘s neglect of the state apparatus cost him his throne. His 
legitimacy problems also encouraged military personnel to abandon their posts to join the 
winning team. The Mobutu regime had either failed to pay military personnel or had 
issued them worthless banknotes. Not only did the military suffer from low morale, they 
were terribly undisciplined. Mobutu provided military resources to his top ranking 
officers and his elite personal guards as minded his personal fiefdom. Mobutu‘s poorly 
funded military could not resist the unorganized troops of the ADFL. One news outlet 
reported that ADFL troops in flip-flops and tennis shoes managed to defeat the country‘s 
military. Mobutu eventually brought in outside reinforcement from foreign mercenaries. 
However, a weak military strengthened the ADFL‘s resolve. Rwanda and Uganda also 
strengthened the ADFL‘s resolve with prior military training and economic support.  
The weak state apparatus also created problems for resource distribution. The 
weak bureaucracy prevented the establishment of clear predictable channels of income 
redistribution. The absence of these channels further endeared people to their traditional 
(ethnic) ties, creating problems of national identity. The artificial state boundaries 
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separating kingdoms already presented problems of national identity. These boundaries 
were the culmination of colonial processes that had no regard for the way societies 
constructed themselves. These lines exacerbated tensions that existed during and prior to 
colonial partition (Saugestad, 2001:170).  
Mobutu suffered a crisis of legitimacy because of his lack of commitment to the 
state he governed for 32 years. He was able to continue ruling because the outside 
community upheld his sovereignty. The IMF, and multi-lateral and bi-lateral donors were 
willing to continue restructuring debt for Mobutu as long as he promised to use his 
country‘s resource wealth to liberalize his economy. However, circumstances suggest that 
Western donors would likely have contributed huge sums of money even in the absence 
of resources. The Congo, because of its geographic location, was a strategic base from 
which Western donors could contest communists in neighboring countries.  
Foreign Powers 
The genocide that occurred two years prior and spilled over into the Congo played a 
major role in the 1996 and in the 1998 conflicts. Refugees fleeing Rwanda fled to camps 
at the Zairian border. Military activity coordinated among the Hutu camp refugees 
provided a self-defense justification for Rwanda‘s occupation in Zaire. Because of 
foreign occupation in Zaire and foreign involvement in ―rebel‖ conflicts, these wars had 
international implications. Also, because of the overwhelming representation of a range 
of countries (from around the world) in these conflicts, these wars could qualify as world 
wars. Still, a number of scholars have included the Congo in their quantitative analyses of 
civil wars in a way that glosses over the uniqueness of these circumstances.  
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The foreign invaders had plenty of justification for their presence, particularly in 
the camps on the Uganda – Rwanda and Congo borders. The Hutu militants could launch 
raids into Uganda and Rwanda from these camps. Later reports suggest that officials from 
Rwanda and Uganda assessed economic prospects during their initial occupation during 
the overthrow of Mobutu. Even without this evidence, the outcome was that Rwanda and 
Uganda, and later other countries set up economic strongholds in the Congo. Again, from 
these perspectives, we cannot decisively say that this was internal natural resource 
conflict by an aggrieved internal group. These findings, however, lend credence to the 
notion that porous borders lengthen natural resource conflicts. This case also suggests 
that proximity of a country‘s resources to another country‘s border also plays s role in the 
decision to occupy another country. For Kabila, the rise to power with support from 
Rwanda and Uganda challenged his sovereignty as a leader from day one. Kabila suffered 
a crisis of legitimacy early in his tenure as leader of the Congo.  
During both wars, the central government lacked the ability to defeat rebel 
groups. The force that overthrew Mobutu was able to do so because of the weakness of 
the Congolese military, not the ADFL‘s strength. Thus the Congolese military under 
Kabila needed assistance from Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, and even the Hutu rebels in 
the refugee camps. The introduction of these new countries into Congo politics created 
new beneficiaries of the Congo‘s resource wealth. For example, the UN has documented 
the economic ventures with which Kabila rewarded Zimbabweans.  
Essentially, rebel groups and the Congolese government under Kabila carved out 
sections of the country as their own. Rebel factions meted out local justice. While the 
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RCD instituted its own humanitarian review board, the RCD also tortured, raped, and 
executed people. Although these groups overtook local economies by force, they also 
sought local legitimacy. Wamba da Wamba, as the early RCD leader, envisioned the type 
of projects that his group could provide to support the local economy. These groups were 
economic cartels protecting and expanding their territory and even challenging the 
territory staked out by the state. At this point the motives are completely distinguishable 
from any grievances by the locals.  
Private Ownership 
Thom labels the new pattern of African warlordism as ―organized banditry.‖ For me this 
pattern is not new, but a continuation of the organized banditry of colonialism. Just as 
Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Zimbabwe, and the Congo have carved up the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, so did European colonizers. This notion of private ownership is 
important because (1) it interfered with the development of the Congo, thereby making 
the country susceptible to war and (2) it gave challengers such as Rwanda and Uganda 
the impression that the state was up for grabs. The role of the military in Congolese 
political processes is also a colonial legacy. The movement toward independence was 
mired in military and authoritarian control. The intersection of military control and the 
notion that the state was ripe for personal ownership created a system of cartels that used 
military muscle for personal security.  
Common Explanations 
The natural resource conflict literature identifies two periods in recent Congolese history 
during which resources figured prominently in civil war. The first round of violence 
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(1996 against Mobutu) did not originally involve resources directly. It began as violent 
expressions of grievances by the Banyamulenge for the citizenship rights, land rights, and 
rule of law. The ADFL became associated with this effort about two weeks later. This 
campaign later involved the control of natural resources.  
 
Grievances 
There were plenty of grievances to challenge Congolese leadership under Mobutu 
and Kabila. However, consistent with the Collier and Hoeffler (2004), the expression of a 
wider range of grievances ultimately did not overthrow Mobutu. A number of groups 
including the UDPS, tried to register complaints through political channels. However, 
they failed because the international community (i.e. Western powers) refused to 
acknowledge their (elected) leaders as sovereign. One could argue that the ADFL 
campaign was grievance transformed into greed. However, the campaign occurred in the 
context of international, not civil war. As is often the case, rebels received economic and 
military aid from external factions which prolonged the Banyamulenge campaign. The 
supporting countries, however, did not limit their pursuits to influencing from the outside. 
They set up political and economic strongholds within the country.  
In the second round of fighting a number of obvious grievances surfaced. The 
Congolese were angry that Kabila had placed so many Tutsis (foreign and local) into 
leadership positions in government and the military. In an effort to establish legitimacy, 
Kabila persecuted, killed, and exiled Tutsis. He also brutally suppressed political dissent 
inside Congo. He was also contending with grievances outside of Congo. The Rwandans 
128 
 
were angry about the Hutu attacks from the refugee camps. The combination of these 
attacks and Tutsi persecution provided Rwanda justification to attack Congo.  
Resource Extraction 
The body of literature that discusses the role that resources play in civil war 
suggests that where heavy infrastructure is necessary to extract resources (industrial 
diamonds, oil), the state will be contested. The reasoning here is that such large projects 
require space, time, and investment that only the state can control. The application of this 
contention to the first war is unclear, since an abundance of lootables and unlootables 
were present in the Congo. However, other applications are clearer. The literature 
suggests that rebels who are united by a common identity and who have secured 
resources in a remote area (away from the capital) will be more likely to seek separation. 
In both wars, the lack of common identity interfered with separation. Another 
consideration here may be the location of resources from another country‘s borders.  
The Congo under Mobutu and Kabila had certainly fallen victim to Dutch 
Disease. Resource extraction was a chief sector, in addition to a number of consumable 
sectors. Because of fear and instability agricultural production was limited to subsistence 
farming. The number of employment opportunities outside of mining dwindled. 
Throughout his 35 years as leader of Zaire Mobutu made gestures and promises to the 
Western world that he would liberalize the country‘s economy. The average percentage 
(of GDP) of single commodity exports and the economic conditions in Zaire support the 
notion that a country‘s dependence upon a small number of commodities makes it 
vulnerable to natural resource conflict. The thinking here is that downturns in the 
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commodity cycles will cause chaos. Yes, Zaire has been vulnerable to downturns in 
commodity cycles. However, the fall in prices was a part of a larger backdrop of 
insecurity. By that time, Mobutu had nationalized large companies to some extent, 
rendering them unproductive. Moreover, the instability reduced the number of sectors 
available to the Congolese. For example, the agricultural sector declined because people 
began to view mining as a more profitable venture and because disgruntled soldiers often 
looted agricultural holdings. The resource cycles were not directly linked to the ADFL 
takeover. However, the backdrop of instability was. When a downturn in the prices of 
Zaire‘s chief export (copper) occurred in the 1970s, the regime simply began to rely on 
revenue from diamonds. Also, Mobutu sustained himself through a combination of 
resource wealth and foreign aid. In the end, economic instability played a secondary role 
in the second war.  
Society: Sobels and More 
During neither war do we see a perfect fit of soldiers to the sobel (soldiers by day-
-rebels by night) model. Before the first war, soldiers were soldiers by day and looters by 
night--looters of homes, property, agriculture, and resources. Also, in the first war 
soldiers worked for both sides, joining the ADFL along its campaign. While other 
political groups aggrieved by Mobutu were nominally a part of the ADFL coalition, it 
appears that their grievances were not chief considerations in this process. In the end, 
Kabila jettisoned them from the group and ignored their requests for representation in the 
new government. The circumstances of the second war challenged the sobel description 
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even more. These rebels were private mercenaries of foreign occupants. Rwanda and 
Uganda did not just support the rebels, they were the rebels.  
In Zaire, the us vs. them dichotomy could be seen in Kasai, Shaba, the Kivus, and 
against the Tutsis in general. Grievances were clearly articulated as group issues. The 
ADFL campaign spawned from Tutsi rebellion against attacks from the Hutu refugee 
camps and the state‘s challenges to Banyamulenge citizenship. The effort was Tutsi-
controlled in the sense that Tutsi-led Rwanda and Uganda ultimately took over resources 
in Zaire. Later, when Kabila wanted to eliminate the foreign presence of Rwanda and 
Uganda, he attached his rhetoric to popular anti-Tutsi sentiments. Support of their Tutsi 
brethren, in addition to attacks from the Hutu camps, provided Rwanda and Uganda 
reasons to enter. Both greed and grievances were wrapped in ethnic clothing, suggesting 
we will probably continue to see a correlative rather than causal relationship between 
ethnicity and natural resource conflict.  
 Once in office, Kabila, like Mobutu, dominated all political processes. He 
controlled the constitutional development process, recruiting reviewers who would not 
challenge him. He installed a weak cabinet of people who had no government experience 
whatsoever. He instituted a military-style justice system where Kabila imprisoned and 
executed political dissidents without due process. He reacted to mass political protest 
brutally and lethally. Accusations of humanitarian abuses dogged his administration even 
after his death in 2001. In short, Kabila provided no political nor legal channels through 
which people could funnel their opposition. Kabila did not develop a political plan to 
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complement his military campaign. The lack of political planning lends credence to the 
idea that this campaign was largely for economic reasons. 
Kabila‘s legitimacy derived from his overthrowing Mobutu and the promise of a 
different type of governance. However, after he assumed power, it became clear that it 
would be business as usual. Once in office, Kabila refused to include the established 
political opposition. Also because of his ties to Tutsi Rwanda and Uganda, Kabila‘s 
legitimacy among the Congolese suffered. The Congolese were resentful because Kabila 
rewarded the Tutsis who had assisted in Mobutu‘s overthrow by assigning them to high-
ranking positions in the government. To restore his legitimacy, Kabila asked Rwanda and 
Uganda to leave the country. He also allowed abuses to remaining Tutsis. These acts 
turned former friends into foes, with both countries sponsoring rebels in northeast Congo. 
Rwanda had already threatened action upon the Congo if the international community 
would not control the Hutu rebels launching attacks from the refugee camps.  
Sovereignty 
The international community‘s acknowledgement of Kabila as the sovereign 
figure stoked his greed and helped project the ADFL as the winner of the conflict. 
Kabila‘s rebel army was really a collection of mildly committed soldiers. When it 
appeared that the ADFL would capture the state, corporations began courting the new 
leader with money and other resources. Evidence suggests that the ADFL sold booty 
futures or production rights to a variety of companies. The ADFL sold these rights 
quickly to fund its war efforts, thereby diminishing the power of the state to resist. 
Outsiders‘ willingness to acknowledge Kabila‘s sovereignty helped initially lengthen the 
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conflict, then shorten it, as he resources that Kabila and the ADFL liquidated helped the 
―rebels‖ achieve a decisive victory quickly. There was also a psychological impact here. 
As companies, other countries, and the Congolese people were projecting the ADFL as 
the winner, it seemed that the ADFL only had to take its rightful position.  
Despite his decisive victory, by relying upon outside sponsorship from Rwanda 
and Uganda Kabila‘s sovereignty was challenged even before it was recognized by the 
international community. The Rwandan and Ugandan-backed rebels had direct access to 
companies, in the same way Kabila had when Mobutu‘s overthrow appeared imminent. 
The rebels controlled local economies by controlling the extraction of natural resources, 
the flow of consumables, and the market values of goods and services.  
Tilting the Balance 
The role of foreign aid and assistance in these conflicts cannot be overestimated. 
Foreign aid could be used for and against the state, as the Congo‘s weak state apparatus 
did not require all aid to be filtered through the central government. Evidence suggests 
that Rwanda and Uganda stage the Banyamulenge offensive as a pretext for capturing 
resources. Their presence clearly lengthened this offensive into a full-blown military 
campaign and government overthrow. While waging a profitable war on foreign soil, 
Rwanda and Uganda continued to receive aid from foreign sources to pay for projects 
that Rwanda and Uganda could have paid for by diverting funds away from military 
exercises.  
On the other side, the Hutus converted humanitarian aid from organizations into 
weapons and resources through which they could control people in the refugee camps. 
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With these resources and weapons they could attack Tutsi in the Congo and in Rwanda. 
For Mobutu, the refugee camps provided a good reason to ask for foreign aid. Western 
officials had begun cutting off his unlimited money supply. He had to enlist the help of 
European mercenaries. However, the European mystique had dissolved and so 
combatants were not fearful of the superior might of white forces. Mobutu‘s own 
arrogance assured him that the West would come to his aid, and this aid would be enough 
to beat back the onslaught. So the promise of unlimited aid and the delivery of some 
financial aid and military assistance was enough to make him confident that he could 
contain the ADFL. However, in late April and early May 1999, Western powers (e.g.. the 
United States) essentially told Mobutu to do the right thing and step down from power 
(Wrong, 2000).  
Summary 
Abuse of resources was one among many problems leading up to both conflicts. Along 
these trajectories of conflict other factors were unique to this region. Humanitarian 
organizations established refugee camps along the eastern Zairian border after the 
genocide. The Hutu rebels reorganized their political and military apparatus inside these 
camps, as it was difficult for humanitarian organizations to distinguish the 
killers/militants from innocent refugees. The rebels controlled the distribution of goods 
and service. 
A legacy of resource mismanagement began with King Leopold of Belgium, as 
the Congo and the resources therein were literally his personal property. After Leopold 
was pressured into relinquishing his personal possession to the Belgian state, the 
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authoritarian rule of the Belgians stifled the development of administrative and social 
structures in the Congo. The Congolese went from colonial subjugation to manipulation 
by Cold War powers. This cloud of superpower manipulation further stifled political 
development. Since the superpowers installed leaders rather than encouraging them to 
seek public legitimacy, the state was viewed as a set of spoils for competing factions that 
could capture the state resources by force. From this perspective, the Congo has operated 
more like a Medieval Kingdom than a modern state.  
The Kabila regime simply continued a legacy of feudalism and personal 
ownership of the state. Kabila‘s regime was different from Leopold‘s and Mobutu‘s in 
that Kabila had to share a larger portion of his spoils with the outside forces that had 
helped him capture the state from Mobutu. But the continued attitude of personal 
ownership invited contestation.  
135 
 
Chapter V: Case Study Republic of Botswana 
 
Scholars and public officials see the Republic of Botswana, in the heart of dark Africa, as 
a brilliant light. It has used its vast resource wealth to propel itself into modern statehood 
(Nyamnjoh, 2006:87).  The macro-economic indicators in Table 9 provide evidence of 
Botswana‘s steady progress.  
While Botswana‘s development has been remarkable, this dissertation is 
concerned with the ways resource wealth has contributed to this development, rather than  
creating political chaos. This chapter will examine the conflict determinants identified in 
Chapters 2 and 3. More specifically, it will look for evidence of the resource curse and 
Dutch disease, and state strengths and weaknesses in general. If some of the conditions 
show up in Botswana that appeared to play a role in the Congo conflicts, then this 
analysis will help eliminate those conditions as determinants of civil conflict.  
In order to compare resource management in Botswana directly with that in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (Zaire), this case study will examine resource 
development from Botswana‘s independence up the late 1990s, the period in which 
resource ownership became most tentative in the Congo.  
Governance: The Macro-economy 
The exact size of the Zaire-Congo economy was unknown, as the formal economy was 
deeply intertwined with the informal economy. The macro-economy in Zaire began to  
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GDP Per Capita Growth 
(Annual Percent) 
1980 1.06 11.99 8.01 
1981 1.07 9.06 5.35 
1982 1.01 12.17 8.48 
1983 1.17 13.15 9.53 
1984 1.24 8.55 5.13 
1985 1.11 7.13 3.78 
1986 1.39 8.17 4.83 
1987 1.97 11.88 8.47 
1988 2.64 19.45 15.86 
1989 3.08 13.06 9.71 
1990 3.79 6.77 3.66 
1991 3.94 7.46 4.38 
1992 4.15 2.92 0.03 
1993 4.16 1.92 -0.85 
1994 4.34 3.63 0.95 
1995 4.77 4.40 1.87 
1996 4.80 5.55 3.14 
1997 5.18 10.17 7.82 
1998 5.19 10.57 8.39 
1999 5.62 7.22 5.30 
2000 6.18 8.23 6.50 
2001 6.03 5.21 3.74 










show obvious decline in the early 1980s. Previously, the state had relied heavily upon 
resource exports. However, the state did not develop the infrastructure to support the 
mining industry, even engaging in inefficient public works projects. For example, the 
country depended upon copper revenue at least until the mid-1970s. Yet it allowed its 
central operation, Gecamines, to fall into disrepair. When copper prices rebounded, Zaire 
was no longer competitive with countries such as Chile that used more efficient, modern 
processes to refine copper.  
As a result of preferential treatment and patronage, companies such as DeBeers 
maintained monopolies under Mobutu. Conversely, Kabila‘s way of doing business 
attracted disreputable companies (or lesser known subsidiaries of larger companies) that 
would assume the initial risk and then sell their operations to more reputable companies. 
This process allowed established companies to disassociate their names from the 
conflicts.  
All sectors struggled to survive in the Congo. The insecurity of land ownership 
damaged the agricultural sector under the Mobutu regime. Under Kabila, foreign 
occupants controlled the flow of crops and money in local economies.  
Mining 
Since Independence, Botswana‘s principle sources of revenue were diamonds, 
cattle, and revenues from its regional economic association. Other notable sources of 
revenue included nickel, copper, clay, coal, semiprecious gemstones, gold, salt, sand, 
silver, soda ash, and construction stone (Lloyd and Mobbs, 1994:113). ―‗Botswana closed  
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1985 with record proceeds of sales of diamonds, beef, copper, and, nickel‘‖ (Gaborone 
Domestic Service, January 24, 1986). Table 10 shows that this pattern of record proceeds 
continued well into the late 1990s.  
Table 11 shows how production of a range of minerals grew from the 1985 to 
2001. Between 1994 and 1999, minerals constituted about 50 percent of Botswana‘s 
GDP. Revenue from the custom‘s pool was about 14 percent, non-mineral income tax 
was about six percent, general sales tax was about four percent, Bank of Botswana profits 
from foreign exchange reserves was about 17 percent, and other revenue was about eight 
percent (BIDPA, 1999). The US Geological Survey reports, ―in the 1990s the entire 
mineral ―industry accounted for more than 40% of the GDP. It also provided more than 
85% of exports, as well as about 50% of Government revenue‖ (Lloyd and Mobbs, 
1994:113). Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and South Africa ―belong to the common 
customs union through which the black states receive up to 35% of their revenue
20
‖ 
(Johannesburg International Service, June 27, 1985). These production numbers help 
explain why ―Botswana‘s very high level of public spending provision has been achieved 
without imposing a high tax burden on the domestic economy‖ (Republic of Botswana, 
2005:9).  
Botswana‘s diamonds are located in three principle sites: (1) Shashe at Selebi-
Phikwe, established in 1970; (2) Orapa, productive in 1971; and (3) Jwaneng, productive 
in 1976 (Masire, 2007). The state developed Shashe as a mine and a township. Although 
                                                        
20 This union is the Southern Africa Customs Union. http://www.sacu.int/index.php  
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Gold (kg) Nickel (T) Copper (T) 
1985 12,634 14 13 19,565 21,692 
1986 13,100 5 25.2 18,972 21,337 
1987 13,225 40 31.7 16,528 19,000 
1988 15,229 38 21 22,539 24,428 
1989 15,252 146 67 21,309 23,403 
1990 17,351 1 46 19,022 22,000 
1991 16,506 0 20 19,294 20,576 
1992 15,946 39 165 18,873 20,413 
1993 14,730 40 192 21,621 20,132 
1994 15,550 67 234 19,041 22,780 
1995 16,802 20 86 18,088 20,461 
1996 17,707 35 5 22,095 23,299 
1997 20,111 54 28 20,157 19,820 
1998 19,639 38 1 22,851 22,124 
1999 21,263 84 8 22,898 20,960 
2000 24,635 112 4 21,446 18,722 
2001 26,190 76 2 22,454 19,209 
Source: Republic of Botswana, Department of Mines. 2002. ―Annual Report.‖ 
 
 
Table 11. Mining as a Percent of Government Revenue and Export Earnings 
Year Portion of Revenue Portion of Export Earnings 
1972 10% of government revenue 1/3 export earnings 
1978-1980 1/3 of government revenue ½ export earnings 
1982 1/2 of government revenues 2/3 of export earnings 
1998 60% of government revenues 3/4 of export earnings 
Source: Masire, Quett. 2007. Very Brave or Very Foolish? Memoirs of an African Democrat. Stephen R. 
Lewis, Jr. (ed). Macmillan Botswana Publishing Company (Pty) Ltd.: Gaborone, Botswana.  
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the mine was unproductive, it played a vital role in the local and national economies.  To 
support the operation and the township, Botswana built a power company in Morupule. 
The government announced funding for the Orapa site in 1967. In the early stages of  
production in 1971, the government developed Orapa as a closed town and mining center 
(Masire, 2007:204).  
Prudence 
Botswana was able to survive economic challenges because of prudence, 
performance, and good luck. Despite its efforts to open other sectors, Botswana relied 
heavily upon diamond revenue. Botswana balanced its reliance on a limited number of 
exports with economic frugality. Rather than extravagant spending on unsustainable or 
unnecessary public works projects state officials used surpluses to establish reserves for 
import cover (Executive Board of the UN Development Program and the UN Population 
Fund, 1997; Johannesburg International Service, August 8, 1982). State officials also 
―sank diamond profits into viable development projects, stabilisation, public Debt 
Service, Productive Employment Development Fund, [and] long-term resources outside 
the country‖ (Masire, 2007:205). In 1982, ―low prices for diamonds and minerals had 
caused a rapid deterioration in Botswana‘s balance of payments‖ (Johannesburg 
International Service, May 7, 1982). In response, the government devalued the currency 
(the Pula) by 10 percent and instituted huge budget cuts (Johannesburg International 
Service, May 7, 1982). It is important to note that Botswana‘s own austerity measures--




Botswana‘s reserve funds from diamonds helped Botswana ride the commodity 
cycles in minerals and in cattle trades. ―Before 1970, livestock formed the economic 
backbone of the country‖ (Denbow and Thebe, 2006:20). Severe droughts occurred upon 
independence, in 1982-83, 1987-88, and in 1992 (Love, 1994). Despite a persistent six-
year drought, GDP increased by 41.5% in 1986-87, up from 14% in 1985-86 (Gaborone 
Domestic Service, July 21, 1988).  Another reason Botswana‘s cattle trade continued 
against serious odds is because of its preferential export agreement with the European 
Union (EU). In 1989/90, 69 percent of Botswana‘s cattle exports went to the EU (Stevens 
and Kennan, 2005). ―Europe has been one of the important importers of Botswana beef‖ 
(Denbow and Thebe, 2006:20). Despite the EU‘s protectionist policies toward the 
Botswana cattle supply, the Botswana cattle industry struggled against increased shipping 
and storage costs, other costs associated with hoof and mouth disease, and the costs 
associated with drought. While Botswana cattle owners incurred these additional costs, 
prices for cattle products remained relatively steady in the EU (Stevens and Kennan, 
2005).  
Luck/Performance 
In the throes of economic crises, the new mining operation—Jwaneng--came into 
full production in 1982. It was the most profitable mine in the world (Masire, 2007). So, 
five years after a downturn, Botswana experienced a 14.5 percent increase in prices in 
1986 (Johannesburg SAPA. September 29, 1987). Also, during the first quarter of 1989, 
prices on three main export commodities-- diamonds, beef, and copper-nickel--were 
nearly 80 percent higher than in previous corresponding periods. Diamond exports were 
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about $1,378 million or about 2.8 million Pula, up 72 percent.  Former President Masire 
recounts that Botswana experienced an economic boom between 1978 and 1980. In 1980 
production doubled. Botswana produced 2.5 million carats with the opening of Orapa. 
With the opening of Jwaneng, the state generated 13 million carats. The state generated 
15 to 17 million carats by the end of the 1980s. In 1997, the state generated 10 million 
carats (Masire, 2007). Copper-nickel exports were up 110 percent. Also, recovery in the 
beef industry in 1988 continued into the first quarter of 1989. As a result, surpluses 
exceeded projections (Gaborone Domestic Service, July 11, 1989.  
Botswana‘s economy grew because of low inflation and strong purchasing power. 
Botswana had stockpiled minerals in July 1987. Also, ―Botswana has never nationalized 
or expropriated any foreign business. There were no restrictions on reinvestments or 
production, repatriation of earnings and capital, and the Government liberalized exchange 
controls at year end 1994‖ (Lloyd and Mobbs, 1994:113). However, Botswana‘s foreign 
direct investment suffered in the early 1990s because of its low interest rates. ―Businesses 
arrange so as to borrow local money. The low interest rates on the Pula‖ meant that it was 
impractical for investors to bring in funds from outside of Botswana (Gaborone Daily 
News, April 20, 1990). Also, ―productivity in transports and manufacturing has been 
declining since the late 1990s‖ (Delechat and Gaertner, 2008: 17). Manufacturing was 
only 3.7 percent of foreign direct investment stock in 1999, ―in spite of the fact for many 




Despite the challenges to the non-mineral sectors, by 1999 thirty-two percent of 
Batswana (compared to an average of 29 percent in other African countries
21
) surveyed 
were satisfied with the state of the national economy. Fifty-five percent of Batswana 
(compared to an average of 64 percent in other African countries) were dissatisfied or 
very dissatisfied with the state of the national economy (Afro-barometer, 1999-2001).  
Corporate Negotiation 
Former President Quett Masire suggests in his 2007 memoirs that the founders of 
Botswana kept the country‘s resource abundance in perspective. Botswana‘s government 
was lauded for several practical approaches, including planning its resource extraction, 
gaining revenue, and expenditure of revenue. More specifically, government built up the 
reserves and negotiated aggressively with mining companies. Masire‘s memoirs suggest 
that the founders understood the artificial value of diamonds. This perspective shows up 
in their negotiations with the international diamond mining industry. The state did not 
allow mining companies to ―hold a deposit off the market‖ (Masire, 2007:201) because 
diamonds have a ―fictitious value‖ (Masire, 2007:205).  The state wanted to extract the 
diamonds as quickly as possible and convert them to a form, such as the dollar, that was 
not as vulnerable to commodity cycles as diamonds. The state would then place these 
dollars into reserve (Masire, 2007).  
                                                        





These booms were boons for the state as well as private mining companies. In 
1968 (Business Week, 2009), the Republic of Botswana established Debswana in a 50/50 
shareholding arrangement with the South African company DeBeers. The state required 
100 percent investment by DeBeers. The founders did not want to be left with 
unproductive operations when companies defaulted on unprofitable projects. Also, since 
the government established that all minerals below the land belonged to the state 
(Republic of Botswana, 1967), three-fourths of the profits went to the government as the 
owner of the minerals. In addition, the state required companies to pay income taxes on 
their own profits. Operations in countries such as South Africa and Namibia had to 
produce quotas for DeBeers. These arrangements disadvantaged these countries when 
production was low and countries were forced to stockpile to meet quotas during 
downturns. Rather than stockpile to cover imports, Botswana negotiated its agreement 
based on production capacity (Masire, 2007), rather than quotas. 
The Central Selling Organization (CSO) (DeBeers) controlled the marketing of 
diamonds, with long-term contracts throughout the world. Botswana had an official check 
after DeBeers‘ pricing because of the variability in pricing for seemingly similar stones. 
As part of Botswana‘s 1975 agreement with DeBeers, DeBeers constructed Orapa House 
in Botswana to sort and value diamonds before they left the country. Botswana had 
previously sent stones to Kimberley in South Africa for sorting and valuation. Also as 
part of this agreement, state officials considered forming its own CSO, but all the 
international marketers had connections to DeBeers. The happy medium was for officials 
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to closely watch the market. The state tried its hand at diamond cutting at Serowe. It 
proved to be a losing venture, and the state abandoned the project (Masire, 207).  
Botswana‘s haggling with DeBeers played a pivotal role in the country‘s 
development. Public officials recognized the leverage the state had with DeBeers; either 
DeBeers would work in Botswana according to terms favorable to the state or Botswana 
would conduct business with another company.  For example, Masire recounts that 
DeBeers wanted to limit Jwaneng mine production to 40 percent (to raise prices). In 
response Botswana threatened to find someone else to mine the site (Masire, 2007:208). 
Also by the 1980s, DeBeers anticipated international fallout from the apartheid system in 
South Africa. Fearing future economic restrictions, DeBeers wanted to stockpile 
diamonds. DeBeers asked for part of Botswana‘s stockpile in exchange for company 
shares. Also in exchange, Botswana could appoint two directors to DeBeers‘ board 
(Masire, 2007). State officials recognized the need to ―increase technical and 
management capacity [among Batswana] since Debswana mine management was 
reporting to Anglo in Johannesburg‖ (Masire, 2007:208), as opposed to reporting to 
Botswana‘s own project managers.  
Tough negotiations with mining companies, not the mineral wealth alone, helped 
secure maximum profits for Botswana. These negotiations were part of a larger 
atmosphere that valued planning of resource extraction, revenue generation, and 
sustainable expenditures. At the heart of these negotiations was durable mining 
legislation. Specifically, the legislature enacted the Mines and Minerals Act in 1967 and 
amended the act in 1976 and 1977 (Ministry, Mines, and Minerals Act, 1967, 1976, 
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1977). The state would permit 25-year leases (MMA, Provision 42), with the option for 
the state to review leases for malfeasance. Provision 76 permits the state to suspend 
permits for false statements. In addition, the legislature enacted provisions to make sure 
that contracts would always work to the state‘s benefit. Provision 44(2) requires that if a 
permit holder makes new discoveries in the course of mining, he/she has to report them to 
the Ministry. Provision 40 allows the state the ―option of acquiring up to 15 percent 
working interest in a proposed mine.‖ Provision 66 outlines the following royalties for 
mining: 10 percent for precious stones, five percent for precious metals, three percent for 
other minerals and mineral products. Finally, Provision 53 stipulates that only citizens of 
Botswana may issue mining permits.  
Other Sectors 
Despite its overwhelming successes, Botswana has struggled to develop sectors  
outside mining and cattle. Agriculture is now being treated as a relic in Botswana. Figure 
2. illustrates the fluctuations, but overall decline, in the agricultural sector.  
Agriculture 
Drought played a major role in Botswana‘s agricultural decline. However, as 
Love (1994) pointed out, the drought explanation is an oversimplification of a larger 
political context. The emphasis on livestock over agriculture favored the political elite 
cattle owners. As the state structured subsidies and gave land privileges to wealthier 
cattle owners, these incentives converted the cattle owners into a modern 






















Figure 2. Botswana Total Agricultural Output, 1985-2001 
Source: Republic of Botswana, Central Statistics Office: Gaborone, Botswana. File Created: April 19, 
2005. Updated: August 24, 2007.  
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the unprecedented rate of mining production, diamond prices inflated the exchange rates, 
thereby inflating agricultural prices. As Love explained: 
recurrent drought created the paradoxical situation wherein the government 
gained credit for limiting the extent of human distress through its drought relief 
program while benefiting from the way in which effects of drought disguised 
major biases impacting agriculture (Love, 1994, html version).  
While agricultural policy seemed to mask class inequalities and favor the cattle-owning 
elite, Niemann (1993) contended that the relationship between the elite bureaucrats 
benefiting from the mining sector was at odds with the interests of old cattle-owning 
elite. He argued that since elite bureaucrats derive their wealth from stock in mining 
companies, they have prevented surpluses from being invested in other sectors, including 
cattle. 
Land played a central role in Botswana‘s economic development. Land was a 
contentious issue in Botswana because of the competing claims to hunt, to graze, to grow 
crops, and to mine resources. The first comprehensive land regulations, the 1975 Tribal 
Grazing Policy established three types of land: commercial farming areas (freehold), 
communal grazing areas (tribal), and reserved areas (state) (Vaughan, 2003; UNCTAD, 
2003). To address land issues, the legislature erected local Land Boards. These boards are 
―not quite executive, legislative, or judicial – quasi-bureaucrats‖ (Werbner, 2004:111). 
The ―Tribal Land Act of 1993 strengthened powers of the Land Boards‖ (Werbner, 
2004:114). These Acts weakened tribal power, in favor of the Land Boards, and thus 
evoked dissent from tribal chiefs (Vaughan, 2003).  
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Problems with access to water exacerbated problems with land. Because of the 
dry conditions in Botswana, borehole syndicates developed as ―a new type of private 
group ownership of resources‖ (61) to drill for water on arid land. ―Many drilled on 
pasture lands‖ (110). The boreholes lead ―to the de facto control of pastures by borehole 
ownership, despite the dejure communal status of grazing land‖ (111). The existence of 
the boreholes supported the idea that ―rights to water are rights to land‖ (111). "Since the 
boreholes must be five square miles apart, that requirement has meant to some that they 
should crowd in pastures in that five square mile range‖ (Peters, 1994). 
Manufacturing 
The ―non-mining private sector grew more slowly than GDP as a whole in the 
past decade‖ (Republic of Botswana, 2005:6). In the late 1990s, Botswana‗s 
manufacturing sector faced a number of challenges. While Botswana‘s Export 
Development and Investment Authority reports that exports increased between 1996 and 
2000, this surge was because of the large Hyundai plant in Botswana, which closed in 
2000. The Motor Company of Botswana employed 600 people. The Halte Garment 
Company employed 1,000 people. It also closed in 2000 (UNCTAD, 2003).  
Botswana officials wrote, ―efforts to diversify the economy had some success in 
the 1980s and early 1990s, but it has been less diverse in recent years‖ (Republic of 
Botswana, 2005:6). Going into 2000, the regional customs union, the SADC, tried to 
move from a struggling customs union to an integrated market. More fundamentally, 
Botswana struggled to wean itself off protectionist policies in food processing, textiles, 
clothing, wood products, and furniture production. However, the country‘s struggle to 
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diversify its economy was institutionalized by protective tariffs (Delechat and Gaertner, 
2008; Bank of Botswana, 2002). One observer noted: ―Perceived impediments to doing 
business in Botswana are related to the labor force and the functioning of the labor 
market, an inefficient government bureaucracy, inadequate and high cost infrastructure, 
as well as issues of access to and cost of finance, in particular for smaller firms‖ 
(Delechat and Gaertner, 2008:19). The state itself expressed concerns about structural 
problems (Republic of Botswana, 2005). As a result of these structural issues, 
―manufacturing is strongly dependent on international market niches to attract foreign 
direct investment‖ (UNCTAD, 2003:73).  
Reports suggest that another fundamental challenge to economic diversity was a 
lack of education among many citizens (Botswana Export Development and Investment 
Authority; Delechat and Gaertner, 2008). One report noted: ―The education system was 
for many years biased towards the needs of the public sector and neglected those of the 
private sector (including the needs of the mining sector)‖ (UNCTAD, 2003:16). As a 
result of poor skills training, foreign investors had to train workers on the job. However, 
industrial training focused on unskilled positions (UNCTAD, 2003). Consequently, 
foreign investors relied heavily on the skilled expatriate workforce. In recent years, 
foreign labor has constituted about five percent of Botswana‘s workforce. This figure 
compares negatively to Organization for Economic and Community Development 
(OECD) countries (including Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, 




Table 12. Foreign Direct Stock,
22
 1999 - Botswana 
Sector Percent 
Mining 75.2 
Retail and Wholesale Trade 9.1 
Finance 7.0 
Manufacturing 3.7 
Real Estate and Business Service 2.0 
Tourism 1.1 
Other 1.1 
Transportation, Storage, Communication .6 
Construction  .1 
Source: Adapted from UNCTAD, 2003 
 
Finally, it appears that HIV/AIDS played a large role in personnel attrition in 
Botswana (Delechat and Gaertner, 2008). The Republic of Botswana estimates that as 
late as 2004, the epidemic possibly affected annual growth by as much as two to three 
percent (Republic of Botswana, 2005). ―One investor interviewed is losing at least one 
skilled member of his staff every month due to death from HIV/AIDS‖ (UNCTAD, 
2003:16).  
Even with labor shortages and structural problems in other sectors, the 
government remained committed to the development of the mining industry. As shown in  
Table 12, foreign-direct stock favored mining projects in 1999. UNCTAD (2003) reports 
despite Botswana‘s having to import technology for manufacturing, ―foreign investors 
make sure technology in mining is updated‖ (UNCTAD, 2003:16). Also, while  
mining accounts for 1/3 of the GDP and ¾ of the total stocks of FDI, it generates 
only 3.5 percent of total employment.[ In addition], mining, which is the largest 
                                                        
22 stock aimed at the development of  ―technology, skills and access to export markets‖ in various sectors of 
the economy (UNCTAD, 2003:3).  
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economic sector, still relies heavily on imported supplies and equipment and there 
is no industry cluster built around this sector (UNCTAD, 2003:18-19). 
Summary 
At a broad level, Botswana managed to avoid the economic and political problems 
present in a number of African countries. Resource revenue, particularly from 
diamonds, played a central role in this outcome. Botswana had the good fortune of 
owning the most profitable mine in the world, the Jwaneng Mine. Botswana invested 
heavily in the infrastructure to support the mining industry. While Botswana also relied 
heavily upon its cattle industry, the state used revenue from the diamond industry to prop 
up the cattle industry. Botswana also benefited from its regional, trading arrangements.  
The sheer value of resources extracted in Botswana could not completely account 
for the state‘s economic success. Botswana officials were prudent in imposing austerity 
measurements upon themselves. Officials maintained high levels of import cover and 
foreign assets. They also engaged in practical infrastructure projects. In addition, they 
controlled public sector wages. Finally, they did not nationalize Botswana‘s economy.  
To complement good fortune and prudence, state founders were also tough, 
objective negotiators. They set conditions whereby mining companies could not default 
on unprofitable projects. They also demanded royalties from each project, as well as 
mining fees and part ownership. In addition, they established contracts with companies 
based on production, not quotas. Therefore, companies could only demand the resources 
Botswana was able and willing to provide.  
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Botswana did not develop other sectors as well as it did the mining sector. 
Agricultural output fluctuated through the 1990s, but was generally in decline. Exchange 
rates, driven up by the mining industry, artificially inflated agricultural prices. Small 
agriculture operations suffered while industrial operations grew in number. A central 
problem associated with agriculture was land distribution. Botswana is generally a dry 
country. As such, ranchers had to invest in boreholes to water cattle and irrigate crops. 
Wealthy syndicate members who owned the boreholes essentially controlled the land. 
Also, the distinction of land as private, state, or tribal also resulted in unequal access. 
Wealthy, private owners used communal lands, in addition to their own land, to graze 
cattle. The decision to support agriculture at a level lower than the cattle trade was the 
result of a political calculus controlled by cattle ranches.  
 Manufacturing also took a back seat to mining. In 2000, two key facilities closed 
in Botswana, putting about 1,600 people out of work. Manufacturing fell victim to poor 
worker training and a poor work ethic. Consequently, as foreign direct investors were 
unwilling to take the risks. Also, investors had to contend with protectionist policies and 
less technical support for manufacturing than was available for mining. Finally, 
HIV/AIDS created personnel challenges for investors.  
State Infrastructure 
The lack of sound infrastructure in Zaire – DRC contributed to both Mobutu‘s and 
Kabila‘s legitimacy problems.  Because they both were perceived by some groups to be 
illegitimate, citizens were willing to embrace outside liberators. The DRC depends even 




Former President Masire contends that the state did not undertake mining for its 
own sake. Officials intended to use mining to build needed infrastructure and social 
supports (Masire, 2007). The state employed a ―development strategy focused more on 
the mining sector‖ (Buthali, 1997:8). The benefits of the mining sector were supposed to 
trickle down (Buthali, 1997). However, in terms of state capacity, most respondents find 
it difficult to ―obtain household services (like piped water, electricity, or telephone), 53 
percent, and a loan or payment from the government (such as agricultural credit or a 
welfare grant), 56 percent‖ (Bratton, et al., 2005:41).  
For an upper-middle-income country (as classified by the World Bank), Botswana 
has limited telecommunications infrastructure. While system capacity lines increased 
about 175 percent (66,000 in 1995 and 180,000 in 2001) and the number of subscribers 
connected increased about 150 percent (about 51,000 in 1995 and 136,000 in 2001), 
Botswana had poor access to electricity. It had poor access when compared to countries 
with comparable average incomes and also compared to poorer, sub-Sahara African 
countries. Botswana has to rely heavily upon electricity sources emanating from South 
Africa because of Botswana‘s ―peculiar pattern of spatial distribution of population and 
economic activity, as well as the fact that Botswana has few local means of generating 
electricity‖ (Bogetic and Fedderke, 2006:32). However, Botswana provides electricity at 
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prices about half the price for electricity in other upper-middle-income countries
23
 
(Bogetic and Fedderke, 2006:32).  
Botswana‘s provision of improved water sources paints a brighter picture of 
access to quality of life services. Ninety-five percent of the population has access to 
improved water sources. Only the economically advanced countries have greater access 
(Bogetic and Fedderke, 2006:32). Access to improved sanitation, however, paints a 
different picture. Comparable to upper-middle income countries, Botswana provides 
about half of the average access among these countries, 41 percent and 86 percent, 
respectively. The rural/urban picture breakdown of access more closely resembles other 
sub-Sahara African countries. About 25 percent of Botswana‘s rural population has 
access to improved sanitation, while about 57 percent of the urban population has access 
to improved sanitation. Comparably, about 28 percent of the rural population in sub- 
Sahara African countries had access to improved sanitation, while 54 percent of the urban 
population had access in these countries (Bogetic and Fedderke, 2006:32). 
Suzanne Daley reported that Botswana had less than five miles of tarred roads at 
independence. By 1996, it had more than 1800 miles (Daley, 1996). Still, compared  
to its income group, Botswana‘s road-kilometers per 1,000 is only two-thirds of that for 
upper-middle-income countries (Bogetic and Fedderke, 2006:37). 
With only 18km of road per 1,000 people there are only five countries with worse 
density: Mali, Mauritius, Niger, Sudan and UAE. The comparable figure for 
upper-middle-income countries is 1,076 km and 1,340 for OECD, while SSA has 
road density of 156 km. However, this could be a reflection of population density 
                                                        
23 Authors argue however, that the low pricing may result form under pricing rather than discounts.  
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given the large size of the country and small population concentrated along the 
South African border (Bogetic and Fedderke, 2006:37). 
Table 13 compares infrastructure access in Botswana to other country categories.  
An examination of Botswana‘s utility infrastructure paints a bleak picture in terms of 
access (Bogetic and Fedderke, 2006:38). Table 14 further quantifies the stark economic 
inequalities. .Also, as Table 15 shows, average annual growth in the state‘s GDP appears 
to grow at a much slower pace when analyzed on a per capita basis.   
Social Welfare 
Botswana achieved an overall annual income growth of 13 percent between 1966 
and 1991. Also, by 1991, Botswana experienced a real per capita income increase five 
times that of 1966. The UN attributes ―government policies for employment and the 
creation of provisions of infrastructure and services‖ for these developments (Executive 
Board of the UN Development Program and the UN Population Fund, 1997). However, 
Botswana‘s persistent problem with poverty and gross economic inequalities 
overshadowed these successes.  
Although Botswana became increasingly urban in the late 1990s, throughout this 
development period it was largely rural. ―The 1971 Census showed that nearly 80% of 
our people lived in settlements of fewer than 5,000 people, and more than 60% lived in 
settlements of fewer than 1,000‖ (Masire, 2007:216). However, the state appeared to 
target a number of programs at the gap left by the transition from an agricultural to an 
urban economy. It also focused social programs at the general population, rather than 
directly at the poor (Bathali, 1997). Still, Masire writes, ―the traditional safety 
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87 9 93 86 9.2 
Low-income 31 6 65 41 3.0 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
15 6 64 37 3.3 
OECD NA 13 99 100 17.3 
Adapted from: Bogetic, Zelijko and Johannes W. Fedderke. August 2006. ―International Benchmarking of 
Infrastructure Performance in the Southern African Customs Union Countries.‖ World Bank Policy 
Research Paper 3987. Pp.32-39. 
 
 
Table 14. Botswana Income Distribution, Reported in 1997 
 Poorest 40 % Middle 40 % Richest 20 % 
1985/86 (household) 10.7 27.8 61.5 
1993/94 (personal) 11.6 29.1 59.3 
1993/94 (household) 9.4 29.4 61.2 
Adapted from: Buthali, Dabilani, Botswana Central Statistics Office. May 7-9, 1997. ―Poverty 




Table 15. Botswana GDP Growth and GDP Growth Per Capita 
Year GDP Growth 
(Annual 
Percent) 
GDP Per Capita Growth 
(Annual Percent) 
1980 11.99 8.01 
1981 9.06 5.35 
1982 12.17 8.48 
1983 13.15 9.53 
1984 8.55 5.13 
1985 7.13 3.78 
1986 8.17 4.83 
1987 11.88 8.47 
1988 19.45 15.86 
1989 13.06 9.71 
1990 6.77 3.66 
1991 7.46 4.38 
1992 2.92 0.03 
1993 1.92 -0.85 
1994 3.63 0.95 
1995 4.40 1.87 
1996 5.55 3.14 
1997 10.17 7.82 
1998 10.57 8.39 
1999 7.22 5.30 
2000 8.23 6.50 
2001 5.21 3.74 
Source: The World Bank Group. World Development Indicators Online. 




 nets – going to live at your uncle‘s place, or borrowing oxen from someone else to 
plough your lands if you had no oxen – had no parallel in the towns‖ (Masire, 2007:217). 
Consequently, Botswana had a 47 percent poverty rate in 1997 (still down from 59 
percent in 1985/86). Most of the poor lived in rural areas (Executive Board of the UN 
Development Program and the UN Population Fund, 1997).  
Healthcare 
By the late 1990s, Botswana had made some notable strides in access to healthcare.    
At independence, we had only eight small hospitals and perhaps two-dozen clinics 
and dispensaries. By the late 1990s, we had 30 hospitals, more than 300 clinics or 
health posts with nursing staff, over 200 facilities with other trained health-care 
staff, and mobile health teams made stops at more than 650 other locations. Over 
80% of our people in rural areas now live within 15 kilometres of a primary 
health care facility (Masire, 2007:219).  
Despite these strides, prevalence of HIV/AIDS in Botswana challenged quality and 
availability of care; it placed a great deal of stress on the system. By 2001, 38.8 percent 
of the adults in Botswana were HIV-positive. This percentage increased from the early 
1990s in, especially in the major urban centers. The rate of HIV infection in Gaborone 
was 14.9 percent in 1992. In 2001, it was 39.1 percent. The rate of HIV infection in 
Francistown was 23.7 percent in 1992. In 2001, it was 44.9 percent. The rate of infection 
in 1994 was 27 percent in 1994. In 2001, it was 55.6 percent. This epidemic intensified at 
the same time that Botswana was regularly breaking country records in government 
revenues (UNAIDS, UNICEF, WHO: 2002). Lamenting the government‘s initial 
ineffective response, Former President Masire writes: 
Our failure to deal with HIV/AIDS in an effective way in the early days of the 
disease arose from judgmental errors. It is one of those things I wish I had 
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handled differently, and it is perhaps my greatest regret. HIV/AIDS is an area 
where we failed to apply the model of policy-making that worked successfully in 
so many other fields (Masire, 2007:237). 
In the early years (1980s) Botswana‘s government developed plans to deal with 
HIV/AIDS, when other countries would not address the issue. However, those early 
programs were narrowly focused on health issues. Later plans began to address 
development issues, such as poverty, economic inequality, and gender equality that were 
woven into this epidemic (UNDP, 2000).  
In 1994, Botswana developed a National Policy on AIDS. In 1996, it began 
collaborating with Harvard University in the Botswana–Harvard School of Public Health 
AIDS Initiative Partnership for HIV Research and Education
24
 (Masire, 2007). In 1999, 
the government established the National AIDS Coordinating agency to address the 
epidemic systematically
25
 (Masire, 2007). In 2000, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, 
Merck & Co., Inc. and the Republic of Botswana established ―the Botswana 
Comprehensive HIV/AIDS Partnership, a new initiative to improve the overall state of 
HIV/AIDS care and treatment in Botswana‖ (CSRWire, 2000; Masire, 2007).  
Education 
By 1998, Botswana had established public funding for old-age pensions (US 
Social Security Administration, 2007; Bathali, 1997), orphan‘s care, survivor‘s benefits, 
disability benefits, and medical benefits. However, Botswana still does not have social 
security legislation. It had also established a framework whereby employers would 





provide unemployment benefits, sickness and maternity benefits, and worker injury 
benefits (US Social Security Administration, 2007).  
During its years as a protectorate, local governments and missionaries  
provided education in Botswana to whites. However, during this period, Botswana was 
able to establish a regional university, the University of Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and 
Swaziland at Roma (Masire, 2007) and make it available to black students. In 1965, 
Botswana had 12 university students. By 1997, 7,500 students were enrolled (Masire, 
2007). UNESCO puts this number around 8,500 by 1998 (UNESCO, 1998). 
The government has established a grant/loan scheme such that students of priority 
subjects- the sciences,  applied sciences, engineering and technology, and science 
teaching - are awarded grants while those pursuing disciplines of lesser priority 
are awarded loans on a sliding scale. It also began providing technical training 
(UNESCO, 998:2).  
 
The state made similar strides in primary and secondary education. ―By 1980, it had 
eliminated primary school fees‖ (Masire, 2007: 221). The state also established a Unified 
Teaching Service so that poorer local districts would also have access to qualified 
teachers (Masire, 2007).  
Beyond education, the state provided two other institutions to promote equality- 
―a progressive income tax and an incomes policy‖ (Masire, 2007:216). Despite the state‘s 
attention to social services, the combination of welfare resources provided by families 
and welfare resources provided by the state, still left many Batswana without a social 
safety net (Wikan, 2004). It appears that the founders wanted to establish a mining 
system that would ultimately develop communities, sectors, and employment (Masire, 
2007). However, there is a tone in Masire‘s writing that suggests that state governing elite 
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(at least the earliest ones) believed that they coddled the poor population into a state of 
helplessness. Although he admits that the economy produced a limited number of viable 
economic opportunities, he writes: 
while many individuals took advantage of the many new programmes of 
assistance or started successful businesses, many more failed to take up those 
opportunities. It also becomes harder to motivate people to improve themselves if 




The general attitude among the founding officials and subsequent governments of 
Botswana was that by supporting the mining industry they were supporting the entire 
economy. They intended for proceeds from mining to support infrastructure in other 
areas. However, compared to its income group (upper-middle income), Botswana 
provided poor access to utilities with marked equalities in rural and urban access. In 
general, indicators show an unequal distribution of wealth and a heavy concentration of 
wealth among the top 10 percent, although the state instituted a progressive income tax.  
 Officials targeted Botswana‘s social welfare programs at the general public and 
not specifically at the poor. Since independence, Botswana increased the number of 
hospitals and healthcare facilities. However, the government‘s failure to address the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic in its initial stages, placed a great deal of stress on the healthcare 
system. While the education system was limited at independence, Botswana increased 
primary and secondary access. It also established its own university. However, the 




Zaire – DRC maintained a weak state since independence. The Belgians knew well the 
wealth potential of the Congo, as Belgium and Leopold had profited from it. At 
independence, the Belgians vacated the political apparatus, while maintaining economic 
control. Also, at independence, the Belgians had not prepared the Congolese for self-rule. 
As part of Leopold‘s legacy, the Congo essentially remained a kingdom, with 
increasingly subdividing fiefdoms.  
Before Botswana became an independent state, it was Bechuanaland, a British 
protectorate, as of 1885. The central tribe of Botswana, the Ngwato, asked the British 
Crown for protection against Boer invasion and annexation by South Africa. Beaulier 
(2003) suggests that Bechuanaland offered few economic opportunities for the British 
Crown or British multi-nationals. The vastness of diamond resources was not known until 
after independence. As Former President Masire puts it, ―we were fortunate that at that 
time there was not even a rumour of any possible minerals other than in the Bangwato 
area‖ (Masire, 2007:199). Had the vastness of Botswana‘s resources become known prior 
to independence, the protectorate would have likely been a colony, and we would be 
analyzing a different Botswana. Since the Crown had already extended itself in its more 
profitable holdings: India, South Africa, and Rhodesia, it did not make sense to invest 
much in a low-return protectorate (Beaulier, 2003:230). Limited British investment 
diminished the need for a Batswana independence struggle against a colonial oppressor. 
―The emergence of formal political parties to voice dissatisfaction with British rule 
emerged only in late 1950s‖ (Denbow and Thebe, 2006:32), although Botswana‘s 
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founding father Seretse Khama seemed to have understood the necessity of violence 
associated with nationalist movements in other African countries (Mungazi, 2005). Also, 
while he did not allow liberation movement bases inside Botswana, between 1976 and 
1979 Botswana allowed the establishment of camps for fleeing Namibians, Rhodesians, 
Angolans, and South Africans (Niemann, 1993).  
A number of the initial developments in Botswana‘s governance can be traced 
back to its first president, Seretse Khama and his inner circle. Khama had been heir to the 
throne of a central tribe, the Ngwato Tribe. Before independence, in 1958 leaders of the 
Ngwato tribe appealed to the Crown to form a legislative council in Botswana of 35 or 
more members and to do away with its advisory council comprised of the chiefs of the 
major tribes (Mungazi, 2005). This was one of the early steps through which state 
officials diminished tribal power in favor of a more national orientation. Through this 
legislative council the people elected Seretse in 1965. On September 30, 1966, Botswana 
became a parliamentary democracy when it received its independence from the British 
Crown.  The Crown‘s hands off (but still paternalistic) approach proved beneficial to the 
modernization of the protectorate, as the Crown placed less social and economic pressure 
on the protectorate than on its former colonies.  
The Republic of Botswana became a multi-party system, although one party, the 
Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), has held power since independence. However, when 
viable opposition developed in 1994 the electoral competition did not disrupt social or 
political life in Botswana (Mungazi, 2005). The country has experienced nine non-violent 
presidential elections. Also, when Khama died in 1980, there was no military coup to 
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contest the open presidential seat (Maudeni, et al., 2007). Evidence of the tribes‘ 
commitment to democratic principles dates back as far back as 1795 (Mungazi, 2005). 
Under a protectorate system the tribes of Botswana were able to continue their own form 
of democratic assembly.  
In order to understand the proposals we made for new democratic institutions at 
both local and national levels, one must understand the consultative traditions of 
Batswana. The kgotla had always been the focal point for the whole community. 
It was a place where people were called for announcements by the chief. It was a 
place where the chief would discuss affairs related to the tribe, as well as a place 
for making laws and for addressing administrative requirements. It was also a 
consultative council – the chief might say he was considering something, and he 
wondered what the people thought of it and what their views were (Masire, 
2007:62 also in Beaulier, 2003 and Ayittey, 2005).  
―The spirit and the practice of the kgotlas are represented in the district level planning 
that exists today. Even today, the National Development Plans are developed at the 
national level, but approved at the local level. This plan covers a number of areas, 
including housing, education, and budget‖ (Global Insight, Economic Forecasts, 2006). 
As a continuation of this legacy, when Khama took office, he articulated his desire to 
strengthen democratic competition rather than install a one-party government (Mungazi, 
2005) 
Mungazi points out that Khama, focused on development: 
Built new lines extending outside Botswana for access to more markets,  
Explored minerals to reduce dependence on South Africa, 
Developed irrigation schemes, and  
Developed national education programs (Mungazi, 2005:132). 
 
Botswana took advantage of resources offered from foreign donors. In the first few 
years, all of its development income came from the British Crown (Masire, 2007). Also, 
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―Botswana relied on expatriate teachers, many of whom were under sponsorship of the 
US Peace Corp‖ (Mungazi, 2005:136). The new government, however, was careful to 
accept aid for the short-term and under conditions favorable to Botswana‘s future. Later, 
in an effort to raise the living conditions in the rural areas of Botswana, the government 
requested assistance in 1986 from the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation 
(NORAD) for the Remote Area Development Program. In 1993, the two countries agreed 
to phase out the program by scaling back the program to ―a low intensity continuation of 
the infrastructure components‖ (Saugestad, 2001:137). The government oversaw the 
beginning, the execution, and the ending of the larger program.  
Evidence suggests that Botswana‘s founders firmly guided the state‘s 
development, even before independence. Tshikedi Khama, Seretse‘s uncle, convinced the 
Ngwato Tribe to allow Roan Selection Trust (RST) to mine copper and nickel. This 
arrangement resulted in the Bamangwato Concessions Limited (BCL) and led to the first 
large mining development (Masire, 2007).  After independence, it was serendipitous for 
the nation that the next big discovery occurred in the Central District, home of Seretse‘s 
tribe. Through his tribal connection, he was able to convince them to allow mining 
operations for the good of the nation (Masire, 2007).  
Summary 
This section has provided an overview of development in Botswana in the years 
before and immediately after independence. In summary, the Republic of Botswana 
evolved from the British protectorate Bechuanaland. Bechuanaland remained a 
protectorate because, at the time, it did not promise much wealth for the British Crown. 
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Since Bechuanaland was a protectorate, its future leaders had room to negotiate with 
British administrative authorities. The first president and chief founder of Botswana was 
Seretse Khama, the British-educated heir to the Ngwato throne, one of the eight principle 
tribes. Prior to independence, Botswana‘s founders appealed to the British crown for a 
proper legislative council to replace the National Advisory Council. Botswana had 
experienced forms of democratic government, prior to independence. In addition to the 
legislature, the tribes had previously engaged and continued to engage in community 
meetings known as kgotlas. Also prior to independence, Botswana had experience with 
the provision of university education (Masire, 2007). Experiences with these institutions 
seem to have helped smooth the transition to a modern democracy.  
Governance 
The pursuit of self-interest weakened the Congo-Zairian state. Mobutu governed through 
a patronage system. Contracts with mining companies had implications for this patronage 
system. He negotiated contracts with companies behind closed doors without legislative 
or bureaucratic input. At various times he allowed elections, but he always diminished 
the value of their outcomes. Also, he ruled through his single party. Ultimately, he would 
decree himself sovereign over the legislature and the judiciary. In addition, he used the 
military as his personal security. Because he underpaid or failed to pay public employees, 
they felt justified in skimming off the profits of the parastatals and accepting bribes. Also, 
the military felt justified in looting and pillaging.  
 Kabila‘s regime also concentrated power in the executive. He believed in 
transparency, but only for his enemies. He negotiated contracts in private with Uganda 
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and Rwanda. When relations with them soured he negotiated with other countries such as 
Zimbabwe to divvy up the spoils. Kabila, like Mobutu was judge, jury, and executioner.  
Transparency 
Public assessment of Botswana‘s governance and resource management, in 
particular is generally positive. The Corruptions Perception Index ranked Botswana 23
rd
 
out of 85 countries in 1998, 24
th
 out of 99 countries in 1999, and 26
th
 out of 90 countries 
in 2000 (Transparency International, 2008). As of the 1999 election, Freedom House 
rated Botswana‘s elections as free and fair (Freedom House, 2006). The Polity IV Project 
has rated Botswana as increasingly democratically since 1966 (Marshall and Jaggers, 
2007). Also, 38 percent of Batswana (compared to an average of 36 percent of other 
African countries) thought that corruption was rare or very rare among civil servants. 
Only 32 percent of Batswana (compared to an average of 48 percent in other countries) 
thought that corruption among civil servants was fairly or very common.  
Botswana developed a number of institutions in the 1990s that support openness 
and transparency in public service. In 1994, Botswana passed the Corruption and 
Economic Crime Bill (Hope, 1997; Freedom House, 2006). The state also set up an 
independent election commission in 1996 (Freedom House, 2006). Public institutions 
have earned the legitimacy of a majority of citizens as well as the respect of the 
international community.  
The governance of the Republic of Botswana has garnered a great deal of praise 
from scholars, policy analysts, and development organizations. However, some aspects of 
the country‘s development have been less than democratic. Throughout the country‘s 
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short history, the executive branch has played a strong, arguably authoritarian (Maudeni, 
et al., 2007) role in Botswana‘s development. Only 44 percent of Batswana (compared to 
an average of 55 percent in other countries) reported trusting the president. Thirty-six 
percent of Batswana (compared to an average of 39 percent in other African countries) 
reported distrusting the president somewhat or a lot. The delicate balance in post-colonial 
countries has been to install an executive strong enough to unite the country without 
concentrating too much power in one branch of the government and reducing 
transparency.  
For this study, it is important to discuss how degrees of transparency have 
factored into resource development. Botswana has instituted various controls to restrict 
individual actors from using state resources as their own personal resources. A central 
feature of the system is a well-organized civil service (Modisi, 1997). Masire (2007) 
explains that in terms of a civil service the founders wanted a system that mirrored the 
British system more closely than the American system; that is, a system with a limited 
number of political appointments (Masire, 2007). While notable cases of corruption have 
surfaced, it appears that they received a great deal of attention because they were 
anomalies in the system. It appears that the system responded aggressively to eradicate 
transparency problems (Hope, 1997). Masire (2007) notes: 
But more important than any specific legislation and investigations was that we 
did not give too much power to any one person. No minister could make other 
major decisions on his or her own but had to involve one or two or three other 
departments. In fact, we went through an elaborate process within government 
when a major decision, such as granting a mining lease, was to be reached. It 
involved consultation between ministries and ultimately discussion and decision 
within cabinet (Masire, 2007:240).  
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Following a corruption scandal in 1992, Botswana established anti-corruption legislation 
in 1994 (Corruption and Economic Crime Bill, 1994; Hope, 1997) with the aid of an 
expert from Hong Kong (Masire, 2007). 1994  
We established an anti-corruption unit that is independent of the police. A number 
of experienced investigators from London‘s Metropolitan Police were recruited to 
set the unit up properly and to train our own people (Masire, 2007:240).  
While international assessments of Botswana‘s public management are generally 
positive, others have criticized state officials for less-than-transparent budget decisions 
and resource management (Freedom House, 2006). 
As another measure to control employee profits from the state, the founders of the 
system instituted an incomes policy. Masire (2007) contends that he and other founders 
wanted to insure that ministers would not get rich off public service. ―It was many years 
before we allowed any first class air-travel, or official cars with drivers, for anyone 
except the late president. The traditional modesty of our people was helpful, of course‖ 
(Masire, 2007:242). The Incomes Policy also served to control the impact of wages and 
salaries on the resource management system. The fear was that overvalued salaries would 
overwhelm the mining system and undercut employment opportunities (Masire, 2007). 
Masire credits the decision to restrain wages as one of the two reasons the country 
achieved economic diversification. ―The restraint on wages and economic disparities 
through the Incomes Policy and sound macroeconomic management were two major 
reasons why we achieved the economic diversification we did‖ (Masire, 2007:244).  
This attempt to control inputs and outputs in the system netted a number of gains 
for Botswana. However, this control (lower wages and benefits) took the luster out of 
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public employment for Batswana. In the late 1990s, Botswana began to struggle to find 
qualified public employees. The decrease in the availability of quality public employees 
occurred in Botswana because of conditions opposite of most African countries (Hope, 
1997). The public sector had to compete with the very private sector opportunities the 
central government had worked to create.  
In 1990, the salary structure was decompressed so that it would be competitive at 
senior levels. [Also,] labor unrest culminating in a week-long strike of over 
13,000 industrial class workers in November 1991 and other political pressures 
persuaded government to increase salaries by slightly higher margins of 23.4 
percent and 16 percent at the lowest levels and 15 percent across the board for the 
middle and senior levels in 1992 (Modisi, 1997:66).  
While the founders‘ intentions in instituting wage controls were noble, these 
policies created disparities in the pay for locals and pay for expatriates (Masire, 2007). At 
independence, because of the limited previous educational opportunities for Batswana, 
expatriates filled most public service positions. To reverse this pattern the government 
systematically assessed opportunities to replace expatriates with trained and educated 
Batswana. Botswana established the 1972 Presidential Commission on Localization and 
Training. However, the government retained a number of expatriates to ensure proper 
training and transition of under qualified Batswana (Modisi, 1997:54-57).  
Legitimacy 
The Westminster style of government is one of many legacies of British rule in 
Botswana. As such, Batswana directly elects its legislative representatives. However, as a 
legacy of African rule, the constitution calls for a House of Chiefs (Ntlo ya Dikgosi) to 
act in a consultative fashion to the president and the legislature and to consider rural 
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interests. However, the movement toward a modern state negated the power of the chiefs, 
at least at the national level (Denbow and Thebe, 2006). Botswana experienced 
legislative rule prior to independence. The British Crown allowed an advisory council in 
the protectorate. The National Advisory Council, formed in 1920, later became the 
African Advisory Council (Masire, 2007; Vaughan, 2003).  
Botswana government enjoyed a great deal of internal and external legitimacy. 
However, the government was marked by a concentration of power in the presidential 
office. Still, the state went to extraordinary lengths to operate above ground. It 
established boards and policies to deal directly with transparency and corruption. It also 
limited the number of political appointments, rather than civil service employees, 
working in the public sector. In addition, it instituted an Incomes Policy to control public 
sector compensation. However, the state had to decompress salaries in the early 1990s to 
retain qualified workers. All of these institutions promoted the understanding that the 
state itself was not to be used as a direct source of personal wealth.  
Party-Legislative Representation 
Indices that measure democracy have often noted that Botswana, although 
constitutionally a multi-party democracy, was ruled by a single party since independence 
(Maudeni, et al., 2007; Nyamnjog, 2006). The single-member district electoral system 
helped institutionalize this single-party status (Maudeni, et al., 2007). By the late 1990s, 
the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) had been the party of all three presidents. Despite 
this concentration of power in a single party, 42 percent of Batswana (compared to an 
average of 40 percent in other African countries) thought that corruption was a fairly rare 
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or very rare problem among elected officials. Twenty-nine percent of Batswana 
(compared to an average of 40 percent in other countries) thought that corruption was 
fairly or very common.  
In 1965, the Botswana National Front (BNF) party formed as a counterweight to 
the BDP (Denbow and Thebe, 2006). The BNF formed to address what it perceived to be 
neo-colonialist developments (Maudeni, et al., 2007). Organization members believed the 
political elite represented Western and their own capitalist interests. While the separation 
into two parties marked a contentious period in Botswana‘s political history, the 
separation did not erupt into violence. However, the BNF set the course for his own 
demise with factional infighting (Maudeni, et al., 2007: Monty and Jaggers, 2006).  
Despite the political hegemony of the BDP, every election since independence has 
been fairly contested by the opposition Botswana National Front (BNF) and two 
other smaller parties. The BNF derives its political support mainly from the 
rapidly growing urban areas and among the younger middle and working class. 
The 1999, 2004 and 2006 legislative elections were viewed as free and fair, 
despite some constraints on opposition access to the media and allegation of 
campaign finance improprieties by the BDP. Opposition parties have long argued 
that the BDP uses its political position to manipulate the electoral process to its 
advantage (Monty and Jaggers, 2006).  
Still ―the BNF won 13 of 40 seats in 1994. The elections of 1999, however, reversed 
those gains, and the Botswana Democratic Party now controls 33 seats, with those of the 
BNF falling to six‖ (Denbow and Thebe, 2006:33).  
BDP retained broad-based support into the 2000s. In 1999-2001, 75 percent of 
Batswana (compared to an average of 57 percent in other African countries) surveyed felt 
close to a political party (Afro-barometer, 1999-2001). The inference here is that 75 
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percent of Batswana felt close to the BDP, since demonstration of party affiliation has 
been closely aligned with the BDP.  
The Judiciary 
Despite its one-party rule political development in Botswana has fostered an 
independent judicial system. Sixty-five percent of Batswana (compared to an average of 
54 percent in other African countries) reported that they trusted the court system 
somewhat or a lot. Twenty-four percent (compared to 38 percent) reported that they 
distrusted the police somewhat or a lot (Afro-barometer, 1999-2001). With regard to 
business ventures, authors of the US Geological Survey Minerals Yearbook found that 
the ―courts repeatedly upheld contracts‖ (Lloyd and Mobbs, 1994:113). The UN 
Conference on Trade and Development (2003) also deemed the judicial system as fair 
and competent (UNCTAD, 2003). Providing additional insight about the justice system, 
Masire writes:  
We agreed within the council that we should permit the two systems of civil law 
to function in parallel – Twasana customary law on the one hand and statute law 
with its Roman-Dutch common law tradition on the other. To provide a degree of 
uniformity in interpretation and to ensure there was not an arbitrary element in 
decision-making, we established a system of appeals from decisions of customary 
courts. In the appeals court for customary law, the judge sits with local assessors 
who understand the local conditions. The High Court in Lobatse makes a final 
determination if there is a further appeal. After 40 years of independence, it is 
estimated that more than three-quarters of all civil and minor criminal matters in 
Botswana are still adjudicated in customary courts (Masire, 2007:65-66).  
 
The Military 
As an extension of a modern system of law and order, Botswana‘s military has 
been apolitical. N‘Diaye suggests that Khama deliberately dragged his feet on 
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establishing a military that could challenge his political authority (Henk, 2004; N‘Diaye, 
2001). Conversely, Henk (2001) focuses on the economic limitations that prohibited the 
development of a military.  However, even inside the military Khama had a voice, as his 
son Ian was second in command. Also, the act establishing the military did not establish a 
Ministry of Defense. Researchers believe that defense decisions were made by the 
president and a small group of advisors (Henk, 2004; Malebeswa, 2002; N‘Diaye, 2001). 
It was clear from the outset that the military was a tool of the state, rather than 
some other entity or person. When the legislature passed legislation to institute a military 
(the Botswana Defense Force (BDF) in 1977 (Botswana Defense Force –BDF- Act, 
1977: Chapter 4), the provision called for a highly professionalized organization. When 
the legislature created the BDF it did so in response to an international border issue. 
Decolonization campaigns in Rhodesia, Angola, and South West Africa were taking 
place all around Botswana. The battles in Rhodesia posed an internal threat to Botswana. 
The Rhodesian military hunted insurgents who had sought refugee in Botswana. These 
military campaigns claimed the lives of Batswana as well as Rhodesians (Henk, 2004). 
Prior to the legislature‘s establishing the BDF, the police force handled matters of 
internal order (Henk, 2004; N‘Diaye, 2001). 
The military retained public legitimacy throughout the 1990s. In 1999-2001, 73 
percent of Batswana (compared to an average of 61 percent in other African countries) 
reported trusting the army somewhat or a lot. Sixteen percent of Batswana (compared to 
an average of 32 percent in other countries) reported distrusting the army somewhat or a 
lot (Afro-barometer, 1999-2001). 
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Evidence points to a high level of military perception of government legitimacy: 
(a) the very limited number of instances of violent clashes between the 
government and its opposition (b) virtual absence of the use of BDF against 
opponents (c) total absence of instances of military restiveness such as mutinies, 
conspiracies, or coup attempts (80).  
Also, Chapter eight of the BDF Act explicitly places the military under civilian control 
(BDF, 1977: Chapter 8).  
The President is the Commander in Chief of the armed forces. The BDF is 
primarily composed of a Regular Force and a Reserve Force, although the 
Reserve Force has never been mobilized. It is noteworthy that none of the three 
Presidents to fulfill this position to date, have had any military background 
(Malebeswa, 2002).  
The president‘s legal connection to the military is but one example of his broad powers. 
This section has highlighted concerns about the concentration of power in the president‘s 
office, as well as the concentration of power in one ruling party. However, Batswana 
surveyed between 1999 and 2001 considered the system to be legitimate, although they 
demonstrated less confidence in the president than other institutions (Afro barometer, 
1999-2001). Batswana also considered the court system to be legitimate, as it was willing 
to challenge the other two branches of government. Finally, Batswana considered the 
military to be legitimate, although a great deal of military authority was vested in the 
presidential office. State officials established a military 11 years after founding the state 
to address border issues. Therefore, the military did not become entrenched in the 





 Intergovernmental organizations, foreign direct investors, and the Batswana 
generally rated the county‘s transparency as positive throughout the 1990s. Features such 
as an apolitical military and an independent judiciary distinguished Botswana from most 
other African countries. However, several aspects of the government were authoritarian 
including military decisions, budget decisions, and decisions about mining. Also, in 
practice a single party, the BDP, controlled the government. The BDP established its firm 
control on state politics prior to independence. Despite this control the state founders 
developed a system that allowed for opposition to emerge. The BNF Party earned 
legislative seats in 1994. This party protested what it perceived to be the BDP‘s 
neocolonial governance.  
In its effort to promote transparency, the government instituted a civil service 
system that reduced the number of political appointees. The government also instituted an 
incomes policy to control wages in the public sector. This policy prevented individuals 
from using state revenue as their own personal incomes. However, this policy later 
backfired. By controlling public sector wages, the government made public sector 
employment less attractive than private sector employment. Consequently, the 
government was challenged to find qualified employees. Also, because of education 
deficiencies both the public and private sector depended heavily upon expatriates.  
Chaos on the Borders 
Porous borders played a central role in both conflicts in the Congo. The instability 
created by the Hutu camps provided a pretext for foreign occupation. The presence of 
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responding forces began a cycle of violence that ultimately justified the presence of at 
least seven countries in the Congo. Once they were there they could prospect for 
resources, set up military/paramilitary to control those resources, and control local 
economies.  
Throughout its young history, the Republic of Botswana has had to balance its 
own interests against volatile circumstances in neighboring countries (Battersby, 1994). 
The volatility subsided by 1997 among all neighbors, except Angola (Executive Board of 
the UN Development Program and the UN Population Fund, 1997). However this history 
of conflict created some challenges for Botswana. Conflicts developed between the 
Shona tribe (77 percent of blacks) and the Ndebele in Zimbabwe. Although the Ndebele 
―supported the idea of a unitary state at independence in 1980, in 1992 it advocated more 
regional autonomy in Zimbabwe‖ (JB, 1992:11). In Lesotho, fighting broke out among 
army factions in on January 5, 1994. On April 4, 1994, army faction members shot the 
Deputy Prime Minister and took four cabinet members hostage because of threats to 
investigate the army (New York Times, April 15, 1994). In 1998, South Africa, by request 
of the government, tried to thwart a coup in Lesotho by factions contesting the election 
results. The factions were strong enough to stave off the South African forces (Daley, 
1998). Democratic elections were bones of contention throughout the region.  Also, 
Angola‘s civil war renewed in 1991. Jonas Savimbi and the National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola (UNITA) rejected the results of the first democratic elections in 
September 1992 (Battersby, 1993).  
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In racially segregated South Africa, blacks voted for the first time in 1994 
(Walker, 1994). This strict dividing line created a debilitating socioeconomic imbalance 
in South Africa. For Botswana, this dividing line created the need for delicate 
negotiations with a white-run government that was openly hostile to black-rule. More 
specifically, South Africans raided African National Congress (ANC) bases in Gaborone, 
Botswana in the mid-eighties. While relations with South Africa were fragile, Botswana 
treaded lightly because it relied heavily upon South African railways (Johannesburg 
International Service, June 27, 1985).  
Despite its trepidations, Botswana demonstrated a willingness to control its 
borders. This tradition began even prior to its protectorate status. The prominent chiefs 
appealed to the British Crown to protect Bechuanaland from Boer invasion. More 
recently, Botswana‘s government reported that it was working with other states in the 
region to crack down on illegal immigrants screening for jobs and residence. This 
response came after widespread complaints that Botswana had become a haven for illicit 
activities (Dakar PANA, November 9, 1987). Also, border incidents in 1977 pushed the 
legislative assembly to enacted legislation creating a military (Botswana Defense Force –
BDF- Act, 1977).  
Summary 
Chaos in surrounding countries eventually spilled over into the Congo. It appears 
that Botswana dealt with its own share of border issues. Tribal warfare occurred in 
Zimbabwe, and the Lesotho army attempted to overtake the government. Also, 
socioeconomic decline resulting from apartheid challenged South Africa‘s stability. 
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Closer to Botswana, asylum seekers from South Africa‘s African National Congress 
(ANC) party took refugee in Botswana, provoking South Africa‘s wrath. Generally, 
however, Botswana was able to control its border. It established a military in 1977, in 
response to such issues.   
Societal Factors 
Ethnic manipulation played a central role in the conflicts in Eastern Congo and in 
resource ownership. After the beginning of the second war, Tutsis largely controlled 
resources in Eastern Congo. The second war occurred in part because the Congolese 
contested the status and resource control by Tutsis in Congo.  
Ethnicity 
Despite Botswana‘s impressive developments, ethnic politics created obstacles for 
the government. The questions for this dissertation are: (1) Did wealth and poverty 
straddle ethnic lines? (2) Was this wealth associated with access to resource revenue? and 
(3) Why did unequal access to resource revenue not result in violent conflicts?  
Despite the government‘s intent to shift from ―ethnicity to territoriality‖ 
(Nyamnjoh, 2006), creating a national identity
26
 required deciding which group identity 
the state would elevate to prominent status. The public face of Botswana was Twasana 
(Werbner, 2004), the face of one of the major tribes and the tribe of founder Seretse 
Khama. ―The name of the country derives directly from dominant Tswana tribes‖ 
(Nyamnjoh, 2006:93). As public policy came to reflect this domination, minorities were 
                                                        
26 ―Botswana nationals (singular is Motswana; plural Batswana)‖ (Nyamnjoh, 2006:93). 
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concerned that the domination of the political space also lead to cultural subversion. ―At 
its most extreme, the tendency was fundamentally against pluralism‖ (Werbner, 
2004:38). For example, since English and Twsana became the languages of public 
education
27
, other cultures were concerned that their languages would be lost (Masire, 
2007; Nyamnjoh, 2006). Werbner (2004) argues that this dynamic of a generic national 
identity began with Botswana‘s protectorate status. Even then, this generic identity 
benefited some tribes more than other.  
A more institutionalized problem for minority groups was that Botswana‘s 
constitution (enacted in September 30, 1966) identifies eight central tribes as the tribes of 
Botswana: the Bakgatla, Bakwena, Bamalete, Bamangwato, Bangwaketse, Barolong, 
Batawana and Batlokwa Tribes (Botswana Constitution, Chapter 78). The constitution 
explicitly grants each group a representative in the House of Chiefs.  The House of Chiefs 
is a consultative, tribal legislature to the National Assembly. Since founding, however, 
some minor tribes have had at-large representation. By explicitly naming these tribes, this 
document marginalized the unmentioned tribes. ―The constitution contained clauses, for 
example, in sections 77, 78, 79 that fixed continuity in tribal citizenships, such as land 
rights, but even more, that reaffirmed the constitutional inequality of subject 
communities‖ (Werbner, 2004:39).  
                                                        
27 ―The Twsana language is used as the principal medium of instruction in almost all primary schools 
during the first two years, and it is compulsory subject for all students in public and private schools.‖ 
Denbow, James and Phenyo C. Thebe. 2006. Culture and Customs of Botswana. Greenwood Press: 
Westport, CT.  
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Cultural subversion was a necessary outcome of a state attempting to transform 
from a collection of traditional, tribal arrangements to a modern state with a national 
identity. Consequently, land distribution took on ethnic dimensions. Because of its 
history as a protectorate, the state inherited the concept of land under private ownership. 
This distribution system was problematic for tribes such as the indigenous Sans whose 
livelihoods of cattle-raising developed through a communal land base.  
Nyamnjoh (2006) suggests that group awareness also coincided with the 
distribution of opportunities from diamond revenue. He suggests that Batswana drenched 
themselves in their ethnicity in an effort to distinguish themselves (and their right to 
employment) from foreigners who might take employment opportunities.  
The surge in the politics of difference and claims to recognition and 
representation among Batswana as individuals and groups has coincided with an 
increased awareness of distinction between ‗locals‘ and ‗foreigners‘. This 
awareness is deeply informed by concerns regarding the opportunities and 
economic entitlements under the diamond boom that has, since the 1970s, 
attracted an impressive number of immigrants, ‗particularly skilled immigrants‘ 
(Nyamnjoh, 2006:101). 
Ethnic differences and overt conflicts were largely masked and re-channeled until 
the 1980s (Nyamnjoh, 2006:87).  
In his analysis of the government‘s relationship with the indigenous population, 
Saugestad (2001:223) refers to a ―general reluctance on the part of the government to 
enter a dialogue with organized groups.‖ He suggests that the government‘s ignoring 
minority demands was part of a larger pattern of dismissing marginal concerns.   
Ethnic tensions may actually speak positively about the Botswana‘s political 
development; that the system was strong enough to allow dissent without tearing the 
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system apart (Nyamnjoh, 2006:87). Table 16 suggests that the Batswana typically saw 
themselves more as part of an ethnic group, than any sub-national groups. They also saw 
their identification with their respective ethnic group as strong and enduring. Even in 
their relatively strong group-identification, Batswana generally thought that the 
government represented the interests of all people and treated all groups fairly most of the 
time.  
Marginalized Kalanga Elite 
Another way to explore the issue of ethnicity in Botswana is to discuss the broader 
society‘s relationship with the two groups that are marginalized at the bottom and the top: 
the Kalanga and the Barsarwa.  
At the ―top‖ end of ethnic marginalization are the Kalanga, who constitute a sizeable 
portion of the business class in Botswana. The line dividing Botswana from Zimbabwe 
also divided the Kalanga (Werbner, 2004). The BaKalanga in Botswana are part of the 
same groups as the Makwerekwere in Zimbabwe (Nyamnjoh, 2006:93). Under the former 
tribal system, the Kalanga did not reign over a particular area. Subsequently, in the land-
distribution system of modern Botswana, the Kalanga were losers, for a time. 
The Kalanga were losers, based on the traditional, tribal arrangements. However, 
since they could not depend upon returns from the land, they invested in the economic 
and intellectual capital available in the burgeoning modern economy. In a modern 
economy the Kalanga could amass economic and intellectual capital (Nyamnojoh, 2006). 
Their status in society resembles the status of the Kasians in Congo (living outside of the 
Kasai Provinces). The Belgians distinguished the Kasai from other groups as  
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Table 16. Group Identity and Relationship to Government 
Question Response Option Percent Responses 
  Botswana Average 
Do you think government 
represents the interests of all 
citizens or of only one group? 









Besides being (Motswana, etc.) 
which specific groups do you feel 





































Do you want your children to 
think of themselves as members 













Do you have stronger ties to 














How often are (your identity 
group) treated unfairly by the 
government? 
Always/to a large extent 
To some extent 










Adapted from Afro-barometer 1991-2001. ―The sample is designed as a representative cross-section of all 
citizens of voting age in a given country. Samples range from 1200 to 2400.‖ 
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intellectually capable. When Mobutu came to power, he exploited this cleavage by 
placing the Kasai in administrative provinces in which they had no ethnic ties. While this 
placement and distinction made them ―superior,‖ it also garnered hatred and disdain from 
other groups. The venom toward the Kalanga in Botswana was especially sharp among 
the central Twsana groups that viewed the Kalanga as outsiders (Nyamnojoh, 2006) who 
benefited disproportionately from Botswana‘s modernization and economic 
developments. However the Kalanga, as high-level beneficiaries of the system, like the 
Congo Kasian were unwilling to rise up in violence over unequal treatment or the 
distribution of wealth.  
The Marginalized Barsarwa/San 
At the ―bottom‖ of Botswana society are about 100,000 indigenous citizens called 
Barsarwa, Sans, Kwe, or Bushmen (sometimes considered a derogatory term). Spread 
across Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa, half of them are in Botswana. 
Demonstrating the fragility of their place in Batswana society, the Barsarwa appealed to 
the UN in 1996 to help prevent the removal of 3,000 of their people from the Kalahari 
Game Reserve by the Botswana government to make way for tourism (Crossette, 1996). 
―The Botswana government wants them out of the reserve, saying their cattle raising and 
hunting game with guns cannot be tolerated in a national park‖ (Daley, 1996b). At one 
point, reporters of the story about the San relocations clouded and sensationalized it by 
adding diamonds as a motivating factor for the removals (Afro-barometer, 1999-2001).  
Former President Masire‘s (2007) memoirs argues that the Barsarwa did not seem 
the least interested in bettering themselves. He further contends that they scavenged off 
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the more prosperous groups. He argues that this attitude made them ripe for exploitation 
by others who were in search of a side show. Masire (2007) describes some of the interest 
in the Barsarwa as spectacle; people interested at gawking as these romantic creatures left 
from time gone by.  
In Masire‘s estimation, these romantics wanted the Barsarwa to be able to enjoy 
the best of both worlds; that maybe their demands lacked authenticity. He describes an 
incident in which the government established a borehole for a mineral prospecting 
operation. According to Masire the Barsarwa flocked to the watering hole. When the 
government abandoned the mining project, it also abandoned the borehole. Critics raked 
the government over the coals for abandoning the borehole to the detriment of the 
Barsarwa who had come to depend on it. The following excerpts include government 
responses to such criticism:  
Everyone knows Barsarwa had never relied on boreholes for water in their 
traditional life; but when the borehole was abandoned, the critics complained that 
we were discriminating against the Barsarwa! For the romantics who talk of 
preserving the traditional Barsarwa way of life to protest the removal of a modern 
convenience seemed hypocritical to me, in fact, virtually all Barsarwa are in 
contact with modern society in various ways; many use cell phones and other 
conveniences and hunt from Land Rovers using high powered rifles (Masire, 
2007:236).  
 
.  ‗They are not demanding traditional rights, said Mr. Mogae, Vice President. They 
are demanding modern citizenship rights. As long as they are in the park, they 
cannot have those rights.‘ They were offered five head of cattle or 15 goats plus a 
small piece of land (Daley, 1996b).  
Masire describes the central government‘s approach to the Barsarwa as one of 
benevolence, in which the government was attempting to provide greater access to 
services, such as schools and utilities (Masire, 2007). ―The government has suggested for 
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years that it has only attempted to stir initiative among the Barsarwa. It contends that is 
time for the Bushmen to leave the desert, learn to read, earn a living, and otherwise join 
the 20
th
 century‖ (Daley, 1996b).  
On the other hand, as Werbner, (2004:36) points out, ―precolonial Africa had 
frontiers, not boundaries‖ (Werbner, 2004:36). Despite this tradition, Daley (1996b) 
pointed out that encroaching cattle ranches that had been subdivided in respect for 
modern property rights squeezed out communal lands on which the Barsarwa used to 
hunt. The Freedom House reports: 
Discrimination against ethnic minorities is a problem. Since 1985, authorities 
have relocated about 5,000 San to settlements outside the Central Kalahari Game 
Reserve. Almost all of those remaining -530 people – left in 2002 when the 
government cut off water, food, health and social services. The San tend to be 
marginalized educationally and do not enjoy the same employment opportunities 
as more privileged groups (Freedom House, 2006).  
 
The San have shown signs of resistance for sure. However, the signs indicate the dissent 
of a marginalized group within the existing social/power dynamic, not necessarily the 
quest for freedom (Saugestad, 2001). 
Summary  
Ethnicity played an important role in Botswana‘s development. In forging a 
national identity, the founders saw ethnicity as something they needed to overcome. 
However, contentions grew around the question of whose identity would constitute the 
national identity. The minor tribes expressed concern about cultural subjugation in favor 
of a Tswana national identity. The minor tribes were concerned about practices such as 
the state designating English and Setswana as the official languages of the public schools.  
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―The name ‗Botswana‘ literally means ‗the land of the Setswana-speaking peoples‖ 
(Denbow and Thebe, 2006:8). The minor tribes were also concerned about their limited 
input in political processes. The state institutionalized their minor status by explicitly 
writing the eight major tribes into the constitution.  
 Two of these minor groups were the Kalanga elite and, at the other end, the 
indigenous Sans. The Kalanga previously had no access to tribal land. So this group did 
not pin its hopes on a fledgling cattle economy; its members trained themselves to thrive 
in the modern economy by cultivating economic and intellectual capital. Their status 
evoked resentment from the Tswana. Members of the general population also resented 
the indigenous Sans who were getting in the way of tourism development in the Kalahari 
Game Reserve. The media sensationalized this struggle by blaming it on diamonds. 
However, it was simply a struggle between traditional and modern society. Increasingly, 
the new Botswana squeezed out the Barsarwa way of life. 
Despite struggles along ethnic lines, ethnic divisions did not lead to violence. 
During this study period, most people still identified with an ethnic group. However, they 
largely believed that the government represented all citizens and that the government 
treated most people fairly.  
Civil Society 
Civil society organizations had some life in the Congo. However, the system 
ultimately robbed them of their power beyond providing services. Both Mobutu and 
Kabila suppressed such organizations. Both men damaged their legitimacy by closing off 
channels of meaningful political dialogue, especially in the eastern regions 
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The question of ethnicity leads to further discussion about the role of civil society 
in general. In 1987 Curry warned that the ―pattern of growth is producing two 
Botswanas-one rich and the other poor-and this poverty is disillusioning many Botswana‖ 
(1987:487). With regard to access to public utilities, huge disparities exist even today 
(Bogetic and Fedderke, 2006:32). The discussion of inequality is highly relevant to the 
potential for civil society development in Botswana. People find it difficult to rally 
around issues that are important to them and develop a vibrant civil society when they are 
hungry or otherwise in need of physical security (Inglehart and Welzel, 205; Nyamnjoh, 
2006).  
Patterns of inequality persisted through the 1990s, despite the development of 
what seemed to be a vibrant civil society. Botswana used a number of vehicles to get 
people to ―buy-in‖ to the society, such as employment brigades for the youth, local 
education boards of governors, and National Development Plans (Masire, 2007). Forty-
six percent of Batswana (compared to average of 23 percent among other Africa 
countries) surveyed considered Botswana a full democracy. Thirty-six percent Batswana 
(compared to an average of 27 percent in other countries) considered Botswana a 
democracy (Afro-barometer authors, 1999-2001).  
Nyamnjoh (2006) warns of the tendency in Africa for procedural rather than 
substantive democracies to emerge. For Nyamnjoh (88), non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) and other organizations with a limited amount of political power may have 
presented a picture of democratic action. Seventy-seven percent of Batswana (compared 
an average of 53 percent in other African countries) reported never having attended a 
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community meeting. Seventeen percent of Batswana (compared to 29 percent in other  
African countries) reported that they had attended a community meeting sometimes. Six 
percent of Batswana (compared to an average of 18 percent in other African countries) 
reported that they had often attended a community meeting (Afro-barometer, 1999-2001). 
Peters (1994) points out that the kgotla was not open to everyone, as everyone is not a 
member of the principal tribes. ―Most CSOs prefer and are encouraged by government to 
stay out of politics‖ (Maudeni, et al, 2007:30). The authors note the apathy toward 
kgotlas and the unwillingness of women to attend these male-dominated forums. They 
also reference the hostile atmosphere of political rallies, which also drove people away 
from public discourse. Similarly, The Economist (1994) points out the limitations of 
using the kgotla for public input. The publication‘s description of the kgotlas suggests 
that they are forums where the central government goes to explain what it has done for 
the people, not to get input.  
 Carroll and Carroll (2004) lend some support to the notion that the central 
government was dismissive, maybe even hostile to civil society organizations. They point 
out that this attitude appeared to change in the mid-1990s. President Masire established 
the High Level Consultative Committee in 1996 for regular input. In 1999, President 
Mogae ―required each ministry to develop equivalent consultative processes‖ (348). 
Carroll and Carroll argue that elected officials began to demonstrate more comfort with 




Botswana‘s government provided many opportunities for Batswana to buy into 
government decisions. Leaders used the tribal meetings to connect to the people through 
their local chiefs, although the meetings were not open to everyone. Scholars have noted 
a general reluctance on the part of officials to allow groups input in the political process. 
However, the central government began to allow more input by civil society 
organizations in the mid 1990s, when the BNF formed viable opposition against the 
central party.  
Chapter Summary 
Scholars and the media often cite Botswana‘s growth as a positive example of 
development in Africa. Their assessments are based upon macro-economic indicators. 
However, analysis at a micro-economic level shows a different picture. Botswana‘s 
poverty rate approached 50 percent. The principal source of wealth in Botswana was the 
mining industry, especially the diamond industry. However, the diamond industry only 
employed about six percent of the population.  
 Botswana was fortunate to discover vast resources under its soil. However, the 
development of the economy also occurred because of prudent management. For 
example, government officials used revenue from minerals to build cash reserves and 
sustain the economy during downturns in the mineral sectors. In addition, Botswana 
officials negotiated aggressively with the resource extraction companies. State law 
requires the companies to invest 100 percent in projects, pay royalties, and pay licensing 
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fees. Also, the state has been careful to filter foreign donations and control deficit 
spending.  
 Despite the success of the mining industry in Botswana, other sectors struggled. 
On average agriculture declined. Scholars argue that the agricultural industry was 
compromised in favor of the interests of the cattle-owning elite. It is no surprise then that 
the small number of cattle-owning elite increasingly owned a greater portion of the 
industry. The manufacturing sector also suffered because of the state‘s lack of 
commitment. Officials were unable to attract foreign investment in the manufacturing 
industry at the same level as they were able to attract foreign investment in the mining 
industry. Also, despite rapid progress in education, state officials were unable to devise 
an education system that adequately trained students to participate in the economy. The 
problem of underemployment was exacerbated by personnel attrition caused by 
HIV/AIDS. The disparities in educational access were reinforced by a range of disparities 
in Botswana society. For example, the rural population‘s access to utilities was 
significantly below urban access. Healthcare had improved but had been stressed by high 
HIV/AIDS rates.  
 Botswana experienced a number of notable successes, including the development 
of a functional Westminster model of government. Because the British Crown took a 
hands-off approach with Botswana as it approached independence, Botswana‘s founders 
had a great deal of leverage to tailor-make a political system for Botswana. Botswana 
instituted a multi-party system-although a de facto single-party system. In 1994, a minor 
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party achieved some measure of victory in contesting the principal party. This contest 
provided political leverage to civil society organizations.  
 Botswana accepted and encouraged praise for its pre-colonial democratic history. 
However, the minority tribes felt marginalized because the majority tribes are explicitly 
recognized in the constitution. Still, several indices have recognized Botswana 
government for its transparency. The high-profile nature of corruption cases suggests that 
corruption was an anomaly in the system. Also, the state instituted an incomes policy that 
controlled the amount of income public employees could earn by working for the state. In 
addition, the state was able to provide law and order, without politicizing the military. 
Just the same, critics condemned the government for guarding decisions about the 
mineral industry.  
Chapter V: An Analysis of the Republic of Botswana 
Scholars and policy analysts often hold Botswana up as evidence that African states can 
thrive. There is plenty of evidence to support this position. I selected Botswana as a 
counterfactual, as it has managed to avoid conflicts, although it was a resource-abundant 
country. In this analysis, I will first explore Botswana‘s shortcomings. Beginning with its 
shortcomings up through the 1990s will allow me to focus on those factors in the Congo 
that appear to have contributed to ―resource wars‖ or civil wars involving natural 
resources. Despite the country‘s unique successes, Botswana showed signs of the 
resource curse and Dutch Disease, two phenomena often associated with resource wars. 
However, these phenomena have not lead to conflict or played a central role in civil 
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conflicts. Botswana has a number of other state weaknesses that have not parlayed into 
violent conflicts.  
Botswana: Cursed? 
Sachs and Werner (1995) contend that countries that are resource-abundant will fail to 
develop. From a macroeconomic perspective, Botswana avoided the resource curse. This 
picture reflects prudent mining sector management and state planning over time. High 
growth rates in the overall economy continued from independence well into the 1990s. 
The state was able to maintain the diamond and cattle markets, even during downturns in 
because of its deep reserves. Especially, if we compare Botswana with countries such as 
the DRC that obviously suffered from what Sachs and Warner call the resource curse, it 
is even more evident that Botswana avoided the curse. However, using Sach‘s and 
Werner‘s definition as a guide, Botswana actually succumbed to the resource curse. But 
its resource curse did not result in a violent society. If we examine Botswana‘s 
development on a per capita basis, then the picture changes drastically. About 47 percent 
of the population lived in poverty by the late 1990s. The education system had failed to 
prepare students for the job market, even the mining industry. Consequently, the better 
jobs were secured by expatriates.  
Despite rapid development throughout the 1990s, Botswana was riddled with vast 
inequalities. An overwhelming amount of evidence suggests that the mineral industry 
helped create many of these inequalities. While the state may have set out to use mining 
revenue to develop state infrastructure and services, by 2001 the mining industry 
employed only six percent of the population. Despite the general population receiving 
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residual benefits from the mining industry (including schools, hospitals, roads, etc), there 
were gross inequalities in access to basic utilities, skills training, and health care. In 
addition, the state‘s initial ineptitude in the face of the HIV/AIDS epidemic created a 
health crisis that exacerbated the disparities further. The prevalence of HIV/AIDS created 
personnel challenges and disincentives for foreign direct investors.  
Botswana had trouble establishing a manufacturing sector in the 1990s.  
Still, this shortcoming did not result in insecurity and violence. Foreign direct investment 
disproportionately targeted the mining sector. For example, investors made sure that 
technology to support the mining industry was available. Neither investors nor state 
officials systematically developed such support for the manufacturing sector. The 
difficulties in the mining sector did not occur by happenstance. They resulted from 
deliberate political decisions. The old political elite clearly supported cattle production to 
the detriment of agriculture, and the cattle industry was propped up by diamond revenue. 
Also, the sparsely populated Botswana did not provide large markets for goods.  In 
addition, Botswana had one of the highest rates of HIV/AIDS infections in the world in 
the 1990s. These factors severely impacted productivity.  
Other Signs of a Weak State 
A single party, the BDP, ruled Botswana throughout the 1990s. This  
single-party rule amounted to the control of resources by an elite political clique. 
Botswana‘s first-past-the-post electoral system was partially responsible for this outcome. 
In addition to this structural cause, the BDP solidified its power base prior to 
independence. Concentration of power in a single party is more troubling considering the 
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concentration of power in the presidential office. Although the legislature selects the 
executive, members of Parliament often fill cabinet posts under the president. Also, the 
president has wide discretion in directing the military, as there is no minister of defense.  
Relevant to this concentration of power, minor ethnic groups were concerned 
about limitations on their public input. Despite Botswana‘s history of democratic 
institutions through Ngwato heritage, not all groups were included in this process. Ethnic 
groups were also concerned that the generically Batswana national identity suppressed 
their cultures and muffled their political voices.  
State Strength: The Key to Avoiding Violence 
Despite the resource curse, Dutch Disease and state weaknesses, Botswana resembled a 
strong, modern state in many ways. The deep disparities present in Batswana society did 
not lead to warlordism. As Vaughn (2003) suggests, Seretse Khama and other state 
planners used the local chiefs as links to the rural population. Also, supporting the cattle 
trade was a political coup for the ruling party. The state was able to develop a cattle 
industry that primarily served the cattle-owning elite, while appearing to offer a hand-up 
to smaller, poorer cattle operations and the rural poor in general.  
Masire succeeded in dominating power by maintaining the collaboration between 
politicians and bureaucrats, while ensuring the stability of the government‘s 
market-based developmental strategy, which focused on the exploitation of the 
cattle and diamond industries. This lucrative economy rewards those who 
dominate the prevailing political-economic arrangement while trying to provide 
for the essential needs of the masses of local people (Vaughn, 2003:138).  
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For example, the establishment of communal lands appears to have benefited various 
groups of people. However, this arrangement opened up additional grazing land for 
private owners who used private land in addition to their own.   
Legitimacy 
By and large, the executive, the legislative, and the judicial branches enjoyed 
legitimacy through the 1990s. Foreign direct investors, for example, received assurances 
that the courts would honor contracts in Botswana. Also, corruption appears limited to a 
few cases to which the government responded forcefully. However, others have 
complained about the limitations on public input, especially in the mining industry.  
An Apolitical Military 
The military was not overtly politicized and certainly not active in the distribution 
of resources. The state established the military as a public institution, rather than security 
for private ownership of resources. State officials have used the military sparingly 
throughout Botswana‘s modern history, but that have never used it to suppress political 
opponents. Botswana did not even institute a military until 1977. It did so in response to a 
border issue. By that time, the central party had entrenched its political base. The military 
continued to protect Botswana‘s borders through the 1990s. This responsibility became 
less of a burden over time, as its regional neighbors became more peaceful. Still, the 
history of the military speaks to the overall respect for law and order in Botswana.  
Law and Order 
Respect for law and order was established even before independence. Early 
political arrangements helped establish the attitude that the state itself was not a source of 
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personal wealth. State planners took advantage of the latitude they had to drive tough 
bargains with mining companies. They did not have to act in haste to get resources out of 
the ground as quickly as possible to liquidate them and pocket the money.  Also, the 
modernizing elite did not gamble with the state‘s sovereignty by placing it on the auction 
block to private companies. In addition, they created access to sources of revenue beyond 
the mining industry, although many of the opportunities were still in the public sector.  
Private Ownership 
The state did not evolve from a legacy of private ownership of state resources. 
Evidence suggests that Botswana has avoided problems with resource management 
because the bulk of resource discovery did not occur until after independence. The timing 
of these discoveries affected the state in two ways. First, since the British Crown had 
invested a limited amount of resources into Bechuanaland, it allowed prospective state 
officials a great deal of input on the future status of the protectorate. Since resource 
discovery was late in coming, the British Crown did not have to protect the interests of a 
parent company, such as the East India Company. Second, since the British Crown (or a 
proxy company) did not exert absolute control its hands-off approach did not necessitate 
a national movement that would ignite a history of state and resource contestation. This 





 status in the Cold War reduced the need for a military-style 
state political apparatus (Masire, 2007).   
Control Over Extraction 
The state exercised rigid controls over the mining industry. Opportunities for 
warlords to negotiate with booty futures were limited. For example, the state initially 
established the diamond site Orapa as a closed city. Also, regulations stipulated that 
mining companies had to report any new discoveries not covered in the original mining 
permit. These diamonds and other mineral were lootable. Still the state maintained 
bureaucratic control over the mineral supply.  
Foreign Aid 
The state initially controlled all foreign aid coming into the country. When the 
state began, it relied heavily on foreign aid. Over time it was able to wean itself from 
donors because of reserves and stockpiles of minerals. Even during periods of heavy 
dependence, Botswana diversified its donors, not relying too heavily on one source. By 
controlling foreign aid, the state was able to control the influence of foreign groups on the 
Batswana population. In addressing African and American relations, former President 
Khama warned against African countries‘ dependence on foreign aid. In this same 
address, he encouraged the US to consider providing more technical assistance to help 
                                                        
28 http://www.nam.gov.za/background/members.htm It is important to note that countries, such as Cuba, 
who clearly engaged in Cold War politics appears on this list. However, since independence, Botswana 
appears to have taken a neutral stance in superpower struggles.  
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African countries capitalize on development opportunities and on income from various 
sources (Khama, 1971).   
Single Party Politics 
As mentioned above, a single party effectively controlled Botswana politics 
through the 1990s. However, viable opposition (primarily through the BNF Party) 
emerged to compete in the 1994 elections. The government was forced to respond by 
creating more inclusive political processes. The important point here is that state founders 
established the political channels, although difficult to navigate, that would allow 
opposition to emerge without violence. Also, the founders institutionalized the national 
connection to the rural populations by writing the House of Chiefs into the constitution, 
although the chiefs had no legislative power. In addition, the tradition of the kgotla at 
least gave the impression of input, but it certainly helps maintained a degree of prestige 
for the chiefs.  
Ethnicity 
Minor ethnic groups expressed concerns about how their cultures were being 
subverted in favor of the generic Twasana identity. The inclusion of the eight major tribes 
legally subordinated minor tribes. Groups such as the Barsarwa and the Kalanga 
struggled to find their identities in Batswana society, as the Kalanga shared culture 
identities with the Makwerekwere in Zimbabwe. Despite problems with the assimilation 




In summary, a number of conflict determinants present in the Congo in the late 1990s 
were present in Botswana in the late 1990s. However, these conditions did not combine 
with the abundance of natural resources, including lootable resources to produce violent 
conflict. Botswana had to contend with complaints of marginalization by minor ethnic 
groups. The government even challenged the Barsarwa‘s access to their traditional 
hunting lands. Also, a single-party effectively ruled Botswana. In addition, Botswana 
showed signs of the resource curse and Dutch Disease. Poverty afflicted almost half the 
country‘s population, and there were gross economic inequalities. As for the Dutch 
Disease, the state had a limited manufacturing sector, a steep decline in agriculture, and a 
superficial cattle trade. Finally, chaos in border states represented security threats to 
Botswana. But violence was kept to a minimum. 
 Various signs of state strength in Botswana offer plausible explanations for 
Botswana‘s avoidance of violent conflict. First, while Botswana faced issues with ethnic 
marginalization, state officials did not engage in systematic hate campaigns and ethnic 
goading, nor did they humiliate minor ethnic groups by challenging their citizenship. 
Second, Botswana did not nationalize its industries. It did not place bureaucrats in charge 
of parastatals simply because they were members of the main patronage system. 
Moreover, the elite did not establish a state for direct personal ownership and personal 
contestation. They also worked to create economic opportunities outside of the mining 
industry, although these opportunities were largely public sector.  
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 Things that occurred before independence also helped Botswana avoid natural 
resource conflict. For example, because British companies did not understand the 
vastness of resources in Botswana, the British Empire gave a great deal of latitude to the 
local elite in developing a new political system. Having overlooked Botswana‘s wealth, 
the Crown did not establish a system of personal ownership of the state‘s resources. The 
Crown‘s loose control over the protectorate also negated the need for a nationalist 
movement. The lack of a nationalist movement reduced the chances of politics becoming 
militarized.  
 Botswana‘s ability to provide for its own security also contributed to the lack of 
violence. In short, Botswana‘s military was able to control the country‘s borders. Inside 
its borders there was a general respect for rule of law. There was also the perception that 
public officials and bureaucrats were legitimate. Unlike their analogs in the Congo, 
Botswana state officials exercised absolute control over the mining industry. They also 
controlled the flow of foreign aid. While Botswana received military assistance from 
donors, it largely stayed out of Cold War politics. Finally, Botswana was effectively ruled 
by a single party. However, that party was held accountable to some extent and did not 
operate based on the whims of a single dictator.  
Final Thoughts 
Kaldor (1999), Duffield (2001), and Berdal (2003) speak of conflicts like those in the 
Congo as a new type of civil war, while Thom (1999) talks about the new African 
warlordism and organized banditry. I disagree with both assessments. The conflicts in the 
Congo were the continuation of a legacy of organized banditry that began at least as early 
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as colonialism. King Leopold robbed the Congo of its resources while brutalizing its 
people and arresting the country‘s development. The Belgians continued this legacy, as 
part of the larger campaign known as colonialism, which carved up various pieces of 
Africa into fiefdoms. Eventually the fiefdom known as the Congo landed in the hands of 
the dictator Mobutu Sese Seko. As his fiefdom became too weak to defend itself in the 
1990s Kabila and his allies, Rwanda, and Uganda further subdivided these fiefdoms. This 
arrangement resembles those brokered by Great Britain, France, Belgian, and Germany to 
divide up Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Africa.  
 Cilliers (2003), Renner (2002), and Klare (2001) have called the conflicts such as 
those in the Congo ―resource wars.‖ However, resources are but one set of factors in a 
trajectory of war that may have began hundreds of years ago. Given the complexity of 
these conflicts, the labels resource war or natural resource conflict are misguided. The 
notion of a resource conflict is attention-grabbing, as it sensationalizes and simplifies the 
dynamics of a complex conflict. In my opinion, too many scholars treat these conflicts as 
phenomena based on cost-benefit analyses of present circumstances. These conflicts 
extend far beyond their temporal and spatial circumstances. Malone and Nitzscheke 
(2005) provide a more valid portrait of these types of conflict when they examine 
resources in the context of a political economy of civil war. Although scholars, such as 
Ross (2003) refer to the role that natural resources play in civil conflict, they muddy the 
waters by using the phrase ―resource curse.‖ This phrase raises the prominence of 




Chapter VI: Conclusions & Generalizations 
 
In this dissertation I have examined the determinants of the onset and the duration of 
intra-state conflicts that involve natural resources. I extracted these determinants from the 
findings of a number of quantitative studies. Given the proliferation of these studies since 
the 1990s, I tested a range of determinants. Case study analysis of these determinants in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Zaire) and Republic of Botswana revealed some 
important differences in resource politics, demonstrating the importance of several 
factors and exposing the limited explanatory value of others. My study indicates that the 
most important factors that affect the onset and duration of intra-state natural resource 
conflict are the following: (1) the colonial and Cold War legacies of the country in 
question; (2) the extent of state control over resource extraction; (3) the strength of the 
state‘s military; (4) the level of foreign intervention in the conflict; and (5) asymmetries 
in resources in one case - Mobutu‘s Congo versus the ―rebels‖ and in another case - 
Kabila‘s African alliance versus Rwanda‘s alliance. Less important factors include the 
onset and continuation of war because of political grievances, the effect of the resource 
curse and Dutch disease, and the types of resources under contention. 
Colonial Legacy 
My analysis indicates that the manner in which a country exited colonialism 
determines to some extent whether the state pursues a rational-bureaucratic state or a 
kleptocratic state. The Congo was brutalized during its colonial history. It was controlled 
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first by King Leopold of Belgium as his personal property. The international community 
shamed King Leopold into relinquishing the Congo to the Belgian state. When the 
Belgians reluctantly left the Congo, they had not prepared the Congolese for neither 
political nor economic independence. Moreover, while the Belgians abandoned the 
political apparatus, they maintained economic control of the Congo. The state became the 
principal source of wealth for the Congolese. It is no surprise then that after Belgian 
control Mobutu nationalized the Congo‘s major industries to avoid outside control. 
Although the nationalization efforts largely failed, they gave Mobutu almost total control 
over resources and further entrenched the kleptocratic state.  
Botswana‘s road to independence was a starkly different experience than that of 
the Congo‘s. Botswana had been a protectorate state. As the name suggests, the British 
Crown acted largely as a protector from Boer invasion. The Crown allowed Botswana to 
remain a protectorate (rather than a colony) because the Crown did not know the extent 
of Botswana‘s wealth until after independence. Since Botswana was unprofitable for an 
already overstretched British Empire, neither the British Crown nor British companies 
were willing to invest heavily in Botswana. Therefore, native Batswana controlled the 
national economy after independence. Although the post-independence economy 
depended heavily upon mining, the Batswana controlled economic opportunities that 
could eventually be extended to their own people. Also, while Botswana depended 
heavily upon public sector employment, officials put controls in place to ensure that no 
individual would benefit disproportionately from the state.  
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Botswana did not have the same legacy of personal control over state resources as 
the Congo. Public officials did not consider state resources to be in the private domain. 
Operating from this perspective, state officials could demonstrate patience in negotiating 
with corporations. There was no haste to secure contracts before opportunities for 
personal gain passed. In short, Botswana went into political independence with the 
autonomy necessary to make economic decisions as a state, rather than as a group of 
economically-rational individuals.  
Cold War 
During the Cold War Mobutu was a puppet of the Western powers. His location 
in the heart of Africa was strategic for Westerners, as the Congo touched borders with 
nine other African countries. The Western powers could, for example, sponsor rebels in 
socialist Angola through the Congo. Consequently, Western powers looked the other way 
as Mobutu abused his own people, continually restructured bad debts, and avoided 
democratic reform. Western powers provided unlimited sources of personal wealth and 
military aid. With these resources, Mobutu was careful to prop up his own personal 
security forces, while neglecting the rank-and-file military. His Cold War status further 
supported the notion of the state as a source of personal wealth. However, once the Cold 
War ended the Western powers had little use for Mobutu. The Clinton Administration 
strongly suggested that Mobutu concede his public office to the front man of the ―rebel‖ 
forces, Laurent Kabila.  
Cold War politics helped set up a number of structural elements for the eventual 
onset of conflicts in 1996. However, the dissipation of Cold War politics helped achieve a 
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decisive end to the first set of conflicts, as Western powers would no longer compensate 
for the Congo‘s weaknesses with aid.  
Botswana‘s experience with the Cold War was starkly different from the Congo‘s. 
Botswana stuck to a non-aligned position. Consequently, superpower politics did not 
obstruct the officials‘ vision for Botswana. Also, Botswana‘s founders were careful about 
becoming too dependent upon foreign aid. As a result of avoiding such attachments, 
Botswana did not get trapped in the endless cycle of deficit spending in which the Congo 
found itself. These findings demonstrate Botswana‘s commitment to developing a 
rational-legal state rather than a kleptocratic state. The Botswana officials did not 
supplant sound economic planning with superpower resources.  
State Control of Resources 
My findings indicate that the legacy of personal ownership is important because it 
established an attitude in the Congo that state resources are the spoils of contests between 
individuals. Uganda and Rwanda entered into conflict with the Congo in 1996 and 1998. 
In 1996 these countries entered as allies of Mobutu‘s successor, Laurent Kabila.  In 1998 
they re-entered as Laurent Kabila‘s enemies. In 1998 Laurent Kabila, responding to 
Congolese complaints about the number of Tutsis occupying top positions in his regime, 
expelled Tutsis from the Congo. Also, he refused to protect Rwanda from the Hutu 
attacks organized in Hutu refugee camps along the Congo border. However, reports from 
the area do not clearly establish Rwanda‘s and Uganda‘s motives for re-entry into the 
Congo. Some evidence suggests that they re-entered for security reasons. Other evidence 
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suggests that they re-entered to finish the resource exploitation they had started during 
the first war in 1996.   
Regardless of Rwanda‘s or Uganda‘s actual motives, the UN Panel of Experts on 
the Exploitation of Natural Resources in the Congo found that during the 1996 conflicts a 
number of high-ranking Rwandan and Ugandan military officials set up financial 
networks through which they could funnel resource extraction revenue. Although 
officially re-entering the Congo for border control and in response to human rights 
violations, individuals from these countries controlled the local economies in the east, 
north, and northwestern regions of the Congo well after 1998. Kabila enlisted the help of 
Namibia, Chad, Angola, and Zimbabwe to help him maintain majority control over the 
state. Kabila rewarded officials from these countries, especially Zimbabwe, with business 
ventures in the mining sector.  
The large fiefdom formerly controlled by Mobutu was politically and 
economically subdivided into smaller fiefdoms controlled most notably by Laurent 
Kabila, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. In short, because resources in the Congo were 
considered to be Mobutu‘s personal property, groups felt justified in challenging his 
ownership rights. Mobutu developed political, financial, social, and communications 
networks that allowed theft from the state. Those networks later served as models for 
interlopers. The pervasive acceptance of private ownership of state resources contributed 
to the onset of conflict in 1996, as other countries refused to relinquish their illegitimate 
claims on foreign resources. 
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States can minimize outside claims on state resources by taking or assuring full 
control over extraction processes. This finding should not be confused with the thesis that 
lootable resources (resources that can be mined) are risk factors for conflict. Lootable 
resources do not have to be risk factors if states exert control over resource operations. 
Throughout most of the late 1960s and early 1970s, copper was a principal means of 
revenue for the Congo. However, the state failed to maintain its main facility in the Shaba 
region. Not only did the state fail to provide vital infrastructure, the insecurity at this 
facility and facilities in a chief diamond region in the south allowed rogue operations. 
When the ―rebel‖ campaign rolled through with military assistance from Uganda and 
Rwanda, resource sites were vulnerable to immediate takeover. These vulnerabilities 
mattered a great deal in both sets of conflicts, as the ―rebels‖ quickly sold resource 
contracts to purchase arms. Conversely, when Botswana officials established the Orapa 
mining site, they controlled entry into and exit from the mining city. 
Foreign Intervention   
Ownership of the Congo‘s resources was complicated by the number of claimants. 
As Ross (2004) contends, civil wars that involve natural resources often draw outside 
intervention. Such was the case when Rwanda and Uganda intervened against Mobutu 
while other African countries allied with Mobutu. These interventions lengthen civil 
conflicts (Hironaka, 2005). The Congo became embroiled in two wars in less than two 
years between 1996 and 1998.   
Initially, Rwanda‘s and Uganda‘s interventions prolonged the Congo‘s internal 
strife. The Banyamulenge were a group of Tutsis living in the Congo. After the 1994 
210 
 
Rwandan genocide, the Hutus who committed the genocide, along with innocent 
refugees, fled to humanitarian camps on the Congo‘s border. From there, Hutu militants 
launched attacks on the new Tutsi regime in Rwanda and on Tutsis living inside the 
Congo. The Banyamulenge (Tutsis native to the Congo) retaliated against the extremists. 
However, with support from Rwanda and Uganda the Banyamulenge took on a more 
aggressive role. This ―rebel‖ alliance eventually sought to control key resource sites. 
After the alliance captured key resource sites, it was able to exhaust the state‘s (and the 
state‘s allies‘) capacity to defend itself. My findings are consistent with those of Fearon 
(2004) and Smith and Stam (2004) who find that asymmetries in economic and military 
resources shorten conflicts. It is also consistent with Buhaug and Gates‘ findings (2002). 
They conclude that the group(s) that controls vital resources controls the state.  
Military Strength 
Several scholars use state strength to explain the onset or duration of conflicts 
involving natural resources (Humphrey, 2005; Malone and Nitzschke, 2005; Fearon, 
2004; Herbst, 2004; Cincotta, 2003; Buhaug and Gates, 2002; Ross, 2001; LeBillion, 
2001-a; Isham, et al., 2001; Alao and Olonisakan, 2000; Goldstone, 2000). My findings 
point to a simple state weakness explanation that centers on the military. Related to state 
weakness, Congo state officials largely collected state revenue from exports, resource 
extraction revenue, and Cold War donations prior to the 1996 and 1998 conflicts. These 
revenue sources placed limitations on citizens‘ demands on the state since these sources 
supplanted personal tax contributions. On the expenditure side, the state failed to 
construct vital infrastructure, such as roads, communication networks, and key social 
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services. However, it was a poorly trained, underpaid, disloyal military that failed to stop 
the ―rebel‖ onslaught. Mobutu even hired mercenaries and enlisted the help of the South 
Koreans to train his soldiers. Mobutu‘s undisciplined forces were not amenable to such 
training. The weak military presented no real threat to the ―rebels‖ who were also 
operating on limited resources. Although the rebels captured the capital city wearing t-
shirts and flip-flops, the asymmetry in military capability helped the ―rebels‖ achieve 
victory in a relatively short time—in about nine months.  
Botswana‘s civilian leaders (as opposed to the military) controlled their society. 
The military had not become a privileged class during the colonial period. Consequently, 
the military did not play a role in the transition to an independent state. By the time state 
officials formed a military in 1977, the principal party, the Botswana Democratic Party, 
had consolidated political power. Since its inception the military has remained apolitical.  
Asymmetries 
 The conflicts that began in 1996 were marked by asymmetries in power, 
ultimately leading to a decisive victory by the ―rebels.‖ First, Mobutu‘s forces were 
unable to cope with the might of a Rwandan--Ugandan alliance that eventually 
included other countries. Angola, in particular, had a strong interest in assisting these  
countries since Mobutu had sponsored rebels inside Angola. While France tried to 
intervene on Mobutu‘s behalf, outside opposition to the Mobutu regime was 
overwhelming. Other states committed to the effort to overthrow Mobutu. Rwanda and 
Uganda increased their military budgets during the first and second set of conflicts, even 
as they received social aid from international organizations. Inside opposition was 
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equally daunting. Once the ADFL movement gained momentum, local officials went on 
record saying that they would not resist the ADFL. Some even celebrated the coming of 
the ADFL. Others went as far as joining the ADFL forces. Also, tilting the balance in 
favor of the ADFL was its capture of key resource sites. Finally, the US helped further tilt 
the balance by asking Mobutu to bow down gracefully.    
 In the second set of conflicts, the Rwandan-Ugandan alliance was offset by the 
alliance Kabila established with Angola, Chad, Namibia, and Zimbabwe. Consequently, 
neither Kabila nor Rwanda achieved a decisive victory. Kabila retained majority control 
of the Congo and Rwanda and Uganda controlled the eastern, north, and northwest 
regions.  
Less Important Factors 
The factors listed above played important roles in resource politics in the Congo 
and Botswana. Other factors also played roles in the cases I examined. They were, 
however, less important than the factors I list above. These factors include the following: 
(1) War as an expression of political grievances; (2) resource curse and Dutch disease; 
and (3) type of resources under contention.  
Grievances 
The initial set of conflicts in the Congo was set in motion by activity in the Hutu 
refugee camps on the Congo border. Humanitarian shelter and aid allowed the Hutu 
militants to reorganize their military apparatus. The militants launched attacks on 
Rwanda from these camps. They also launched attacks on the Tutsi population living 
inside the Congo. One Tutsi group, the Banyamulenge, retaliated with support from 
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Rwanda and Uganda. The Mobutu regime had previously victimized this native group by 
challenging its citizenship rights. Consistent with Collier and Hoeffler‘s (2001) findings, 
the Banyamulenge campaign appeared to be an expression of grievances that morphed 
into an expression of greed (to take over key resource sites and control the state). 
However, reports suggest that Tutsi rebels operating out of Uganda and Rwanda had 
trained the Banyamulenge in advance of this ―rebellion.‖ Therefore, there is still some 
question as to how much the early stages of this campaign truly expressed the grievances 
of the Congolese Tutsis.  
The idea that rebel mobilization is largely driven by grievances is challenged by 
conditions in the Congo prior to the 1996 conflicts. For over 32 years, conditions in the 
Congo fostered grievances. However, the groups that sought redress through political 
channels were largely ineffective. Also, they had limited relationships to the campaign 
that eventually overthrew Mobutu. During the Cold War the Western powers actually 
rebuffed the political claims of legitimate political organizations. 
 The Botswana case provides additional evidence that grievances are weak 
predictors of the onset and duration of civil war. The mining industry was the chief 
source of wealth and development in Botswana. That development was limited to certain 
segments of society, as evident by an almost 50 percent poverty rate and an education 
system that left a number of Batswana unemployable in productive sectors. Still, 
Botswana remained peaceful.  
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Resource Curse/Dutch Disease 
The Congo, like Botswana, was clearly the victim of what scholars call the 
resource curse. The Congo was also a victim of Dutch Disease, the phenomenon in which 
countries fail to develop sectors other than mining. The literature suggests that these 
conditions lead to conflicts over resources. However, these conditions existed in the 
Congo for over 32 years before the 1996 conflicts. Also, the Congo had endured a 
number of downturns in resource export values prior to 1996. The Congo‘s resource 
wealth was vast and varied enough that when there was a downturn in one market, 
Mobutu simply shifted dependence to other resources. When there was an overall 
shortfall in resource wealth, Mobutu could rely upon donations from Western powers.  
While these conditions made the Congo vulnerable to instability, Mobutu used his 
patronage network to control rebel mobilization. He gave local leaders the privilege of 
local control. He also shuffled regional leaders around to make sure no leader established 
a strong political base. He went as far as placing leaders outside their ethnic bases, 
making it difficult for them to establish a foothold.  
 Botswana, like the Congo, had a number of important vulnerabilities. At the 
macro-economic level, Botswana appeared to have escaped the resource curse. In short, 
resource abundance did not thwart the state‘s development. However, on a per capita 
basis, as with the Congo, Botswana was victim to this curse. The mining industry was 
supposed to support other areas of development. However, there was clearly an unequal 
distribution of wealth in the country. About ½ of Botswana‘s population lived in poverty 
throughout the 1990s. Also, in terms of utility access, Botswana failed to measure up to 
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countries with similar average incomes. Disparities in utility access were especially 
pronounced when measuring them along rural-urban lines. Still, Botswana was free of 
violent conflicts over resources.  
Botswana was also a victim to Dutch disease. It failed to adequately develop other 
sectors, especially manufacturing. Industrial resources and foreign direct investment 
largely targeted the mining industry, which employed only about six percent of the 
population. Expatriates occupied a number of key positions in the mining workforce 
because the Botswana education system had not prepared its students to enter the job 
market. Despite these conditions, Botswana did not become embroiled in conflict.  
Theoretical Applications and Implications 
I undertook this project to test theory. Specifically, I wanted to know which 
factors are associated with the onset and endurance of conflicts involving natural 
resources. My case studies suggest that some factors are more important than others in 
fostering and promoting natural resource conflict. I summarize my primary substantive 
findings above. In closing, I would like to offer some final thoughts on the study of 
natural resource conflict. 
 One thing that my case studies make clear is that in some cases unique historical 
circumstances contribute to the onset and duration of natural resource conflict. While this 
finding makes formulating a general theory difficult, it is an accurate reflection of the 
Congolese experience.  
My data show that the 1996 and 1998 conflicts developed and continued because 
of unique historical circumstances in the Congo. In 1994, someone shot down a plane 
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carrying the Hutu presidents of Rwanda and Burundi. These assassinations triggered the 
Rwandan genocide. This genocide was the climax of tensions that stretched back 
hundreds of years. Colonial cleavages had only exacerbated these tensions. As Tutsi 
rebels took control of the Rwandan government, Hutus fled en masse to bordering Zaire. 
Among the refugees were men who had committed the genocide. Residing in camps 
along the Rwanda/Zaire border, Hutus began attacking Tutsi groups native to the Congo. 
The Hutu military apparatus was able to regroup in the camps, even controlling the 
behavior of other refugees in the camps. Mobutu offered no protection to the Tutsi from 
the Hutu. However, one Tutsi group, the Banyamulenge, retaliated with help from 
Rwanda and Uganda. The Banyamulenge‘s defensive campaign became an offensive 
campaign that ultimately overthrew the government of Zaire.  
Despite heavy involvement from Rwanda and Uganda, the Banyamulenge 
operation packaged itself as a rebel movement. A washed up Congolese rebel turned 
smuggler, Laurent Kabila was the front man for this campaign. Laurent Kabila rushed to 
take control of vital resource areas. Mobutu was unable to defend his country because his 
troops were undisciplined and disloyal. He had previously failed to pay his troops. He 
had also allowed the military to loot Congolese communities. Consequently, soldiers 
were undisciplined, even as Mobutu sought outside training for his soldiers.  
Scholars explain that rebel mobilization often occurs among the ranks of enlisted 
military. According to this thesis, enlisted soldiers compensate for low pay by 
moonlighting as rebels.  Mobutu‘s high-ranking officials and rank-and-file soldiers 
certainly resorted to pillaging and looting. However, their actions did not amount to 
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serious rebel mobilization, although they constructed road blocks, pillaged citizens, and 
looted resource sites.  
As Kabila attempted to consolidate power, the Congolese protested his regime. In 
addition to their outrage at gross human rights violations, they were angry that Kabila had 
placed so many Tutsis in positions of power. These Tutsis, some of them foreign, had 
formed the basis of Kabila‘s earlier ―rebel campaign.‖ In the background, tensions had 
already been brewing between Kabila and his ally Rwanda because Kabila refused to 
control Hutu activities in the refugee camps. Refugees had mounted attacks on Rwanda 
from the camps. Kabila aggravated this situation by expelling the Tutsi from the Congo. 
With help from Uganda and Rwanda, the Tutsis in the Congo retaliated.  However, 
Kabila was able to suppress them, but only with the aid of Namibia, Chad, Angola, and 
Zimbabwe. Just the same, Rwandan representatives maintained control of key resource 
areas in northeastern Congo. Uganda took control of the north and northwestern areas. A 
UN Panel of Experts concluded that factions from Rwanda and Uganda, especially their 
military leaders, had become aware of the Congo‘s resource potential during the initial 
incursion with Kabila. It was during those incursions that top-ranking military personnel 
from these countries began to establish financial and transportation networks to support 
resource exploitation.  
Operationalization  
 My case studies also show that future scholars of natural resource conflict might 
want to rethink how they operationalize key variables. First of all, the conflicts I studied 
here support the notion that battle-related deaths no longer sufficiently define the severity 
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of a civil war. My case studies show that civil wars increasingly involve civilian targets 
who become victims of personal insecurity, rape, and displacement. As such, quantifying 
the impact of war in terms of battle-related deaths cannot sufficiently portray the true 
nature of a civil war. In addition, the very notion of ―civil war‖ may need to be rethought 
by scholars of natural resource conflict. My case studies show that foreign occupiers 
often play major roles in what we tend to label ―civil wars.‖ For example, Rwanda and 
Uganda did not just sponsor ―rebels‖ inside the Congo. Both countries committed 
military personnel to the occupation and exploitation of the northern and eastern regions. 
Their occupation was certainly justified by the attacks from the Hutu camps. However, 
both countries robbed stockpiled resources, robbed banks, pillaged personal savings, 
controlled mining and agriculture, diverted resources to their home countries for export, 
and controlled local economies.  Third, many of the conflicts that we call natural resource 
conflicts may not actually be natural resource conflicts. For example, the Zaire-Congo 
conflicts I discuss here involved a range of political dynamics, including a political 
genocide. There is a risk of assigning natural resources too prominent a role in these 
conflicts. While scholars have debated the merits of case study analysis, my case studies 
have highlighted some of the operationalization problems present in a number of 
quantitative studies that examine the relationship between natural resources and conflict. 
Scholars have convincingly quantified a link between natural resources and civil war. 
However, the role of the resources themselves is over-determined in many of these 
studies.  This over-determination is reflected in terms such as ―natural resource conflict‖ 
and ―resource curse,‖ which appear frequently in this discourse. An abundance of natural 
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resources is one among many historical factors that draw resource-abundant, developing 
countries into civil war.  
Because of these operationalization problems scholars have found it difficult to 
establish causality between resource dependence and civil conflict. Zaire-Congo had 
depended heavily upon resources for over 30 years before the 1996 conflict occurred. 
Botswana had also depended heavily upon resources, but without violent conflict. In the 
other direction, conflict in Zaire-Congo seemed to only entrench the already existing 
resource dependence. I can even say that the Congo depended less on resources after 
these conflicts because other countries, especially Rwanda and Uganda, controlled and 
relied upon the Congo‘s export resources.  
The Way Forward/Future Study 
 The findings in this dissertation require that we step back from the generalizations 
falsified above because they are based on the assumption that the conflicts beginning in 
1996 and 1998 were about natural resources alone. Yes, we can say that conflicts around 
resources have taken place in the Congo.  However, a number of quantitative studies give 
limited weight to other political factors involved in these conflicts. For example, the 
initial onset of conflicts in the Congo in 1996 was as much about the misuse of 
humanitarian aid as it was about natural resources. In failing to account for the full range 
of factors that contribute to civil war, findings on the role of natural resources in conflict 
have been misleading. It is not surprising then that scholars have struggled to establish 
causality for these conflicts.  
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This dissertation also suggests that we should reexamine conflicts in other parts of 
the world involving natural resources, paying special attention to the difference between 
inter-state and intra-state wars. The conflicts in the Congo have been called civil wars. 
This label has led to over-deterministic explanations. In the first Congo conflicts, internal 
grievances (Collier and Hoeffler, 2001) played a role in fostering conflict. However, 
these grievances did not sustain the conflict. Greed and outside intervention sustained 
these conflicts up to the point where Mobutu was overthrown. The triggering 
Banyamulenge offensive/defensive constituted a civil conflict. When Rwanda and 
Uganda intervened, these disputes morphed into interstate war. Also, as Hironaka 
(2005:6) explains, there is a ―bias in the international systems against territorial 
reshuffling.‖ International norms and laws support this bias. The literature on the role of 
resources in conflict also supports this bias. This discourse often portrays challenges to a 
state by other states as components of civil war, when much broader phenomena are 
taking place. The 1998 war occurred as a result of Rwanda‘s self-defense, Rwanda‘s and 
Uganda‘s greed, and Rwanda‘s grievances over the way Congolese were treating Tutsi‘s 
inside Congo.  
Botswana 
 One of the reasons I chose Botswana as a case study is that it represents a 
relatively successful case of development in sub-Saharan Africa. However, in the last few 
chapters I have largely glossed over the lessons we can learn from Botswana. In 
conclusion, I will examine some of these lessons. 
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 Botswana is a powerful case that demonstrates natural resources can serve an 
African country well. Botswana went into independence in the unique position of 
controlling its own wealth. It was able to do so because the British were not aware of 
Botswana‘s vast wealth during the colonial period. Still, the state founders carefully laid 
the groundwork that allowed the state to benefit from every stage of the mining process. 
Also, the founders were willing to walk away from negotiations if companies would not 
agree to the state‘s terms. In addition, the country enlisted the help of the London Police 
to institute anti-corruption measures. Also, the incomes policy attempted to limit the 
amount of money people could make off the state. Most importantly, such measures 
helped shape the attitude that the state would not be a source of personal wealth.  
Despite its relative successes, Botswana grappled with a number of deeply–rooted 
problems over the years. First, there has always been a huge wealth gap in the country, 
particularly between the urban and rural populations. The limited capacity of the mining 
sector exacerbated this wealth gap. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the mining sector 
employed only six percent of the population. Despite this low capacity, Botswana 
officials were less committed to the development of other sectors. Also, expatriates 
played a disproportionately large role in this sector because most Batswana were 
undereducated for key positions. In addition, the Batswana work force (as with other 
aspects of society) was in a state of attrition in the late 1990s because of the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic.  
Botswana also grappled with concerns from its minority populations about 
second-class status. Eight major tribes are explicitly mentioned in the constitution, 
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suggesting their prominence in Batswana society. Minor tribes were concerned about a 
loss or subversion of their tribal identities as Tswana was the ―official‖ identity in 
Botswana. Despite these concerns, Botswana maintained a peaceful society.  
Through the 1990s, Botswana was de facto a single-party regime. The Botswana 
Democratic Party was the only viable party in a multi-party system. The first serious 
challenge to its authority did not occur until 1994. On the whole, however, Botswana‘s 
public officials enjoyed a great deal of legitimacy. How was this possible? First, the 
founders played upon Botswana‘s pre-colonial experiences with democracy. By invoking 
the history of a tribal public meeting, the leaders were suggesting that the people had 
direct input into government decision-making. However, national officials did not usually 
seek meaningful input from these meetings. They used these forums to report the news. 
These public meetings also helped maintain the prestige of the tribal chiefs, even in the 
face of an increasingly modernizing society. The chiefs‘ presence and input also helped 
legitimize the national government‘s positions. Second, the government decided early on 
to support the cattle-owning elite at the behest of the agricultural sector. Both sectors 
were difficult and impractical to maintain because of drought. Since a number of 
Batswana were tied into the cattle market, even if in non-profitable way, public policies 
that supported the agendas of the cattle-owning elite were seen as supporting the society 
at large. In addition, Botswana gradually asserted itself as a regional leader, being careful 
not to seem too combative with its more powerful neighbor, South Africa. Botswana was 
the product of a number of contradictions. However, these contradictions allowed the 
country to move development indicators in a positive direction. 
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The Botswana case, with all its contradictions, presents somewhat of a challenge 
to public policy prescriptions for conflict prevention. This case suggests that positive 
development can take place even among a number of characteristics that we associate 
with state weakness. By closely aligning elite interests with the traditional interests of the 
people, states officials were able to maintain a sense of satisfaction internally. Externally, 
Botswana limited its involvement in the security issues of other countries, while being 
careful to protect its own border. Again, Botswana, unlike the Congo and most post-
colonial countries, was able to control its internal and external politics because of the 
absence of control by a former ―mother‖ country.  
Since Botswana asserts direct control over its resources, the Botswana case 
suggests room for further study of companies that operate in Botswana under a number of 
restrictions but play by a different set of rules in other countries. Botswana would serve 
well as a control case for a number of studies on the developing world and African 























Africa Energy & Mining. January 8, 1997. ―Rebels Knock on OKIMO‘s Door.‖ Sections:  
Mining; Zaire; No 196. 
 
Afro barometer. 1999-2001. Core Partners: Center for Democratic Development (CDD- 
Ghana), The Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA), and Institute for 
Empirical Research in Political Economy, IREEP. 
 
Alao, Abiodun and ‗Funmi Olonisakan. Winter 2000. ―Economic Fragility and Political  
Fluidity: Explaining Natural Resources and Conflicts.‖ International  
Peacekeeping. Vol 7 No 4 Pp.23-36.  
  
Almquist, Alden. 1994. ―The Society and Its Environment.‖ In Zaire: A Country Study.  
Sandra W. Meditz and Tim Merrill (eds.) Federal Research Division, Library of 
Congress. Pp.61-131.  
 
American Museum of Natural History. Downloaded June 4, 2008. ―The Nature of  
Diamonds: The Types of Diamond Deposits.‖ 
http://www.amnh.org/exhibitions/diamonds/types.html.  
 
Amnesty International. December, 19, 1996. ―Hidden from Scrutiny: Human Rights  
Abuses in Eastern Zaire.‖  
 
Angstrom, Jan. Autumn 2001. ―Towards a Typology of Internal Armed Conflict:  
Synthesizing a Decade of Conceptual Turmoil.‖ Civil Wars. Vol 4 No 3 Pp.93-  
116.  
 
Ashcroft, John. September 24, 2002. Remarks at AUC Indictment Press Conference:  
United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). Washington, DC.  
 
Auty, Richard. Winter 2004. ―Natural Resources and Civil Strife: A Two-Stage Process.‖  
Geopolitics. Vol 9 No 1 Pp.29-49.  
  
Ayittey, George B.N. 2005. Africa Unchained: The Blueprint for Africa’s Future.  
Palgrave: New York, NY.  
  
Ascher, William. 1999. Why Governments Waste Natural Resources: Policy Failures in  
Developing Countries. Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore, MD.  
 
Balazik, Ronald. 1998. ―Gemstones.‖ US Geological Survey.  
 




Banks, Glenn. 2005. ―Resources and Conflict in the Asia Pacific Region: Linking  
Resources and Conflict the Melanesian Way.‖ Pacific Economic Bulletin. Vol 20 
No 1 Pp.185-191.  
 
Barker, Greg (writer, producer, and director). April 1, 2004. Ghosts of Rwanda. Public  
Broadcasting Company, the British Broadcasting Corporation, and Silverbridge 
Production, Limited. Frontline. WGBH: Boston, MA.  
 
Battersby, John. May 5, 1993. ―Mobutu‘s Intransigence Frustrates Zaire Reformers.‖  
Christian Science Monitor.  
 
Battersby, John. September 21, 1994. ―Striving for Links After Decades of Hostility.‖  
ProQuest Historical Newspapers (1908 – Current file), Christian Science Monitor, 
p.8.  
 
Bedford, Eleanor. June 10, 1997. ―USCR Site Visit Notes (excerpts, part 1): Site Visit to  
Eastern Congo/Zaire: Analysis of Humanitarian and Political Issues, April 10 to 
May 10, 1997.‖ US Committee for Refugees. 
 
Bogetic, Zelijko and Johannes W. Fedderke. August 2006. ―International  
Benchmarking of Infrastructure Performance in the Southern African Customs 
Union Countries.‖ World Bank Policy Research Paper 3987. Pp.32-39.  
 
Bollag, Burton. September 6, 1989. ―UN Critical of IMF Austerity Plan.‖ Special Report  
to the New York Times. 
 
Bonner, Raymond and Howard French. May 19, 1997. ―Rebel Army Captures Zaire in T- 
Shirts and Tennis Shoes.‖ ProQuest, New York Times (1851-2005), p.A1.  
 
Bonner, Raymond. July 17, 1997. ―Westerners Angle for Mining Stakes in Congo.‖  
ProQuest, New York Times (1851-2005), International Business Section, p.D4.  
 
Botswana Constitution, Chapter 1, Chapter 78. 
  
Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis. March 1999. BIDPA Special  
Briefing: ―The 1999 Botswana Budget.‖ No 2.  
 
Buckley, Stephen. November 2, 1996. ―Rwandan Army Captures Refugee-Filled Zairian  
Town, Thousands of Hutus Flee Joint Tutsi Attack.‖ The Washington Post. p.A01.   
 
Buhaug, Halvard and Paivi Lujala. 2005. ―Accounting for Scale: Measuring Geography  




Buhaug, Halvard and Scott Gates. 2002. ―The Geography of Civil War.‖  
Journal of Peace Research. Vol 39 No 4 Pp.417-433.  
 
Business Week. Accessed January 8, 2009. ―Metals and Mining: Company Overview.‖ 




Buthali, Dabilani: Botswana Central Statistics Office. May 7-9, 1997. ―Poverty  
Measurement in Botswana.‖ Presented at the Seminar on Poverty Statistics in 
Santiago.  
 
Caprioli, Mary. 2004. ―Democracy and Human Rights Versus Women‘s Security: A 
Contradiction?‖ Security Dialogue: Special Issue on Gender and Security. Vol 35 
No 4 Pp.411-428. 
 
Carroll, Terrance and Barbara Wake Carroll. November 2004. ―The Rapid  
Emergence of Civil Society in Botswana.‖ Commonwealth and Comparative 
Politics. Vol 42 No 3 Pp.333-355.  
 
Cater, Charles. 2003. ―The Political Economy of Conflict and UN Intervention:  
Rethinking the Critical Cases of Africa.‖ In Karen Ballentine and J. Sherman 
(eds). The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance. 
Lynne, Rienner: Boulder, CO. Pp.19-45.  
 
Cincotta, Richard P., Robert Engelman and Danielle Anastasion. 2003. ―The Security  
Demographic: Population and Civil Conflict after the Cold War.‖ Population  
Action International: Washington, DC. www.populationaction.org.  
 
Chavez, Rebecca Bill. July 2003. ―The Construction of Rule of Law of Argentina: A Tale  
of Two Provinces.‖ Comparative Politics. Vol 35 No 4 Pp.417-437.  
  
CNN. October 13, 1996. ―Zaire Refugee Camps Site of New Ethnic Killing.‖  
 
Coakley, George J. 1997. US Geological Survey. Minerals Commodity Survey.  
 
Coakley, George J. 1996. US Geological Survey. Minerals Commodity Survey.  
 
Coakley, George J. 1995. US Geological Survey.  Minerals Commodity Survey. 
 





Collier, Paul, Anke Hoeffler and Mans Soderbom. 2004. ―On the Duration of War.‖  
Journal of Peace Research. Vol 41 No 3 Pp.253-273.  
 
Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. 2004. ―Greed and Grievance in Civil War.‖ Oxford  
Economic Papers. 56 (563-595).  
 
Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. February 17, 1999 draft. ―Justice-Seeking and Loot-  
Seeking in Civil War.‖ Available through the World Bank.  
  
Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. Revised January 1998. ―On Economic Causes of  
War.‖ Oxford Economic Papers. 50, Pp.563-73.  
 
―Congo Business Shake Down.‖ June 22, 1997. ProQuest, New York Times (1851-2003),  
p.3.  
 
Crossette, Barbara. March 31, 1996. ―Rising Variety of Groups Vie for Attention  
at UN Rights Forum.‖ ProQuest Historical Newspapers, The New York Times 
(1857 – 2005), p.8.  
 
Corporate Social Responsibility Newswire. July 10, 2000. ―The Bill & Melinda  
Gates Foundation, Merck & Co., Inc., and The Republic of Botswana Launch 
New HIV Initiative.‖ http://www.csrwire.com/News/257.html .  
 
Daley, Suzanne. September 23, 1998. ―Tiny Neighbor Gives South African Army  
Rude Surprise.‖ ProQuest Historical Newspapers, The New York Times (1857 – 
2005), p.A3.  
 
Daley, Suzanne (a). July 8, 1996. ―Few Want Stocks: Now Livestock, That‘s Different.‖  
ProQuest Historical Newspapers, The New York Times (1857 – 2005), p.A4.  
 
Daley, Suzanne (b). July 14, 1996. ―Botswana Pressing Bushmen to Leave Reserve.‖  
ProQuest Historical Newspapers, The New York Times (1857 – 2005), p.3. 
 
Dakar PANA. November 9, 1987. ―Stringent Measures for Illegal Immigrants.‖  
Published in Daily Report. Foreign Bureau of Information Services: FBIS-AFR-
87-217 on  p.4. Headings: Botswana, Southern Africa. 
 
Day, Kirpatrick and Paula Ghedini. October 1, 1996. ―Another Forced Exodus.‖ The  




Debroux, L., Hart, T., Kaimowitz, D., Karsenty, A. and Topa, G. (Eds.) 2007 Forests in  
Post-Conflict Democratic Republic of Congo: Analysis of a Priority Agenda. A 
joint report by teams of the World Bank, Center for International Forestry 
Research (CIFOR), Centre International de Recherche Agronomique pour le 
Développement (CIRAD), African Wildlife Foundation (AWF), Conseil National 
des ONG de Développement du Congo (CNONGD), Conservation International 
(CI), Groupe de Travail Forêts (GTF), Ligue Nationale des Pygmées du 
Congo (LINAPYCO), Netherlands Development Organisation (SNV), Réseau des 
Partenaires pour l‘Environnement au Congo (REPEC), Wildlife Conservation 
Society (WCS), Woods Hole Research Center (WHRC), World Agroforestry 
Centre (ICRAF) and World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF). xxii, 82p. ISBN 979-
24-4665-6  
 
Dietrich, Christian. 2002. ―The Criminalized Diamond Economy of the Democratic  
Republic of the Congo and its Neighbors.‖ Occasional Paper #4. Partnership 
Africa Canada. International Peace Information Service Network Movement for 
Justice and Development. Series Editor: Ian Smillie 
 
Delechat, Corinne and Matthew Gaertner. March 2008. ―Exchange Rate in a  
Resource-Dependent Economy: The Case of Botswana.‖ Authorized for 
distribution by Emilio Sacerdoti. IMF Working Paper: WP/08/83.  
 
Denbow, James and Phenyo C. Thebe. 2006. Culture and Customs of Botswana.  
Greenwood Press: Westport, CT.  
 
DeRouen, Karl R. and David Sobek. 2004. ―The Dynamics of Civil War Duration and  
Outcome.‖ Journal of Peace Research. Vol 41 No 3 Pp.303-320.  
  
de Soysa, Indra, 2002(a). ―Ecoviolence: Shrinking Pie or Honey Pot?‖ Global  
Environmental Politics. Vol 2 No 4 Pp.1–34. 
 
de Soysa, Indra, 2002(b). ―Paradise Is a Bazaar? Greed, Creed, and Governance in Civil  
War, 1989–99.‖ Journal of Peace Research. Vol 39 No 4 Pp.395-416.  
 
Diesling, Paul. 1991. How Does Social Science Work? Reflections on Practice.  
University of Pittsburgh Press: Pittsburgh, PA. 
  
Dion, Douglas. January 1998. ―Evidence and Inference in the Comparative Case Study.‖  
Comparative Politics. Vol 30 No 2 Pp.127-143.  
  
Dunning, Thad. August 2005. ―Resource Dependence, Economic Performance, and  




Dunning, Thad and Leslie Wirpsa. 2004. ―Oil and the Political Economy of Conflict in  
Colombia and Beyond: A linkages Approach.‖ in The Geopolitics of Resource 
Wars. Phillipe Le Billion (ed). Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group: UK.  
 
Duva, Anjali Mitter. 2007. ―Indonesia: After the Wave, Aceh‘s Road to  
Peace and Autonomy.‖ Frontline World Series. Public Broadcasting  
Company.  
 
Eckstein, Harry. 1975. ―Case Study and Theory in Political Science‖ in  
Handbook of Political Science, Vol 7. Strategies of Inquiry. Fred J. Greenstein 
and Nelson W. Polsby (eds). Addison-Wesley. Reading, MA. Pp.116-118,  
  
Elbadawi, Ibrahim and Nicholas Sambanis. 2002.‖How Much War Will We See?  
Explaining the Prevalence of Civil War.‖ Journal of Conflict Resolution. Vol 46 
 No 3 Pp.307-334. 
 
Erlanger, Steven. August 5, 1998: August 4, 1998 – Congo. ―US Sees Rwandan Role in  
Congo Revolt.‖ New York Times, p.A8.  
 
Executive Board of UN Development Program and the UN Population Fund.  
September 15-19, 1997. Third Regular Session. Reported June 23, 1997. 
DP/CCF/BOT/1.  
 
European Commission. November 4, 2001. ―Communication from the Commission on  
Conflict Prevention.‖ Com(2001) 211 final. Brussels.  
 
Fearon, James and David Laitin. February 2003. ―Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War.‖  
American Political Science Review. Vol 97 No 1 Pp.75-91.  
  
Fearon, James. 2005. ―Primary Commodity Exports and Civil War.‖ Journal of Conflict  
Resolution. Vol 49 No 4 Pp.483-507.  
  
Fearon, James D. 2004. ―Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others?‖  
Journal of Peace Research. Vol 41 No 3 Pp.275-301.  
  
Firmin-Seller, Kathryn. April 2000. ―Institutions, Context and Outcomes: Explaining  
French and British Policy in West Africa.‖ Comparative Politics. Vol 32 No 3 
Pp.255-272.  
  
Fisher, Ian. August 4, 1999: July 30, 1999 – Congo. ―Brutal Bands of Rwandans Bar  




Fisher, Ian. January 1, 1999. ―For Rebels in Congo, Popularity is Elusive.‖ New York  
Times, p.A8.  
 
Fisher, Ian. December 25, 1998. ―Where War is Forever, the Diamonds are Cheap.‖ New  
York Times, p.A4.  
 
Fisher, Ian. December 21, 1998: Reporting on Minerals, December 17, 1998 – Congo.  
―Uganda‘s Helping Hand to Congo Rebels Raises Questions About Motives.‖ 
New York Times, p.A8.  
 
Flintoff, Corey. July 22, 2008. ―Karadzic: War Criminal or Nationalist Hero?‖ National  
Public Radio.  
 
French, Howard. August 5, 1998: August 4, 1998 – Abidjan, Ivory Coast. ―Congo  
Replay.‖ New York Times, p.A1 
.  
French, Howard. November 20, 1997: November 18, 1997 – Congo. ― Though Mobutu is  
Buried, Corruption Dies Hard.‖ New York Times,  p.A3.  
 
French, Howard. September 18, 1996. ―Zaire Struggles to Keep Neglected Region in  
Fold.‖ New York Times. 
  
Gaborone Daily News. April 20, 1990. ―Accelerated Economic Diversification  
Needed.‖  p.4 Foreign Bureau Information Service: FBIS-AFR-90-122-S p.83. 
June 15, 1990. Heading: Botswana.  
Gaborone Domestic Service. July 21, 1988. ―SADCC Study Highlights Growing  
Economy.‖ Published in Daily Report on July 26, 1988. Foreign Bureau of  
Information Services: FBIS-AFR-88-143. p.6.  
 
Gaborone Domestic Service. July 11, 1989. ―Foreign Reserves Increase by $102  
Million.‖ Published in Daily Report on July 12, 1989. p.29. Foreign Bureau of 
Information Service: FBIS-AFR-89-132.  
 
Gaborone Domestic Service. January 24, 1986. ―Sanction Threats ‗Ominous‘.‖  
Published in Daily Report. Foreign Bureau of Information Services: FBIS-MEA-
86-019 on January 29, 1986. p.U2.  
 
Geddes, Barbara. 1990. ―How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get:  




Gberie, Lansana. October 2001. ―Destabilizing Guinea: Diamonds, Charles Taylor, and  
the Potential for Wider Humanitarian Catastrophe.‖ An occasional paper by  
Partnership Africa-Canada.  
 
George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett. 2005. ―Case Studies and Theory  
Development‖ in Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. 
George and Bennett (eds). MIT Press: Cambridge, MA Pp.3-36 
 
Gereffi, Gary, Ronie Garcia-Johnson and Erika Sasser. July-August 2001. ―The New  
NGO-Industrial Complex.‖ Foreign Policy. Issue 119 Pp.56-65.  
 
Global Insight, Economic Risk and World Market Analysis. 2006. Republic of Botswana  
and Republic of Congo. http://www.globalinsight.com.  
 
Global Witness. 2004. ―Same Old Story: A Background Study on Natural Resources in  
the Democratic Republic of the Congo.‖ Global Witness Publishing: Washington, 
DC.  
 
Goldstone, Jack A. Fall 2002. ―Population and Security: How Demographic Change Can  
Lead to Violent Conflict.‖ Journal of International Affairs. Vol 56 No 1  
Pp.3-21.  
 
Guevara, Ernesto Che. 1999 – 1
st
 American Edition. The African Dream. Sperling and  
Kupfer (eds). 1999. Originally published as Revolucionaria: Congo.  
 
Gramot, Sanche de. October 3, 1964. ―Tshombe in Wonderland.‖ Saturday Evening Post.  
Vol 237 Issue 34 Pp.83-91. 
 
Hardin, Garrett. 1968. ―The Tragedy of the Commons.‖ Science. Vol 162 No 13 
Pp.1243-1248.  
  
Hegre, Havard. 2004. ―The Duration and Termination of Civil War.‖ Journal of Peace  
Research. Vol 41 No 3 Pp.243-252.  
  
Hegre, Havard. June 2004. ―Size Asymmetry, Trade, and Militarized Conflict.‖ Journal  
of Conflict Resolution. Vol 48 No 3 Pp.403-429.  
  
Hegre, Havard. 2002. ―Some Social Requisites of a Democratic Civil Peace: Democracy,  
Development, and Armed Conflict.‖ presented at the Annual Meeting of the  
American Political Science Association. Available through the World Bank.  
  
Hempel, Carl Gustav. 1965. Aspects of Scientific Explanation. Free Press: New  
York, NY.  
233 
 
Henk, Dan. 2004. ―The Botswana Defense Force: Evolution of a Professional  
African Military.‖ African Security Review. Vol 13 No 4. 
 
Herbst, Jeffrey. 2004. ―African Militaries and Rebellion: The Political Economy of  
Threat and Combat Effectiveness.‖ Journal of Peace Research. Vol 41 No 3  
Pp.357-369.  
 
Hochschild, Adam. 1999. King Leopold’s Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and  
Heroism in Colonial Africa. First Mariner Books Edition.  Original Publication – 
1998. Houghton Mifflin: New York, NY.  
 
Hope, Kempe Ronald, Sr. 1997. African Political Economy: Contemporary Issues in  
Development. M.E. Sharpe: Armonk, NY.  
 
Human Rights Watch. 1999. ―The Democratic Republic of the Congo: Human Rights  
Development.‖  
  
Human Rights Watch. February 1999. ―Democratic Republic of Congo Casualties of  
War: Civilians, Rule of Law, and Democratic Freedoms.‖ Vol 11 No1(A). See: 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/congo/.  
 
Human Rights Watch. January 1, 1994. ―Human Rights Watch World Report: Zaire.‖  
Online. UNHCR Refworld available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/467fca7d5.html  [accessed 6 January 2009].  
  
Human Rights Watch. January 1, 1993. ―Human Rights Watch World Report 1993:  
Zaire.‖ Online. UNHCR Refworld, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/467fca62c.html  [accessed 9 January 2009]. 
 
Humphreys, McCartan. August 2005. ―Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict  
Resolution: Uncovering the Mechanisms.‖ Journal of Conflict Resolution. Vol 49  
No 4 Pp.508-537.  
  
Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel. 2005. Modernization, Cultural Change and  
Democracy: the Human Development Sequence. Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge, MA.  
 
International Labor Organization. May 17-2, 1999. ―Social and Labor Issues in Small- 
Scale Mines.‖ Report for discussion at the Tripartite Meeting on Social Labor 




Isham, Jonathan, Lant Pritchett, Michael Woolcock, and Gwen Busby. March 15, 2002  
draft of an earlier version prepared for UN/WIDER. ―Varieties of Rentier  
Experience: How Natural Resource Export Structures Affect the Political 
Economy of Economic Growth.‖  
 
JB. December 28, 1992. ―Unity Pact Over Persistent Tension.‖-Bulawayo, Zimbabwe.  
ProQuest Historical Newspapers (1908 – Current file), Christian Science Monitor, 
p.11.  
 
Johannesburg SAPA. September 29, 1987. ―Reserve Bank Reports ‗Healthy Economy‘.‖  
Published in Daily Report. Foreign Bureau of Information Service: FBIS-AFR- 
87-189 on September 30, 1987. Headings: Botswana, Southern Africa.  
 
Johannesburg International Service. June 27, 1985. ―Relations with RSA at Freezing  
Point.‖ Published in Daily Report, Middle East and Africa. Foreign Bureau of 
Information Services: FBIS-MEA-85-125 on June 28, 1985. Page U1. Headings: 
Botswana, Southern Africa. 
Johannesburg International Service. May 7, 1982. ―Currency Devaluation,  
Deflationary Measures Cited.‖ Published in Daily Report, Middle East and 
Africa. Foreign Bureau Information Service: FBIS-MEA-82-097 on May 19, 
1982. p.U2, headline: Botswana. 
Johannesburg International Service. August 8, 1982. ―Stockpiled Diamonds Until  
Conditions  Improve.‖ Published in Daily Report, Middle East and Africa. 
Foreign Bureau Information Service: FBIS-MEA-82-155 on August 11, 1982. 
p.U4, headline: Botswana. 
Karl, Terry Lynn. 1997. The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro- 
states. University of California Press: Berkley, CA.  
  
Keen, David. 2001. ―War and Peace: What‘s the Difference?‖ International  
Peacekeeping. Vol 7 No 4 Pp.1-22.  
 
Keppel, David. May 18, 1997. ―US Hasn‘t Stopped Assaulting Other Cultures.‖ Proquest,  
New York Times (1851-2005), p.E16. 
 
Khama, Sir Seretse. 1971. ―Africa and America: The Seventies.‖ Delivered to the Third  
Annual Conference of the Africana-American Dialogues: Lagos, Nigeria. Vital 




Kiakwama, Gilbert and Jerome Chevallier. 2001. ―Democratic Republic of Congo.‖ In  
Aid and Reform in Africa: Lessons from Ten Case Studies. Shantayanan 
Devarajan, David Dollar, and Torgny Homgren (eds.). The World Bank: 
Washington, D.C. Pp.629-643. 
 
King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sydney Verba. 1994. Designing Social Inquiry:  
Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton University Press: 
Princeton, NJ.  
 Kisangi, Emizet F. September 2003. ―Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A  
Mosaic of Insurgent Groups.‖ International Journal of World Peace. Vol 20 No 3 
Pp.51-80.  
  
Klare, Michael T. May/June 2001. ―The New Geography of Conflict.‖ Foreign Affairs.  
Pp.49-61.  
  
Kuhn, Thomas 1962. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. University of Chicago  
Press: Chicago, IL.  
 
LeBillion, Phillipe. 2003. ―Getting it Done: Instruments of Enforcement‖ In  
Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions. Ian Bannon and 
Paul Collier (eds). World Bank: Washington, DC. Pp.215-286.  
 
Le Billon, Philippe. 2001(a). ―Angola‘s Political Economy of War: The Role of Oil and 
Diamonds 1975–2000.‖ African Affairs. Vol 100 No 398 Pp.55-80.  
 
Le Billon, Philippe.  2001(b). ―The Political Ecology of War: Natural Resources and  
Armed Conflicts.‖ Political Geography Vol 20 No 5 Pp.561–584. 
 
Lloyd, Antonides and Phillip Mobbs. 1994. ―The Mineral Industry of Botswana.‖  
US Geological Survey.  
 
Love, Roy. March 1994. ―Drought, Dutch Disease, and Controlled Transition in  
Botswana.‖ Journal of Southern African Studies. Vol 20 Issue 1 Pp.71-83.  
 
Luong, Pauline Jones and Erika Weinthal. May 2001. ―Prelude to the Resource Curse:  
Explaining Oil and Gas Development, Strategies in the Soviet Successor States 
and Beyond.‖ Comparative Political Studies. Vol 32 No 4  Pp.367-399.  
  
Mahoney, James and Gary Goertz. November 2004. ―The Possibility Principle:  
Choosing Negative Cases in Qualitative Research.‖ American Political Science 




Malebeswa, Tendekani E. 2002. ―Civil Control of the Military in Botswana.‖ In  
Ourselves to Know: Civil-Military Relations and Defence Transformation in 
Southern Africa, Pg. 67-80. Rocky Williams, Gavin Cawthra, and Diane 
Abrahams (eds). Institute for Security Studies: Pretoria, South Africa.  
 
Malone, David M. and Heiko Nitzschke. April 2005. ―Economic Agendas in Civil Wars:  
What we Know, What we Need to Know.‖ Discussion Paper No. 2005/07. United  
Nations University – World Institute for Development Economics Research 
(WIDER).  
  
Masire, Quett. 2007. Very Brave or Very Foolish? Memoirs of an African  
Democrat. Stephen R. Lewis, Jr. (ed). Macmillan Botswana Publishing Company 
(Pty) Ltd.: Gaborone, Botswana.  
 
Maudeni, Zibani, Dorothy Mpabanga, Adam Mfundisi, and David  
Sebudubudu. ―Consolidating Democratic Governance in Southern Africa: 
Botswana.‖ Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA): Johannesburg, South 
Africa, EISA Research Report, No 31.  
 
McKeown, Timothy J. Winter 1999. ―Review of Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific  
Inference in Qualitative Research by Gary King; Robert O. Keohane; Sydney  
Verba.‖ International Organization. Vol 53 No 1 Pp.161-190.  
  
McKinley, James C. May 18, 1997. ―Zairian Rebel and His Plan Puzzle the West.‖  
ProQuest, New York Times (1851-2005), p.1.  
 
McKinley, James C., Jr. October 26, 1997. ―Terror Reigns in Uganda Border Zone.‖ New  
York Times. 
 
McNeil, Donald, Jr. July, 12, 1999. ―Not Quite a Triumph in Congo.‖ ProQuest, New  
York Times (1851-2005), p.A9.  
 
Meditz, Sandra W. and Tim Merrill. 1994. Zaire: A Country Study. Sandra Meditz and  
Tim Merrill (eds). Federal Research Division, Library of Congress: Washington,  
DC. Pp.137-199.  
 
Ministry of Mines, Democratic Republic of Congo. June 2003. ―Guide to Mining  
Investor.‖  
  




Modisi, Mogolori. 1997. ―Civil Service Reform in Botswana Since the 1980s:  
Lessons of Experience.” In Civil Service Reform in Francophone Africa. 
Adamolekun, Lapido; Guy de Lusignan, and Armand Atomate (eds). Pp.53-67. 
World Bank Technical Paper Number 357. African Regional Series. The World 
Bank: Washington, DC.  
  
Mokoli, Mondonga and Hans P. Binswanger. September 21, 1998. ―Prerequisites for a  
Development-Oriented State in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.‖ World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper No 2018.  
 
Moore, Barrington. 1966. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and  
Peasant in the Making of the Modern World. Beacon Press: Boston, MA.  
 
Moyroud, Celine and John Kautunga. 2002. ―Coltan Exploration in Eastern Democratic  
Republic of the Congo (DRC).‖ In Scarcity and Surfeit: The Ecology of Africa’s 
Conflicts. Jeremy Lind and Kathryn Sturman (eds). African Center for 
Technological Studies and Institute for Security Studies: Pretoria, SA. Pp.157-
185.  
 
Mungazi, Dickson A. 2005. We Shall Not Fail: Values in the National Leadership of  
Seretse Khama, Nelson Mandela, and Julius Nyerere. Africa World Press: 
Trenton, NJ.  
 
Mutume, Gumisai. October 2004. ―Against the Odds Africa Strives to Rebuild its  
Domestic Industries: Economic Diversification to Guard against Unfavourable 
Commodity Prices.‖ Africa Renewal. Vol 18 No 3 Pp.1. United Nations: New 
York, NY.  
 
N‘Diaye, Boubacar. 2001. The Challenge of Institutionalizing Civilian Control:  
Botswana, Ivory Coast, and Kenya in Comparative Perspective. Lexington 
Books: Lanham, MD.  
 
New Pittsburgh Courier (City Edition). May 13, 2000. Vol 91 Issue 39 p.A2.  
 
New Pittsburgh Courier (City Edition). February 12, 2000. Vol 91 Issue 13 p.A2.  
 
New Pittsburgh Courier (City Edition). August 14, 1999. Vol 90 Issue 65 p.A2.  
 
New York Times. September 1, 1999. ―Congo Rebels Finally Sign an Accord but Real  
Peace is Still Distant.‖ p.A4.  
 





New York Times. July 28, 1998: July 28, 1998 - Congo. ―Congo Says Foreigners Have to  
Quit its Army.‖ p.A5.  
  
New York Times. May 25, 1997: May 24, 1997 – Kinshasa. ―Troops in Congo Break up  
Anti-Kabila Protests.‖ ProQuest, New York Times (1851-2005), p.8.  
 
New York Times. April 15, 1994. ―Dissidents Slay Deputy Premier of Lesotho.‖  
ProQuest Historical Newspapers, The New York Times (1857-2005), p.A10.  
 
Nichiporuk, Brian. 2000. The Security Dynamics of Demographic Factors. Rand  
Corporation. Report #MR-1088-WFHF/RF/DLPF/A: ISBN: 0-8330-2780-8.  
  
Niemann, Michael. 1993. ―Diamonds are a State‘s Best Friend: Botswana‘s Foreign  
Policy in Southern Africa.‖ Africa Today. Vol 40 Issue 1 p.27, 21p.  
 
Noble, Kenneth B. March 31, 1993. ―Tens of Thousands Flee Ethnic Violence in Zaire.‖  
New York Times.  
  
Noble, Kenneth. April 14, 1990. ―Simple Request by Zaire's Leader Spurs Troubling  
Torrent by Critics.‖ Special Report to New York Times.  
 
Norwegian Refugee Council – Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. August 2002.  
―Dual Land System and Resources Like Coltan Have Increased Tensions in 
Eastern DRC.‖ Property Issues Section.  
 
Nyamnjoh, Francis B. 2006. Insiders and Outsiders: Citizenship and Xenophobia in  
Contemporary South Africa. Zed Books: London, UK. 
 
Nye, Joseph S., Jr. and John Donahue. 2000. ―Introduction.‖ In Governance in a  
Globalizing World, Joseph S Nye, Jr. and John Donahue (eds). Brookings 
Institution Press: Washington, D.C. Pp.1-41. 
 
Olsson, Ola and Heather Congdon Fors. 2004. ―Congo: The Prize of Predation.‖ Journal  
of Peace Research. Vol 41 No 3 Pp.321-336.  
  
Onishi, Norimitsu. July 19, 1999: July 18, 1999 - Congo. ―The Guns of Africa.‖  
ProQuest, New York Times (1851-2005), p.A8. 
 
Paris AFP. October 14, 1974. ―Government to Increase Share in Diamond Mine.‖  
Published in Daily Report, Sub-Saharan Africa. Foreign Bureau of Information 
Services: FBIS-SSA-74-139 on October 16, 1974, p.E1, headings: Botswana, 




Pegg, Scott. Autumn 2003. ―Globalization and Natural Resource Conflicts.‖ Naval War  
College Review. Vol LVL No 4.  
  
Perlez, Jane. August 2, 1994. ―Return of Refugees to Rwanda Slows, Frustrating  
UN.‖ The New York Times.  
 
Peters, Pauline.1994. Dividing the Commons: Politics Policy and Culture in Botswana.  
University of Virginia Press: Charlottesville, VA.  
Pomfret, John. July 9, 1997. ―Rwandans Led Revolt: Defense Minister Says Arms,  
Troops Supplied for Anti-Mobutu Drive.‖ Washington Post, p.A10.  
 
Popper, Karl. 1968. The Logic of Scientific Discovery. New York: Harper and Row.  
  
Przeworski, Adam and Henry Teune. 1970. The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry. 
Wiley: New York, NY. 
 
Rabasa, Angel; Steven Boraz; Peter Chalk; Kim Cragin; Theodore Karasik;  
Jennifer Moroney; Kevin O‘Brien; and John Peters. 2007. Ungoverned 
Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks. Prepared for the 
United States Air Force. Rand Corporation: Santa Monica, CA.  
 
 Reed, Cyrus. 1998. ―Guerrillas in the Midst.‖ In African Guerillas, Christopher Clapham  
(ed). Indiana Press: Bloomington, IN. Pp.134-154.  
 
Reno, William. 1998. Warlord Politics and the African State. Lynne Rienner  
Publishers: Boulder, CO.  
 
Reno, William. November 1997. ―Sovereignty and Personal Rule in Zaire.‖ African  
Studies Quarterly. Vol 1 No 3. on-line at www.clas.ufl.edu/africa/asq. 
 
Republic of Botswana. Mines and Mineral Act of 1967, amended in 1976 and  
1977. 
 
Republic of Botswana. circa 2005. ―The Achievement of SADC Macroeconomic  
Convergence Targets in Botswana: Performance and Policy Issues.‖ 
Commissioned by the South African Development Community.  
 
―Rising Star: A Helping Hand from the CIA.‖ May 17, 1997. ProQuest,  
New York Times (1851-2005), p.7.  
 
Ron, James. August 2005. ―Paradigm in Distress? Primary Commodities and Civil War.‖  




Rose Richard. 1991. ―Comparing Forms of Comparative Analysis.‖ Political Studies.  
Vol. 39 Pp.446-462. 
 
Ross, Michael L. 2004. ―What Do We Know About Natural Resources and Civil War?‖ 
Journal of Peace Research. Vol 41 No 3 Pp.337-356.  
  
Ross, Michael L. February 2004. ―How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War:  
Evidence from 13 Cases.‖ International Organization. Vol 58 No 1 Pp.35-67. 
 
Ross, Michael. 2003. ―Natural Resource Wealth Can Make You Poor.‖ In  
Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions.  
Ian Bannon and Paul Collier (eds). World Bank: Washington,  
DC. Pp.17-42.  
 
Ross, Michael L. 2003. ―Oil, Drugs, and Diamonds: The Varying Roles of Natural  
Resources in Civil War‖ In Karen Ballentine and J. Sherman (eds). The Political 
Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance. Lynne, Rienner: 
Boulder, CO. Pp.47-70. 
 
Ross, Michael L. April 2001. ―Does Oil Hinder Democracy?‖ World Politics. Vol 53  
Pp.325-61.  
 
Ruschemeyer, Dietrich,  Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens. 1992.  
Capitalist Development and Democracy. University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 
IL.  
 
Rustad, Siri Aas; Jan Ketil Rød; Wench Larsen; and Petter Nils Gleditsch. 2007.  
―Foilage and Fighting: Forest Resources and the Onset, Duration and Location of 
Civil War.‖ Presented at Polarization and Conflict Workshop, Palma, Mallorca, 
December.  
  
Sachs, Jeffrey D. and Andrew M. Warner. 1995. ―Natural Resource Abundance and  
Economic Growth.‖  Development Discussion Paper No. 517a, Harvard Institute 
for International Development, Cambridge, MA 
(http://www.cid.harvard.edu/hiid/517.pdf). 
 
Sartori, Giovanni (ed). 1984. Social Science Concepts: A Systematic Analysis. Sage  
Publications: Beverly Hills, CA.  
 
Saugestad, Sidsel. 2001. The Inconvenient Indigenous: Remote Area Development in  
Botswana, Donor Assistance, and the First People of the Kalahari. 




―Secretary of State on New Government in Congo.‖ CQ Press Electronic Library.  
Historic Documents Series Online Edition, hsdc97-0000036337. Originally  
published in Historic Documents in 1997 (Washington: CQ Press, 1998). 
http//library.cqpress.com/historicdocuments/hsdc97-0000036337 (accessed 
December 14, 2008).  
 
Shi, Tiajian. July 2001. ―Cultural Values and Political Trust: A Comparison of the  
People‘s Republic of China and Taiwan.‖ Comparative Politics. Vol 33 No 4 
Pp.401-419.  
 
Sizemore, Bill. September 2003. ―Pat Robertson's Right-Wing Gold Mine: The Little- 
known Tale of the Evangelist and the Dictator.‖ Ms. Magazine. 
http://www.msmagazine.com/sept03/sizemore.asp downloaded October 24, 2008.  
 
Skocpol, Theda. 1979. States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France,  
Russia, and China. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, MA.  
 
Smith, Hampton, Tim Merrill, and Sandra W. Meditz. 1994.  ―The Economy‖ In Zaire,  
A Country Study. Sandra W. Meditz and Tim Merrill (eds.). Federal Research 
Division, Library of Congress. Washington, DC. Pp.135-198.  
 
Smith, Alastair and Allan C. Stam. December 2004. ―Bargaining and the Nature of War.‖  
Journal of Conflict Resolution. Vol 48 No 6 Pp.783-813.  
 
  
Snyder, Richard and Ravi Bhavnani. August 2005. ―Diamonds, Blood, and Taxes: A  
Revenue-Centered Framework for Explaining Political Order.‖ Journal of  
Conflict Resolution. Vol 49 No 4 Pp.563-597.  
 
Stearns, Scott. July 16, 1992. ―Botswana Stands to Gain as South Africa Changes.‖  
ProQuest Historical Newspapers, Christian Science Monitor (1908 – Current file), 
p.12.  
 
Steinbeck, John. 1939. Grapes of Wrath. The Viking Press: New York,  
NY.  
 
Steinberg, James. 1996. ―Preventive Diplomacy: A Key Element in US Foreign Policy:  
An Interview with James Steinberg.‖ American Perspectives on Conflict  
Resolution: US Foreign Policy Agenda, USIA Electronic  




Stevens, Christopher and Jane Kennan. February 2005. ―Botswana Beef Exports  
and Trade Policy.‖ Institute of Development Studies. University of Sussex: 
Brighton, UK. 
 
Suhrke, Astri, Espen Villanger, and Susan Woodward. 2005. ―Economic Aid to Post-  
Conflict Countries: A Methodological Critique of Collier and Hoeffler.‖ Working 
Paper. Chr. Michelsen Institute of Development Studies and Human Rights. 
Project number 23005. Bergen, Norway.  
The Economist. June 3, 1997. ―Stored Wealth.‖ Vol 343 Issue 8015 Pp.36-37. Accession  
#9705090919.  
 
The Economist. March 15, 1997. ―The Diamond City.‖ Vol 342 Issue 8008 Pp.42-43.  
Database: Business Source Premier. Accession No 9703253646. 
 
The Economist. March 3, 1997. ―Waiting for the Rebels.‖ Vol 342 Issue 8007 Pp.43-44.  
Database: Business Source Premier. Accession No 9703253562. 
 
The Economist. November 23, 1996. ―Polls to Nowhere.‖ Vol 341 Issue 7993 Pp.20-22.  
Database: Business Source Premier. Accession No 9702251453. 
 
The Economist. February 15, 1996. ―The Coming Order.‖ Vol 342 Issue 8004 Pp.42-44.  
Database: Business Source Premier. Accession No 9611257978. 
 
The Economist. October 19, 1996. ―Death Shadows Africa‘s Great Lakes.‖ Vol 341 Issue  
7988 Pp.45-47.  
 
The Economist. November 21, 1994. ―Africa‘s Pointing Finger.‖ Vol 349  Issue  
8095 p.48.  
 
The Economist. October 14, 1994. ―Mobutu Redivivus.‖ Vol 333 Issue 7885 Pp.54-56.  
 
UN Commission on Human Rights Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the  
Democratic Republic of the Congo (former Zaire) / submitted by the Special 
Rapporteur, Roberto Garreton in accordance with Commission resolution 
1997/58, 30 January 1998. E/CN.4/1998/65. Online. UNHCR Refworld, available 
at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b0ad4.html  [accessed 8 February 
2009] 
 
Thom, William G. Fall 1999.  ―Congo-Zaire‘s 1996-97 Civil War in the Context of  
Evolving Patterns in Military Conflict in Africa in the Era of Independence.‖ 




Turner, Thomas. 1994. ―Government and Politics‖ In Zaire: A County Study. Federal  
Research Division, Library of Congress. Washington, DC. Pp.201-263.  
 
UNAIDS, UNICEF, and WHO. 2002. ―Epidemiological Fact Sheets on HIV/AIDS  
and Sexually Transmitted Infections.‖  
 
UNESCO. October 5-9, 1998. ―Higher Education in the Twenty-first Century: Vision and  
Action, Botswana.‖ World Conference on Higher Education. Volume V – 
Plenary.  
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 2003. Investment  
Policy Review: Botswana. United Nations: New York, NY and Geneva,  
Switzerland.  
 
United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs. March 21, 1997. ―Zaire: IRIN  
Briefing, Part VI, Kasai.‖ Integrated Regional Information Network for the Great 
Lakes.  
 
United Nations Development Program. 2002. ―Botswana Human Development Report  
2000.‖ Towards an Aids-Free Generation. Petadco Printing House: Gaborone, 
BW. ISBN 99912–0–355–9 
 
United Nations – Expert Panel Appointed by Secretary General. April 12, 2001. Report of  
the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other 
Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Reference 
S/2001/357.  
 
United Nations – Expert Panel Appointed by Secretary General. October 16, 2002. Final  
Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources 
and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Reference 
S/2002/1146.  
 
United Nations. October 11, 1995. ―Maintenance of International Security: Development  
 of Good-Neighborly Relations Among Balkan States.‖ Report to the Secretary- 
 General, Addendum. Fiftieth Session, Agenda Item 81.   
 
―UN Secretary General on War in the Congo.‖ CQ Press Electronic Library. Historic  
Document Series Online Edition, hsdc093-3610-181176. Originally published in 
Historic Documents of 2001 (Washington: CQ Press, 2002). 
http://library.cqpress.com/historicdocuments/hsdc01-93-3610-181176 (Accessed 




―UN Secretary General on the War in Congo." CQ Press Electronic Library, Historic  
Documents Series Online Edition, hsdc00-0000033505. Originally published in 
Historic Documents of 2000 (Washington: CQ Press, 2001). 
http://library.cqpress.com.proxy.lib.utk.edu:90/historicdocuments/hsdc00-
0000033505 (accessed February 7, 2009). 
 
―UN Secretary Annan on the War in Congo.‖ CQ Press Electronic Library, Historic  
Documents Series Online Edition hsdc99-0000038527. Originally published in 
Historic Documents of 1999 (Washington: CQ Press, 2000). 
http://libary.cqupress.com/historicdocuments/hsdc99-0000038527 (accessed 
December 14, 2008).  
United Nations Human Rights Committee. March 26, 1986. ―DRC: Views of the Human
 Rights Committee Under Article 5, paragraph 4 of the Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Right.‖ Twenty-seventh session. 
Communication No. 138/1983: CCPR/C/27/D/138/1983.  
 
US Census Bureau, International Database. Queried June 2, 2008. Table 10: Total  
Midyear Population.  
 
U.S. Census Bureau, International Database. Queried June 2, 2008. Table 10: Infant  
Mortality Rates & Life Expectancy at Birth, by Sex. Washington, DC.  
 
US Central Intelligence Agency, US. 1973-1997. Maps of Zaire. Accessed through the  
University of Texas Libraries, Perry-Costaneda Library Map Collection.  
 
USGS, Alluvial Diamond Mining Project. Downloaded June 4, 2008. ―What is Alluvial  
Mining?‖ 
http://geology.er.usgs.gov/eespteam/diamondproject/alluvialmining.htm. Reston, 
VA.   
 
USGS. January 1996. ―Minerals Commodity Survey.‖ Reston, VA.   
 
US Department of State. Downloaded December 2008. ―Background Notes: Rwanda.‖  
Washington, DC.  
 
US Department of State. February 26, 1999. ―Democratic Republic of Congo Country  
Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998.‖ Released by the Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. 
www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1998_hrp_report/congodr.html. 
Washington, DC.  
 
US Department of State. February 1995. ―Zaire Human Rights Practices, 1994.‖  
Washington, DC.  
245 
 
US Government Printing Office. April 1987. ―Visit of Zaire's president - Mobutu Sese  
Seko remarks made by President Reagan and President Mobutu after meeting on 
Dec. 9, 1986.‖ In US Department of State Bulletin. 2004 Gale Group. Ref: 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1079/is_v87/ai_4991192. 
 
US International Trade Administration. April 1991. ―Overseas Business Report  
(NTDB): Zaire 1992.‖ University of Missouri, Saint Louis Government 
Document. #OBR910400.  
 
US Social Security Administration, Office of Policy. 2007. ―Social Security  
Programs Throughout the World: Africa.‖ Washington, DC.  
 
Verdeja, Ernesto. 2002. ―On Genocide: Five Contributing Factors.‖ Contemporary  
Politics. Vol 8 No 1 Pp.37-54.  
 
Walker, Sam. April 29, 1994. ―In Boston Jubilant South Africans Cast First Votes  
for Democracy.‖ ProQuest Historical Newspapers (1908-Current file), Christian 
Science Monitor, p.3.  
 
Wallerstein, Immanuel and Terrence K. Hopkins with Robert Bach, et. al. 1982. World  
Systems Analysis: Theory and Methodology. Sage Publications: Beverly Hills, 
CA.  
 
Wallis, William. October 20, 1996. ―Ethnic Tutsi Rebels, Zairian Troops Clash: 28  
Reported Killed: Ailing Mobutu Remains in Switzerland.‖ The Washington Post, 
p.A28. 
 
Waltz, Kenneth. 1979. Theory of International Politics. McGraw-Hill. New York, NY.  
 
Weinstein, Jeremy. August 2005. ―Resources and the Information Problem in Rebel  
Recruitment.‖ Journal of Conflict Resolution. Vol 49 No 4 Pp.598-624.  
 
Weber, Max. 1965. ―Essays on Bureaucracy‖ In Bureaucratic Power in National Politics.  
Francis E. Rourke (ed). Pp.3-13.  
 
Weber, Max. 1949. ―Objective Possibilities and Adequate Causation in Historical  
Explanation‖ In The Methodology of Social Sciences. Translated by Henry Finch 
and Edward Shils. Pp.164-188;272, 278.  
 
Werbner, Richard. 2004. Reasonable Radicals and Citizenship in Botswana: the Public  




Wrong, Michela. 2000. In the Footsteps of Mr. Kutz: Living on the Brink of Disaster in 






Kimberly Lynn Douglass is a native of Jackson, Tennessee. She graduated from 
Tennessee State University with a liberal arts degree in 1995 and a Masters of Public 
Administration in 1997. She began her professional life in Nashville, Tennessee, working 
as an analyst for the Tennessee State Comptroller and the Tennessee Department of 
Environment and Conservation. In 2002, she left Nashville to attend the University of 
Tennessee. She received her Ph.D. in political science in May 2009. She worked as an 
instructor of record at the University of Tennessee from 2003 to 2007. She is currently a 
visiting lecturer at Tennessee Technological University.  
 
Dr. Douglass is married to Edward Tate and has one son, Jackson Douglass-Tate.  
 
 
 
